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Abstract 
Contingent valuation is a non-market valuation technique which elicits preference 
data from participants by asking them to value a change in the provision of a specific 
good or service, contingent on the specifications outlined in a hypothetical market 
scenario. A commonly observed feature of CV results is a significant and pervasive 
disparity that develops between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures 
of value. While these two measures should theoretically produce the same value 
estimate for a particular good, with the exception of a small difference due to the 
income effect, this is not the case in a majority of the experimental CV literature. This 
WTA-WTP disparity is the focus of this thesis‘ investigation, which aims to offer a 
more accurate understanding of the phenomenon. 
This thesis provides a detailed review of past research experiments investigating the 
WTA-WTP gap, identifying two main alternate explanations for the disparity: one 
which explains the discrepancy as resulting from flaws in the methodological design 
of the CV experiments (weak experimental design) and one which suggests the gap is 
caused the fact that people place a higher value on a good they own than an identical 
good they do not own (endowment effect theory). 
To assess the legitimacy of each of these two explanations, this thesis presents an 
experimental investigation into the WTA-WTP gap, where a basic CV survey is 
design and then used to elicit preference data from participants for organic cotton. 
The experimental design includes six CV surveys, all of which are fundamentally 
identical except for small specific alterations, which will allow valuation results to be 
compared across survey groups in an attempt to isolate the effect that the specified 
survey design features have on valuation estimates. Two of the surveys collect WTP 
and WTA data from participants under a binding condition where the average 
valuation stated by the group would determine a binding monetary outcome for all of 
the participants. Two further surveys collect WTP and WTA data from participants 
where no binding monetary outcome is specified (i.e. purely hypothetical), and the 
final two treatment groups are asked to estimate the WTP and WTA of the binding 
groups, rather than provide their own personal value estimates. The core comparisons 
possible between these survey designs include: assessing whether a WTA-WTP gap 
is observed even when controlling for features of weak experimental design, 
assessing how the hypothetical nature of a CV experiment impacts on the valuation 
results, and whether participants are able to provide an unbiased estimate of others‘ 
preferences. 
Data was collected from 178 participants with between 27 and 31 respondents 
involved in each of the six survey groups. The data was then analysed using SPSS to 
test whether there were significant differences between the valuation estimates 
collected from the different participant groups.  
The results of the experiment found that the WTA-WTP gap is caused by the 
endowment effect rather than weak experimental design, that hypothetical and 
binding treatments do not differ significantly in terms of valuation estimates, and that 
participants are able to provide unbiased estimates of others‘ preferences, so long as 
they are not first asked to state their own preferences. 
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Glossary of Terms 
Contingent Valuation A stated preference methodology which aims to 
measure changes in welfare by describing a 
hypothetical situation to respondents and then 
eliciting how much they would be willing to pay 
either to obtain or to avoid a situation 
Direct-Use value Where individuals make actual use of the resource 
for either commercial purposes or recreation  
Economic Value The monetary measure of wellbeing associated with 
the change in the provision of some good. The term 
‗economic value‘ and ‗welfare change‘ can be used 
interchangeably  
Environmental Valuation The procedure of valuing changes in an 
environmental good and service by measuring the 
changes in the producer and consumer surpluses 
associated with the environmental good. 
Hedonic Pricing Method A methodology which uses market price data to 
estimate the empirical relationship between the 
price of a good (e.g. housing) and the characteristics 
of that good (e.g. number of bedrooms, air quality, 
proximity to amenities, etc.). Through regression 
analysis, a estimated monetary value can be placed 
on each of the good‘s attributes.  
Hypothetical Bias The possibility that estimates of WTP and WTA 
may be biased due to the hypothetical nature of the 
payment commitment in stated preference surveys  
Incentive Compatibility The quality of a valuation mechanism in which 
truth-telling and utility maximisation coincide. An 
incentive compatible elicitation technique will 
remove any incentive for participants to employ 
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strategic bargaining techniques, and ensure that 
answering truthfully is in the respondent‘s best 
interest. 
Meta-Analysis A statistical procedure where a number of empirical 
studies are used as inputs to a wider study that aims 
to explain the variability in the outcomes of the 
individual studies. 
Opportunity Costs The opportunity cost of choosing option A is the 
highest value a productive resource such as labour, 
capital, land or a natural resource could return if 
placed in the best alternative, option B. Opportunity 
cost is sometimes defined simply as ‗what is given 
up to gain something else‘. 
Passive-use goods The value placed on a resource by people who are 
not current users of that resource and who do not 
intend to use the resource themselves  
Protest Bid A response to a valuation question which does not 
give the respondent‘s genuine WTP (or WTA), but 
either a zero value or an unrealistically high (or 
low) value 
Starting Point Bias A bias present in some elicitation techniques where 
the final stated value of a participant shows 
dependence on the starting value point defined in 
the elicitation exercise  
Strategic Bargaining A feature of a non-incentive compatible valuation 
mechanism, where respondents have an incentive to 
either understate or overstate their true WTP or 
WTA in order to influence the outcome of the 
experiment. 
  xiii 
Total Economic Value Total economic value of an environmental resource 
is made up of i) use values and ii) non-use values. 
Use values are composed of a) direct use value, b) 
indirect use value and c) option value, whilst non-
use values are made up of a) altruistic values, and b) 
existence values and c) bequest values 
Willingness to Accept The amount of monetary compensation an 
individual demands to forgo provision of a good or 
to accept the loss of a good. 
Willingness to Pay The amount of money an individual is willing to 
pay to obtain a good or to avoid the loss of a good. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a survey-based nonmarket-
valuation technique which has been used to estimate the economic value of a wide 
variety of goods and services, from the forests of Spain (Soliño, Prada, & 
Vázquez, 2010) to the opportunity to reduce one‘s risk of developing cancer (W. 
Adamowicz, Dupont, Krupnick, & Zhang, 2011). However, like all non-market 
valuation techniques, the CVM is not refined to a perfect science, and there is still 
much debate in the literature about how a CV experiment should be designed, and 
whether the technique is theoretically capable of estimating the true economic 
value of a good. 
Critics of the CVM have often pointed to the significant disparity that 
exists between the willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) 
measures of value, as evidence that the methodology is unable to produce 
meaningful results. The WTA measure of value is collected when participants are 
asked to state how much compensation they would demand to give up a particular 
good, while the WTP measure asks participants how much they would be willing 
to pay to gain a good. According to standard economic theory, these two value 
measures should be about equal. However, significant disparities, unable to be 
explained by current economic theory, are persistent throughout the CV literature, 
and critics often cite this WTA-WTP disparity as evidence that the CVM is 
flawed by suggesting the disparity is caused by weak experimental design. 
However, proponents of the CVM argue that the WTA-WTP gap may instead 
indicate a fundamental upwards shift in the value that participants place on a good 
once they own the good. 
The CVM has also been criticised in regards to the hypothetical nature of 
this survey technique. Some economists argue that a hypothetical bias would be 
present is CV experiments, leading to inaccurate valuation results since what 
people say they will do (i.e. how much they say they would be willing to pay) may 
not always reflect what they will actually do.  
 
To assess the impact that individual design components on a CV survey 
have on valuation result, researchers often construct and run simple experiments 
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involving goods such as mugs or pens in an effort to isolate the effect of 
differences in survey design. 
 The research detailed in this thesis involves a CV experiment which has 
been specifically designed to assess the impact that particular survey design 
elements have on the valuation data. The design elements which are the primary 
focus of this experiment include: 1) the initial allocation of property rights for the 
good being valued, and the way in which the elicitation questions are phrased (i.e. 
WTP or WTA), and 2) the hypothetical nature of the experiment (i.e. do 
participant‘s decisions have binding monetary outcomes or are they purely 
hypothetical). 
These survey design elements were chosen to be the focus of this thesis 
because there has been a great deal of experimental testing of these design 
elements, but disagreement still remains regarding their effects on valuation 
estimates.  
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
1) Investigation of the Endowment Effect 
This first research objective that this thesis aims to achieve is an 
understanding of whether the commonly observed WTA-WTP disparity is simply 
the result of the methodology itself (weak experimental design) or whether the 
difference indicates a true difference in participants‘ preference towards the good 
depending on how the elicitation question is phrased (endowment effect). 
Furthermore, if the WTA-WTP disparity is indeed the result of an endowment 
effect, where participants endowed with the good place a higher value on that 
good simply because they own it, then this research aims to separate this effect 
into its two components: parting disutility, also known as loss aversion, and 
unanticipated ownership utility. To separate these two effects, the methodology of 
this research will follow an experimental design presented by Loewenstein and 
Adler (1995), who uses estimated WTA and actual WTA and WTP to calculate 
the proportion of the WTA-WTP gap caused by unanticipated ownership utility. 




a) Does a significant WTA-WTP disparity emerge in a CV experiment even 
when controlling for features of weak experimental design? 
b) Are individuals who are not endowed with a good able to anticipate the 
magnitude of the endowment effect experienced by participants who are 
endowed with the good? 
 
2) Investigation of a Hypothetical Bias  
The second feature of CV design that this thesis will address, involves 
investigating how the hypothetical nature of a contingent valuation experiment 
impacts on the valuation estimates of participants, and also to assess whether a 
hypothetical bias contributes to the WTA-WTP disparity. To investigate these 
points, two more research questions are posed: 
c) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce significantly different 
valuation results to those obtained from an identical experiment where 
participants‘ decisions have a binding monetary consequence? 
 
d) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce a significantly 
different WTA-WTP gap than an identical experiment with a binding 
monetary consequence 
 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
The structure of this thesis is as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 will provide a detailed look at the Contingent Valuation 
literature focusing on investigations into the WTA-WTP disparity. This literature 
review will begin by introducing the concept of a non-market valuation technique, 
such as the CVM, explaining why these techniques are of significant important, 
and how they actually measure the economic value of goods without having to 
rely on functional market prices. Next, the process of designing a contingent 
valuation experiment will be looked at in detail, since the experiment this thesis is 
based around will adopt this methodological approach. After the CV design 
process is reviewed, the two measures of value which can be elicited through this 
methodology – WTP and WTA – will be analysed to determine that these 
measures are actually trying to quantify. Following this, the WTA-WTP disparity 
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will be introduced, and the main explanations for this disparity will be addressed: 
weak experimental design, the substitutability effect, and the endowment effect. 
Lastly, the importance of understanding the true nature of the disparity will be 
addressed. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe the methodology that was used in this thesis‘ 
investigation of the four research questions detailed previously. This chapter 
provide an overview of the experimental design and also construct a number of 
hypotheses that the experiment aims to answer. Next, construction of the survey 
design will be described, paying particular attention to the differences between the 
six sets of surveys involved in the experiment. Following this, the data collection 
process will be reviewed, looking at how participants were collected, and how the 
experimental CV procedure was conducted. 
 
Chapter 4 will provide the findings and discussion of this thesis, looking 
firstly at the quality and distribution of the various data sets collected during the 
experiment. Next, finding related to identification of the WTA-WTP gap will be 
presented, followed by a deconstruction of the disparity into unanticipated 
ownership utility and parting disutility. Following this, results will be presented to 
assess the impact that the hypothetical nature of the CV experiment had on the 
valuation results collected from participants. Lastly, biases in prediction results 
will be compared across the different treatment groups to determine whether these 
groups of participants are able to produce unbiased estimates of other participant‘s 
WTP or WTA. 
 
Chapter 5 will provide some concluding remarks regarding the findings of 








Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The first principal detailed in Mankiw‘s (2007) book Principles of 
Economics [Fourth Edition] states that ―making decisions requires trading off one 
goal against another‖ (p.4). Whether it is a university student deciding how to 
allocate their time between socialising and studying, or a manager considering the 
cost of purchasing a new piece of machinery, all decisions involve a trade off. 
Acknowledging this trade off and having a clear understanding of what is being 
sacrificed is important for good decision making because ―people are likely to 
make good decisions only if they understand the options that they have available‖ 
(Mankiw, 2007, p. 5). 
In a market-based economic system, the price level of goods and services 
plays a crucial role in determining the appropriate allocation of resources in the 
economy through the concept of an invisible hand. Firms ―decide whom to hire 
and what to make... [and] households decide which firms to work for and what to 
buy with their income‖, using price levels and self-interest as the guiding factors 
behind their choices (Mankiw, 2007, p. 9). Market economies, though based on 
the activities of self-interested decision makers, ―have proven remarkably 
successful at organising economic activity in a way that promotes overall 
economic well-being‖ (Mankiw, 2007, p. 9). 
However, sometimes decision making involves goods and services that do 
not have any kind of market price associated with them, and this makes it difficult 
for consumers, producers, and policymakers to make efficient decisions regarding 
these products. Policy makers in particular rely heavily on cost-benefit analysis to 
determine which policy design would offer the most in terms of benefits to society 
for the least cost (Bateman et al., 2002). If a policy decision involves non-market 
goods or services, such as improving the water quality of a particular lake or 
expanding a national park, then it is difficult for decision makers to weigh the 
costs against the benefits since the benefits of any decision are often intangible. 
With no monetary value associated the outcomes of such a policy, choosing once 
course of action over another, and justifying this decision, can be very difficult. 
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This issue of decision making and price availability was concisely expressed by 
Brown, Peterson, and Tonn: 
Congressional legislation emphasises that public resource 
allocation should reflect the values citizens assign to those resources. 
Yet, information about assigned values and preferences of members of 
the public, including economic measures of value, required by decision 
makers is often incomplete or unavailable (1995, p. 250). 
One of the core goals of environmental economics is to assign monetary 
values ―to non-market goods and services, where the monetary values have 
particular and precise meanings‖ (Bateman et al., 2002). Attaching such a value to 
these non-market goods and services allows decision makers to compare the 
outcomes of policy decisions in monetary terms, insuring that the most efficient 
decision is made. There is a significant amount of literature which investigates 
and critiques the various methodologies underlying this valuation process, as well 
as many research papers which put these techniques into practice. 
This literature review begins (section 2.2) with an overview of the 
different approaches that can be taken to environmental-valuation broadly 
categorised as either revealed preference or stated preference techniques. Section 
2.3 will look at the process of constructing a contingent valuation experiment, 
outlining the critical design components, and how the methodology can be tested 
for validity and reliability. Section 2.4 will look closely at the two different 
measures of value used in contingent valuation experiments, willingness to pay 
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), and what these measures actually 
quantify. This will lead on to section 2.5 which introduces the concept of the 
WTA-WTP gap and the conventional explanation for the disparity known as the 
income effect. Following this, three alternative explanations for the WTA-WTP 
gap will be introduced and examined: (2.6) weak experimental design, (2.7) the 
substitutability hypothesis and (2.8) the endowment effect. Section 2.9 will 
provide justification as to why studying the true nature of the WTA-WTP gap is 
important for non-market valuation.  
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2.2 Introduction to Non-Market Valuation  
This section of the literature review will explain the need for economic valuation 
of non-market goods and services, and will also introduce two of the most 
prominent methodologies for valuing such effects.  
2.2.1 The Need for Non-Market Valuation Techniques 
All decisions involve making a choice and all choices involve a sacrifice of some 
kind. If option A is chosen then option B cannot be, ―if only because the resources 
allocated to A cannot now be allocated to B‖ (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 2). There 
are many ways that decisions can be made, and trying to assess which choice is 
best can be very complicated, even for decisions which at first glance may seem 
simple. Bateman et al. (2002) use the example of alternative ways to save 
people‘s lives to demonstrate the complexity of decision making tasks. 
Suppose there are two alternative strategies which will save human 
lives, both of which will cost the same amount of money to implement. 
Option A is expected to save 100 lives, while option B is expected to 
save 50 lives. Choosing option A over option B appears to be the best 
decision because it will save more lives. However, the question must 
then be asked: are all lives equal? Some may argue that saving the life 
of an infant if more valuable than saving the life of an elderly person, 
so different lives may need to be weighted to reflect this. If option A 
was to save the lives of 100 elderly people and option B was to save 
the lives of 50 infants, then choosing which of the two alternatives is 
best may not be as simple as previously thought. If society placed a 
higher value on the lives of the 50 infants, then option B may now be 
considered the superior strategy (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 2). 
Bateman et al.‘s life-saving example demonstrates how the value which society 
places on a particular non-market effect, in this case the age of a life to be saved, 
can impact on what decision should be made.  
Comparing two alternative courses of action involving environmental goods, such 
as national parks, can also be problematic because these goods often hold 
recreation and intrinsic value which is not typically measured in monetary terms. 
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For example, suppose policy makers were choosing between option A, which 
would restore 100 hectares of forest, and Option B, which would restore 50 
hectares of forest. Assuming both options cost the same amount of money to 
implement, it would appear option A offers the most value to society since it 
would restore twice as much forest as the alternative. However, if option B would 
restore 50 hectares of forest located in an area easily accessible to hikers and 
campers, while option A would restore 100 hectares of forest inaccessible to such 
recreational users, then option B might now be considered to offer the most value 
to society. 
In both of the above example, deciding which of the two options offers the 
greatest benefit to society should not be based solely on how many lives are saved 
or how much forest is restored, but the value that society would place on those 
changes. However, these non-market effects often do not have any measure of 
value associated with them, and are therefore difficult to incorporate into decision 
making tasks. Environmental valuation aims to fill this information gap by 
measuring the economic value that society places on these non-market goods and 
services. This allows decision makers to weigh the true costs and benefits of 
alternative strategies more accurately, resulting in a more efficient allocation of 
resources and greater benefits to society (Bateman et al., 2002). 
The terms non-market valuation and environmental valuation are closely related, 
but are not identical concepts. Non-market valuation is the process of estimating 
an economic value for a good (or an attribute of a good) based on the preferences 
of society in a way that does not require the presence of tradition market functions 
(e.g. buying and selling). Environmental valuation on the other hand, is the non-
market valuation of environmental goods or services. Despite being slightly 
different concepts, the two terms are sometimes used interchangeable throughout 
the following literature review. 
2.2.2 What is Non-Market Valuation? 
According to Lipton, Wellman, Sheifer, Weiher, and NOAA ―environmental 
valuation is a series of techniques that economists use to assess the economic 
value of market and non-market goods‖ (1995, p. 16). The ―term value in 
economics has a precise definition — it is the price individuals are willing to pay 
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in order to obtain a good or service‖, not to be confused with monetary value 
which is the price individuals are actually required to pay (Lipton et al., 1995, p. 
9). A ―fundamental distinction between the way economics and other disciplines 
such as ecology use the term value is the economic emphasis on human 
preferences‖ (Lipton et al., 1995, p. 10). If people prefer one item over another, 
then that item is considered to be more valuable. By analysing the preferences of 
an individual towards a non-market good, or even individual attributes of a good, 
it is possible to estimate their willingness to pay (WTP), and therefore the value 
that they place on the good. 
Through econometric analysis of consumer preference data collected using the 
methods outlined below, it is possible to estimate the economic value (i.e. their 
WTP) that society places on non-market goods and services such as outdoor 
recreation areas, wildlife, improvements in health, and many more. The ability to 
attach an economic value to a good or service which does not automatically have 
such a value assigned to it, can allow politicians to efficiently allocate capital into 
projects that generate the most welfare to society, and allow market research 
companies to design products that best cater to the demands of the consumer 
(Merino, 2003).  
2.2.3 Revealed Preference and Stated Preference Techniques 
Consumer preferences can be elicited using either Revealed Preference (RP) or 
Stated Preference (SP) techniques (Merino, 2003). The revealed preference 
approach uses existing ―behavioural data to estimate the ex post willingness to pay 
[of consumers] for various commodities‖, and includes techniques such as the 
travel cost method and the hedonic pricing method (Whitehead, Pattanayak, Van 
Houtven, & Gelso, 2008, p. 873). Revealed preference methodologies rely on 
observations of the past behaviour of individuals and are therefore limited to 
valuing goods for which some kind of use or price data is already available. 
The stated preference approach however, uses ―hypothetical data to estimate ex 
ante willingness to pay for various commodities‖, and includes the contingent 
valuation method the choice experiment method, and the contingent ranking 
method, among others (Whitehead et al., 2008, p. 873). These stated preference 
techniques directly measures the preferences of participants by asking them 
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directly how much they would be willing to pay for the provision or a good 
(contingent valuation), or by asking them to choose their most preferred option 
(choice experiment) or rank (contingent ranking) carefully crafted alternative 
product options which range in attribute qualities and price (Bateman et al., 2002, 
p. 21). These SP techniques do not require any existing behavioural data from 
individuals, and can therefore be utilised for a wide variety of applications, such 
as assessing demand for products which do not yet exist (Carson, 1989). 
To compare how revealed preference and stated preference techniques differ on a 
fundamental level, the travel cost method (RP) and the contingent valuation 
method (SP) will now be introduced. 
2.2.3.1 The Travel Cost Method 
The travel cost method (TCM) is mostly used ―for estimating the benefits 
of access to natural areas for tourism and recreation‖ such as lakes and national 
parks (Driml, 2002, p. 12). Since most natural recreation areas do not charge an 
access fee (and if they do the fee is often minimal) no traditional market exists 
where the benefits of the resource can be valued in terms of the price that people 
would be willing pay to access them. The TCM uses the cost of travelling to a 
particular recreation area, and the time-costs associated with the trip, as a 
substitute for the price that people pay to gain the benefits of the site (Lipton et 
al., 1995). 
Researchers adopting the travel cost methodology must collect data from 
individuals on the number of trips they takes to various recreation sites each year, 
the distance they travel to get there, as well as their primary motivation for going 
to each site (e.g. tramping, relaxation, hunting and fishing, ect). By ―observing the 
characteristics of individuals visiting the site - for example, the specific attributes 
of their trip to and from the site as well as the total number of visits - economists 
are able to estimate the ‗derived demand‘ for the site‖ (Lipton et al., 1995, p. 43). 
The researcher then needs to isolate the attributes of the recreation site that they 
wish to value, and measure the level of each attribute at each recreation area. 
These attributes may be the quality of scenery, the amount of wildlife in the area, 




Once the appropriate data is collected, the researcher can then compare the 
demand function for the different recreation areas against the varying levels of 
benefit attained at each location. Using a random utility model, willingness to pay 
estimates can then be derived for the different site attributes (Shaw, 2005). See 
Anderson (2010) for an demonstration of the TCM being used to estimate the 
demand for ice climbing in Hyalite Canyon, Montana, or Bestard and Font (2009) 
who use the TCM to assess how environmental diversity influences which forests 
people in Spain choose to visit. 
2.2.3.2 Contingent Valuation Method 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) ―is a survey or questionnaire-based 
approach to the valuation of non-market goods and services... [which derives] 
values through the elicitation of respondents‘ willingness-to-pay to prevent 
injuries to natural resources or to restore injured natural resources‖, though the 
method is not limited to just environmental goods (Lipton et al., 1995, p. 50). The 
CVM is a stated preference technique since it directly asks respondents how much 
they would be willing to pay to gain or improve a particular good, and therefore 
does not rely or require any existing behavioural data. 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) elicits preference data directly from 
individuals who are placed within a carefully designed hypothetical market 
scenario (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). The scenario describes the good or service 
being valued, defines an initial level of provision, a proposed change in provision, 
and the conditions under which the change would provided or withheld. The 
respondents are then asked how much they would be willing to pay for the 
increase (WTP), or how much they would need to be paid in compensation to 
accept a decrease (WTA) in the level of the good. There are other measures of 
value which can be elicited using the CVM, but these will be examined in greater 
detail later in the literature review. This WTP or WTA data can then be used to 
derive the total economic gain (or loss) of the proposed change under analysis. 
See Du Preez, Tessendorf, and Hosking (2010) for an application of the CVM 




2.2.4 Critique of the Revealed Preference Approach 
Revealed preference valuation techniques have several shortfalls which stated 
preference methods, such as contingent valuation, aim to avoid. Firstly, ―revealed-
preference methods involve econometric problems that have yet to be fully 
overcome... The travel cost method, for example, encounters as yet unresolved 
problems associated with how to value time spent in travel and at the recreation 
site, how to treat trips with several destinations..., and other such problems‖ 
(Bishop & Romano, 1998, p. 5). 
Bishop and Romano (1998) also suggest that even if these econometric issues 
were solved, the fundamental process involved in collected revealed preference 
data would still provide only a partial measure of the true value of a non-market 
good (p.5). For example, it may be possible to capture the increase in recreation 
value of a lake after an improvement in its water quality through the travel cost 
method. However, this would not include the increased aesthetic value observed 
by people driving past the lake on their way to work each morning. Furthermore, 
―revealed-preference methods are particularly limited in addressing ‗non-use‘ or 
‗passive use‘ values‖ which originate from human preference for nature, unrelated 
to personal use of the environmental good itself (Bishop & Romano, 1998, p. 5). 
Another limitation of RP techniques is that they rely on observations of how 
people behave in relation to the good being valued (e.g. their travelling behaviour 
utilised in the TCM), and are thus limited to valuing goods for which this 
information is already available. Revealed preference techniques are therefore 
unable to measure the expected economic value of newly developed goods, 
services, or unique environmental restoration policies.  
The major benefit of RP methodologies, which is also its main shortfall, is 
that these techniques use actual behaviour rather than stated behaviour as the 
foundation for their valuation (as in SP techniques), and some economists argue 
that actual observed behaviour is the superior indicator of people‘s true 
preferences (Kahn & Tice, 1973).  consider that ―perhaps we can most easily 
glean the truth in what we see people actually doing, not from listening to what 
they say they will do (p. 183). However other authors, such as Wardman (1988), 
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have found evidence to suggest stated behaviour is a ―reasonably accurate guide 
to true underlying preferences‖  (p.71). 
 
2.2.5 Critique of the Stated Preference Approach 
The main criticism of the SP approach is that ―individuals‘ stated 
preferences may not correspond closely to their actual preference... because of 
systematic bias in SP responses... or because of difficulty in carrying out the SP 
task‖ (Wardman, 1988, p. 71). This criticism is based on the fact that RP 
techniques elicit preferences from participants in a hypothetical market 
environment, often using valuation mechanisms which are unfamiliar and 
potentially confusing to respondents. The hypothetical nature of all stated 
preference techniques, along with specific issues related to the various 
methodologies within this framework may create a systematic bias in respondent‘s 
answers so that the valuation does not reflect their true preferences.  
For example, in a hypothetical contingent valuation scenario participants 
may be asked how much they would be willing to pay for a specific improvement 
in an environmental amenity. Since the participants are aware that the payment is 
purely hypothetical, they may be expected to overstate their true WTP for the 
change in an attempt to appear more generous (Bryan & Jowett, 2009), 
Furthermore, it is possible that participants may simply not put enough thought 
into their decisions, since they feel their choices do not have any real impact or 
meaning. Therefore, the hypothetical nature of SP techniques may need to 
inaccurate estimates of respondents‘ true WTP. 
The second point which was raised by Wardman (1988) is that participants 
involved in SP experiments may find it difficult to provide an accurate 
representation of their true preference because of the unfamiliar and potentially 
confusing nature of the experimental market that they are placed in. Contingent 
valuation is more prone to this kind of error than other SP techniques such as 
choice experiments, especially if the scenario is considered unrealistic or 
confusing (see section 2.6). If the hypothetical market environment described in a 
CV experiment lacks realism, then participants may find it difficult to reveal their 
true preferences (Plott & Zeiler, 2005).  
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Surveys used for SP experiments are also vulnerable to response effects, 
where small changes in the wording of questions or the ordering or choices can 
sometimes cause significant changes in survey responses (Schuman & Presse, 
1981). In contingent valuation for example, a response effect known as the 
starting point bias is sometimes observed when a bidding-game elicitation 
mechanisms is used, which creates a correlation between the level of the first bid 
amount and the final bid amount (Onwujekwe & Nwagbo, 2002). 
The main benefit of stated preference techniques is that the ―models are 
capable of measuring a full range of values, including so called passive use or 
non-use values, as they do not rely on the observation of actual behaviour‖ (Du 
Preez et al., 2010, pp. 136-137). Despite the many limitations of the stated 
preference approach to environmental valuation, the methodology has become 
increasingly popular due to its wide range of applications, and many economists 
and behavioural philologists are working to refine and improve the various 
techniques (Bateman et al., 2002). 
In the following section the contingent valuation method (CVM) of non-
market valuation will be analysed in further detail, providing an overview of the 
process involved in designing a CV experiment, and methods for testing the 






2.3 Designing a Contingent Valuation Experiment 
Placing a monetary value on the cost of pollution, the aesthetic and 
recreational value of a national park, or improvement in the water quality of a lake 
is a cornerstone of the economic approach to the environment (Hanemann, 1994). 
However, functional markets rarely exist for these types of environmental goods, 
so researchers have developed various methods of non-market valuation, most of 
which are based on the preferences of the population. Contingent valuation (CV) 
is one such method, categorised as a stated preference technique, which aims 
value non-market goods by collecting preference data from individuals through 
their response to valuation questions which are contingent on a particular 
hypothetical scenario. At the heart of any CV survey is the ‗scenario‘ which 
describes ―the attributes of the good or service to be valued and specifies the 
conditions under which respondents are to decide how much, if anything, they 
would be willing to pay for the good or service described‖ (Bishop & Romano, 
1998, pp. 3-4). Contingent valuation ―circumvents the absence of markets for 
public goods by presenting consumers with hypothetical markets in which they 
have the opportunity to buy [or sell] the good in question‖ (Carson, 1989, pp. 2-
3). 
This section will begin with a brief overview of contingent valuation, 
followed by an examination of the important design components involved in a 
contingent valuation experiment, which include: (1) designing the hypothetical 
market scenario, (2) choosing an elicitation mechanism, and (3) collecting 
characteristics data from participants. Lastly, the techniques used to assess the 
validity and reliability of valuation estimates elicited through the CVM will be 
introduced. 
It is important to note that this review will not provide a comprehensive 
examination of the CV process in its entirety, but will rather focus on the 
particular design aspects important in constructing a CV experiment. Since the 
focus of this thesis is on the WTA-WTP gap rather than the process of calculating 
welfare gains or losses, reviewing the entire valuation process from experimental 
design to data-analysis would be largely irrelevant. For a full understanding of the 
process involved in defining a CV experiment, and measuring welfare changes 
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using CV data, see Carson, 1989; Bishop and Romano, 1998; Bateman et al., 
2002. 
2.3.1 Overview of the Contingent Valuation Method 
Though resource-economist Ciriacy-Wantrup suggested using a direct 
interview method for valuing nonmarket natural resources as early as 1947, the 
first clear example of contingent valuation was used by Robert K. Davis in the 
1960s when he used questionnaires to estimate the benefits of outdoor recreation 
in a backwoods area of Maine (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). The CVM has been 
used by many researchers over the past few decades to place monetary values on 
goods which cannot be valued through traditional market functions (i.e. price 
levels).  
Bateman et al. (2002) explain the nature of economic valuation through 
the contingent valuation method (CVM) in terms of measuring the benefits and 
costs associated with the gain or loss of a particular non-market good. These 
benefits and costs are defined by an individual‘s personal preference towards the 
non-market good and their unique set of indifference curves.  
An individual receives a benefit whenever he receives 
something in return for which he is willing to giving up something else 
that he values..., [while] an individual incurs a cost whenever she 
gives something that she would willingly give up only if she was given 
something else that she valued as compensation. 
     (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 16) 
To determine how large the benefit is that an individual gains from 
receiving a good or service, Bateman et al. recommends measuring how much he 
or she is willing to pay to receive that good or service, known as their willingness 
to pay or WTP (2002, p.16). To determine the cost of giving up a good or service, 
it is suggested to measure the monetary compensation that an individual demands 
so that they are indifferent between retaining the good or service and the receiving 
the compensation rate. The level of compensation required by the individual is 
known as their willingness to accept, or WTA. Further detail regarding these two 
different measures of value can be found in section 2.4.1. 
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Estimating the true maximum amount of money a person is willing to pay 
to receive a good, gives an indication of the total benefit that person expects to 
gain from the good in terms of changes in their personal utility (Bateman et al., 
2002). Collecting valuation estimates from a representative sample of a 
population, assuming the data is a true reflection of the sample‘s preference 
towards the good, provides an measure of the total benefit to the population that 
provision of the non-market good would create.  
Because the CVM elicits valuation data from participants within a 
hypothetical market, rather than an authentic functional market, the design of the 
hypothetical scenario and the processes used to collect the valuation data are 
critical. Unrealistic or confusing market structures, or elicitation questions which 
create a bias in participant‘s responses, will produce valuation estimates which do 
not reflect the true value people place on the non-market good. Any conclusions 
based on biased WTA or WTP estimates will be inaccurate 
The closer the contingent valuation experiment mimics real market 
processes, the closer the respondent‘s stated WTP should be to their true WTP 
(Carson, 1989). What follows is a description of how researchers design a 
contingent valuation experiment, with the intention of collecting unbiased WTA 
or WTP values from participants. 
 
2.3.2 Designing a Contingent Valuation Experiment 
Contingent valuation (CV) uses ―survey questions to elicit people‘s 
preferences for public goods [or any non-market goods] by finding out how much 
they would be willing to pay for specific improvements them‖, or how much they 
would need to be compensated for the loss of a particular good (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989, p. 2). These willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept 
(WTA) values can be elicited using a variety of methods, though all techniques 
involve three key procedures (Mitchell & Carson, 1989): (1) Designing a 
hypothetical market model, (2) eliciting WTA or WTP data from participants, and 
(3) collecting characteristics data from respondents. 
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2.3.2.1 Creating a Hypothetical Market Model 
The researcher must construct a hypothetical yet detailed and plausible 
market model, which is read aloud to the respondent or communicated through an 
easy to understand description. The market model should describe the ―good 
which is being valued, the baseline level of provision, the structure under which 
the good is provided, the range of available substitutes, and the method of 
payment‖ (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 3). For example, if a researcher wanted to 
evaluate the benefit to society of improving the water quality of a local lake, then 
they may design a contingent valuation scenario to describe this change, in order 
to elicit valuation estimates from a sample of local residents.  
The good being valued is the change in water quality of the lake, so the 
researcher may want to describe the lake, its various recreational uses, how many 
people visit the lake per year, and the native fish and bird species which reside in 
the lake. The baseline level of provision in this scenario may be that the lake 
currently contains a given level of nitrogen and phosphorus which sometimes 
create algae blooms rendering the lake unusable by residents and unsuitable for 
fish and bird life for three months out of the year. The change in water quality, 
which is the non-market good under valuation, can then be described in terms of a 
particular reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus levels, which will result in the 
lake remaining usable all year round. The provisional rule (i.e. the structure under 
which the good is provided), could be that if the average WTP of participants for a 
system to remove excess nitrogen and phosphorus from the water is greater than 
the cost of the system, then the system will be purchased. Available substitute 
goods, which should also be described to participants, could include alternative 
methods of controlling the algae blooms. The method of payment for the good 
may be a yearly fee of $10 per household in the area surrounding the lake. 
Designing a market model to seem as realistic as possible is important 
since participants will be making their valuation within this market context 
(Bateman et al., 2002). If the hypothetical scenario closely mimics the structure of 
a real market, then the thought process that participants go though when making a 
valuation statement should be similar to how they value goods in a real market 
 19 
 
environment, resulting in stated WTP and WTA values which reflect respondent‘s 
true value for the good.  
The question or questions which are used to elicit participant‘s WTP or 
WTA for a good are the second important design feature of a contingent valuation 
scenario. Several commonly-used elicitation mechanisms will now be described. 
2.3.2.2 Choosing an Elicitation Mechanism 
After ―presentation of the valuation scenario, the provision mechanism and 
the payment mechanism, respondents are asked questions to determine how much 
they would value the good if confronted with an opportunity to obtain it‖ 
(Bateman et al., 2002, p. 135). This step involves obtaining stated WTP or WTA 
values from the respondent using questions which are clear and easy to understand 
but do not themselves create a bias the respondent‘s answers. A WTP question 
may ask a respondent ‗would you be willing to pay $10 to gain Good A‘, while a 
WTA question may ask them ‗would you be willing to accept a payment of $10 
for forgo the provision of Good A‘. To these types of questions, known as single-
bounded dichotomous choice questions, participants would answer either yes or 
no, providing the experimenter with an indication as to whether their true WTP or 
WTA lay above or below $10. An obvious disadvantage of this type of question is 
that it only provides one upper or lower limit to a participant‘s valuation of a 
good, and therefore cannot provide a direct measure of their maximum WTP or 
WTA.    
While it may seem plausible to directly ask an individual how much they 
are willing to pay for a particular good, ―respondents often find it difficult to pick 
a value out of the air... without some form of assistance‖, and this can lead to 
inaccurate WTP estimates (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 97). Researchers have 
therefore developed a number of different elicitation-mechanisms which aim to 
extract an individual‘s true maximum WTP or minimum WTA.  
Bateman et at. (2002) outlines five of the most commonly used CV 
elicitation mechanisms: open ended questions, the bidding game, payment cards, 
the single-bounded dichotomous choice method, and the double-bounded 




Open Ended Questions 
The open ended direct elicitation format asks a respondent a question such 
as: ‗What is the maximum amount per year that you would be prepared to pay to 
improve the water quality of the Waikato River, in the way previously described?‘ 
The benefit of the open ended question style is that it does not provide the 
respondent with any indication as to what the value of the change might be, so the 
presence of an anchoring bias is minimised (Bateman et al., 2002). However, 
because people often find it difficult to pick a value out of the air with no tangible 
basis for the valuation, open ended questions tend to result in large non-response 
rates or protest bids (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
 
The Bidding Game 
The bidding game was one of the most widely used elicitation formats in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 138), and asks respondents a 
question such as: ‗Would you be willing to pay $5 per year for an improvement in 
the water quality of the Waikato River, as described previously?‘ If the response 
is ‗Yes‘ then the bid is increased by a given amount until the response becomes 
‗No‘, and this is considered the individual‘s maximum WTP for the change 
(Bateman et al., 2002).  
The simplicity of the bidding game, and the iterated nature with which 
questions are asked is thought to ―capture the highest price consumers are willing 
to pay, thereby measuring the full consumer surplus‖ resulting from the proposed 
change (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 99). A major disadvantage with the bidding 
game however, is that the value of the starting bid, and the rate at which the bids 
increase, may be interpreted by respondents as suggesting a possible value for the 
good, creating an anchoring point bias (Bateman et al., 2002). This bias can lead 
to many unrealistically high WTP bids as respondents wish to avoid the socially 
awkward situation of saying ‗No‘ to a change which would be beneficial to their 






The Payment Card 
The payment card approach presents respondents with a full list of 
possible payment values (e.g. $1 - $100 in $5 iterations), and could ask: ‗Which 
of the amounts listed below would best describe you maximum willingness to 
pay, per year, for the increase in the water quality of the Waikato River as 
outlined previously?‘ This elicitation technique was developed in an attempt to 
―maintain the properties of the direct question approach while increasing response 
rates for WTP questions by providing respondents with a visual aid‖ (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989, p. 100). This procedure reduces the chance of an anchoring point 
bias yet still provides a context which respondents can use to help guide their 
valuation. However, the range of prices listed on a payment card, and the 
increment at which the price increases, can still create a valuation bias in that 
respondents may pick values somewhere in the middle of the range even if these 
values do not represent their true WTP (Bateman et al., 2002). 
 
Single-Bounded Dichotomous Choice  
The single-bounded dichotomous choice or referendum method presents 
individuals with a single Yes/No question such as: ‗Would you pay $5 per year to 
improve the water quality of the Waikato River in the way described previously?‘, 
with the payment amount varied across the sample. This elicitation format 
simplifies the cognitive process for the respondent by presenting the valuation 
question in way which is similar to how they would decide to purchase a 
particular good from a supermarket (e.g. if the price is less than their true WTP 
then they will purchase the good). This method reduces outliers and non-
responses (Bateman et al., 2002), and with no incentive to exaggerate their WTP 
(i.e. in order to promote acceptance or opposition of a particular policy decision), 
this elicitation method is considered incentive compatible. Incentive compatibility 
means that it is in the respondent‘s strategic interest to answer ‗Yes‘ if his WTP is 
equal to or greater than the price level, and answer ‗No‘ if it is not (Hoehn & 
Randall, 1987).  
The drawback of single-bounded dichotomous choice elicitation technique 
is that it does not directly specify the maximum WTP of an individual. Rather it 
only provides direction as to whether their WTP is greater or less than a particular 
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value. Therefore, more observations are required to obtain WTP estimates that 
have the same level of statistical significance as those elicited using other methods 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 101). 
 
Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice  
The double-bounded dichotomous choice method follows the format of the 
previous technique by asking the respondent a Yes/No question, such as: ‗Would 
you pay $5 per year to improve the water quality of the Waikato River in the way 
described previously?‘, with the payment amount varied across the sample. 
However, once the first question is answered, a follow-up question of the same 
format offers a second price level which is higher than the first if the previous 
response was ‗Yes‘, and lower if it was ‗No‘.  
Using this double-bounded elicitation technique can offer greater 
estimation efficiency than the single-bound alternative since a respondent‘s WTP 
may be captured within the lower and upper bounds of the questions (e.g. between 
$5 and $15). However, using the double-bounded question format may remove 
the incentive compatibility of the method since ―the second question may not be 
viewed by respondents as exogenous to the choice situation‖, and anchoring bias 
and yea-saying may also be present (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 141).   
 
Each elicitation format has its advantages and disadvantages, and the 
researcher must assess these factors in relation to the needs of their experiment 
and any time or monetary constraints they face. Once the elicitation mechanism is 
decided upon, the final stage of experimental design is to construct questions to 
collect characteristics data from participants.  
 
 
2.3.2.3 Collecting Characteristic Data 
The final step in the designing a contingent valuation experiment, is to 
create several follow-up or debriefing questions. According to Bateman et al. two 
important types of debriefing questions should be included in a contingent 
valuation experiment: ―questions to explain why respondents were or were not 
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willing to pay for the change presented..., [and] questions to explain respondent‘s 
views of the scenario presented‖ (2002, p. 145).  
Collecting data on why participants are or are not willing to pay for a 
change, such as the increase in water lake quality, allows the researcher to assess 
to the validity of individual value responses (Bateman et al., 2002). Including 
questions which assess a respondent‘s attitudes, opinions, and knowledge 
regarding the good being valued, can be used to verify whether a WTA or WTP 
statement is based on the actual preferences of the respondents, or is simply an 
unfounded statement. For example, if a participant states a high WTP for the 
proposed increase in water quality of the lake from our previous example, but the 
follow up questions suggests that the respondent cares little for the lake‘s 
recreational, aesthetic, and habitation value, then their stated WTP may not be an 
accurate estimate of their true WTP. 
Collecting data on how participants viewed the CV scenario, after 
completing the elicitation procedure, allows the researcher to assess the credibility 
of the valuation results as a whole (Bateman et al., 2002).  If participants found 
the scenario to be vague, confusing, or unrealistic, then the WTA and WTP 
estimates obtained through the CV experiment could be considered invalid as they 
may not have captured the respondent‘s true valuation for the good. 
 
The aim of the CV experiment is to: (1) place participants within a 
plausible hypothetical scenario which mimics a real market environment, (2) elicit 
WTP or WTA data from participants through a mechanism which does not in 
itself lead to a bias in their valuation, and (3) collect characteristics data from 
participants to assess whether their value estimates are based on their actual 
preferences. If designed correctly, the contingent valuation method can be used to 
estimate the true value that the population, from which the sample was drawn, 
places on the non-market good.  
 
2.3.3 Evaluating the Validity and Reliability of CV Data 
The contingent valuation method is controversial ―because it involves 
asking individuals directly about monetary valuation related to given hypothetical 
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changes in the provision of an amenity‖, and some economists believe such a 
direct approach cannot produce meaningful value estimates (Veisten, 2007, p. 
205). Venkatachalam  notes that the ―major criticism of results of CVM revolves 
mainly around two aspects, namely, (a) validity and (b) reliability‖ (2004, p. 90), 
where ―validity refers to the ‗accuracy‘ and reliability refers to ‗consistency‘ or 
‗reproducibility‘ of the CV results (Kealy, Montgomery, & Dovidio, 1990).  
Opponents to the CVM argue that the validity and reliability of such 
experiments are questionable and that WTP estimates are potentially random 
responses which do not reflect any true underlying preference of the participant 
(Veisten, 2007). To dispel these speculations, proponents of the CVM have 
developed various ways to test the validity and reliability of an experiment, in 
order to justify the value estimates they produce. 
 
2.3.4 Validity 
The validity of a CV study is essentially the degree to which this particular 
methodological approach is able to measure the true economic value that 
individuals place on a good. According to the literature there are two measures of 
validity that can be applied to the CVM: convergent validity and theoretical 
validity (Mitchell & Carson, 1989).  
Convergent validity ―concerns the correspondence between a measure and 
other measures of the same theoretical construct‖ (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 
204). Essentially, convergent validity requires that the estimated monetary value 
of a non-market good should be consistent regardless of whether the value was 
estimated through the CVM or some other valuation method. For example, 
comparing the value of organic cotton estimated through the CVM to the value for 
organic cotton calculated through hedonic price estimation could provide a 
measure of the convergent validity of these two measures. If the values estimated 
from the two different methods converge then this would imply they are both 
valid in terms of convergent validity. 
Theoretical validity, on the other hand, involves ―assessing the degree to 
which the findings of the study are consistent with theoretical expectations‖ 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 206). Testing the theoretical validity of a CV 
experiment often involves regressing some measure of an individual‘s WTP 
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against a group of independent variables which should, according to economic 
theory, explain at least a portion of the respondent‘s WTP. The ―size and sign of 
the estimator coefficients are then examined and judged to be consistent or 
inconsistent with theory‖ (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 206). 
 
2.3.5 Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the ability of the particular contingent 
valuation experiment to produce valuation estimates which reflect the true 
preferences of participants by minimising sources of random variation in 
valuation results. Put simply, ―reliability refers to the extent to which the variance 
of the WTP amounts given by respondents in a contingent valuation survey is due 
to random sources, or ‗noise‘‖ (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 211). 
Variation in respondent‘s stated WTP can arise from three principle 
factors: (1) real underlying differences in participant‘s valuation of the good, (2) 
variation which arises due to the design of the contingent valuation experiment, 
and (3) variation caused by the sampling procedure used to select participants 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 211). The greater the reliability of a contingent 
valuation experiment, the less the variation in stated WTP is caused by random 
sources such as experiment design or the participant sample. Therefore, reliable 
WTP estimates vary only as much as the true differences in the underlying 
preference of participants.  
The reliability of an experiment can be assessed by a test-retest method, 
where WTP estimates are elicited from a group of participants through an 
identical CV procedure at two different points in time. A strong correlation 
between the value estimates for each participant at the two different points in time 
would indicate the CVM is reliable since it would appear that variation in WTP is 
caused primarily by differences in the true preference of participants. A very low 
correlation between participant‘s WTP over the two experiments would indicate 
that variation in the value estimates is caused largely by factors relating to the 
experimental procedure. 
Reliability requires that, in repeated measurements, (a) if the 
true value of the phenomenon has not changed a reliable method 
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should result in the same measurement (given the method’s accuracy) 
and (b) if the true value has changed a reliable method’s measurement 
of it should change accordingly. 
      (Loomis, 1990, p. 79) 
 
In a national transportation risk survey, Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and 
Philips (1985) collecting valuation data using CV, then re-interviewed a subgroup 
of their original sample a month later and found no significant difference in the 
response of the individuals. Loehman and De (1982) conducted a test-retest CV 
experiment to collect valuation data from 45 college students on their valuation of 
an air quality control policy. The correlation between participant‘s original WTP 
amounts and their stated WTP three weeks later was very high (r = 0.86), 
indicating the reliability of their experiment was strong.  
Using the test-retest method to measure an experiment‘s reliability is very 
costly however, especially when the survey involves the general population, as 
locating the same group of respondents and convincing them all to participant 
may be difficult (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 212). Therefore, to test the 
reliability of a study, most researchers aim to show that the valuation responses 
they collect are not purely random. This can be done ―by obtaining a respectable 
R
2
 when regressing WTP on a set of independent variables, since the higher the 
R
2, the lower the random portion of the WTP response variance‖ (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989, p. 213). Testing for reliability using regression analysis differs from 
testing for theoretical validity in that it does not require that the independent 
variables are theoretically connected to the dependent variable. Mitchell and 
Carson (1989) suggests an R
2
 lower than 0.15 including only a few key variables, 





2.4 Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept Measures of 
Value 
Contingent valuation studies ―usually consider two different questions in 
order to assess a respondent‘s valuation of a given good or service: (i) the 
maximum buying price or willingness-to-pay (WTP) and (ii) the minimum selling 
price or willingness-to-accept (WTA)‖ (Schmidt & Traub, 2009, p. 229). These 
WTP and WTA values are collected from a representative sample of a population 
and then analysed in order to make inferences about how that population as a 
whole values the non-market good under analysis (Bateman et al., 2002). Many 
economists suggest that these two measures of an individual‘s value should be 
similar for most goods, with any small differences being attributed to income 
effects (Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; Randall & Stoll, 1980; Willig, 1976). However, 
―repeated experimentation has shown that values of WTP and WTA for the same 
good can be vastly different‖, and that this disparity cannot be attributed entirely 
to an income effect (W. L. Adamowicz, Bhardwaj, & Macnab, 1993, p. 416). The 
ratio of ―WTA:WTP lies between 3:2 and 3:1 for private goods like mugs, 
chocolate bars or hockey tickets but takes on much higher values for publicly 
provided goods‖ (Bischoff, 2008, p. 283). Understanding the cause of this 
disparity is important to ensure that contingent valuation studies are able to 
produce realistic and relevant estimates of increases or decreases in society‘s 
welfare associated with proposed changed in a non-market good. 
This section of literature review aims to define the concepts of WTP and 
WTA, and explain what these two measures of value are actually quantifying in 
terms of people‘s preferences. Following Bateman et al (2002), indifference 
curves will be used to define the concepts of WTP and WTA in terms of 
compensating variation, equivalent gains and equivalent losses. Lastly, the 
concept of a disparity between WTA and WTP measures of value will be 
introduced, leading onto the following section of literature review. 
2.4.1 Measuring value in terms of WTP and WTA 
Carson (1989) defines willingness to pay (WTP) as ―the amount of money 
an agent would be willing to give up to obtain a change and still be as well off as 
his previous entitlement‖, while willingness to accept (WTA) ―is the amount of 
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money which would have to be given to an agent, with a specified entitlement, to 
forgo a change and still be as well off as if the change had occurred‖ (p.25). 
According to this definition, WTP would be a measure of the maximum price an 
individual would pay to receive a new t-shirt, and WTA would be the level of 
payment offered to an individual, at which they would be indifferent between 
receiving a free t-shirt or the monetary compensation. Some studies however have 
simply defined WTP as an individual‘s maximum ‗buying‘ price, and WTA as an 
individual‘s minimum selling price (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). 
Defining WTP and WTA values as being buying and selling prices infers that 
some participants have ownership of the good (i.e. the sellers) and others do not 
(i.e. the buyers), while Carson‘s (1989) perhaps more generalised explanation 
does not specify any kind of initial ownership. The exact specification of what 
WTP and WTA are measuring is therefore largely dependent on the experimental 
context put forward by the researcher. However, WTP is always a measure of how 
much an individual is willing to pay to accept or prevent a change from occuring, 
and WTA is always a measure of how much money an individual would need to 
be paid to accept forgo a change in provision. Whether or not this change in 
provision is the gain of a good or a loss of a good depends on the experimental 
situation.  
Essentially WTP and WTA are both trying to measure how much 
monetary value an individual places on a good (e.g. a mug), or a particular 
attribute of a good (e.g. added branding on a mug). However, the cognitive 
process that a respondent goes through when answering a WTP elicitation 
question is quite different to the process of making a WTA judgement.   
Bateman et al. explains the concepts of WTP and WTA through the use of 
indifference curves and changes in an individual‘s level of utility (2002, p.24). 
The authors also offer a brief explanation as to the cause of the WTA-WTP gap, 
drawn from the relevant literature. These WTA-WTP gap theories are addressed 
in further detail later in the literature review.  
2.4.2 Value Measures and Indifference Curves 
The two indifference curves (I and I‘) in Figure 1 represent the preferences 
of an individual between consuming various quantities of a composite for all 
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private goods, measured on the Y-axis, and quantities of a public good, measured 
on the X-axis under the constraint of a fixed level of income (Bateman et al., 
2002). The indifference curves I and I‘ link all the possible combinations of the 
two goods between which the individual is indifferent. Each indifference curve 
―can be thought of as corresponding to a level of welfare, utility or well-being, 
with I‘ corresponding to a higher level... [since as] the indifference curves move 
up and to the right, the welfare of the individual increases‖ (Bateman et al., 2002, 
p. 25).  
Since the Y-axis is measuring an individual‘s expenditure on a composite 
of private goods, which have a monetary value attached to them, it is possible to 
use these indifference curves to place an inferred value on changes in the public 
good, which does not have a monetary value attached, by looking at how private 
good expenditure changes relative to the public good. The true WTP and WTA of 
an individual is based on the standard economic principal that people are rational 
decision makers and will allocate their income between private good expenditure 
and public good expenditure in a way that will maximise their personal utility 
function (Randall & Stoll, 1980). While Bateman et al.‘s example uses public 
good expenditure on the x-axis, the theory is the same for any non-market good, 
provided private good expenditure is a non-perfect substitute for the good being 




Figure 1. Measure of Change in Human Welfare 
(Bateman et al., 2002, p. 24) 
 
From Figure 1 we can identify ―four measures of the value of a change in 
the quantity of a public good‖ known as compensating variation for the increase 
in a good, compensating variation for the decrease in a good, equivalent gains, 
and equivalent losses (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 25). These measures are all 
dependent on the initial private and public good consumption level, the shift in 
consumption along a single indifference curve, and also the expansion or 
contraction of the indifference curve itself.  
Compensating Variation for a Gain 
Compensating variation for an increase in a public good is measured by 
the decrease in private good expenditure that maintains the individual‘s original 
level of utility (Bateman et al., 2002). Suppose that an individual‘s consumption 
of the two goods begins at position A, with y0 consumption of the private good 
and x0 consumption of the public good. If consumption of the public good is 
increased from x0 to x1 so that the individual is now at position C on their 
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indifference curve, the decrease in private good expenditure (BC) is the amount of 
variation that perfectly compensates for the increase in the public good.  
To illustrate the concept of compensating variation for a gain, suppose an 
individual with a fixed level of income was asked how much they would be 
willing to pay to improve the water quality of a local lake so that it became safe 
enough to swim in. It is assumed that the individual would receive a benefit from 
the additional recreation value associated with a ‗clean lake‘, so to maintain the 
same level of overall utility the individual would be willing to reduce expenditure 
on private goods. The individual‘s true WTP would represent the exact reduction 
in private good expenditure that would maintain the original level of utility, given 
the improvement in the water quality of the lake. 
Compensating Variation for a Loss 
Compensating variation for a reduction in a public good is measured by 
the increase in private good expenditure which maintains the individual‘s initial 
level of utility given a decrease in the public good (Bateman et al., 2002). Assume 
that an individual begins at position B on indifference curve I‘, consuming x1 
level of the public and y0 level of private good. If consumption of the public good 
was to decrease from x1 to x0 then, to maintain the same level of utility, the 
individual would increase expenditure on private goods from y0 to y1, shifting to 
position D on the indifference curve. Therefore, the compensating variation for 
the loss of the public good is equal to DA. 
To illustrate compensating variation for a loss of a public good, suppose 
that an individual already has access to a lake with ‗clean water‘ and was asked 
how much money they would need to be given to accept degradation of the lake to 
a point where it was considered unsafe for recreational use (WTA). The individual 
would experience a reduction of utility from the loss of the public good, but gain 
utility from the money they are being offered. The true WTA value of the 
individual would be the exact amount of money they would need to be paid to 





Equivalent gain is a measure of an increase in private good expenditure 
that would extend an individual‘s level of utility by the same amount as a given 
increase in public good consumption (Bateman et al., 2002). Assume that an 
individual begins at position A on indifference curve I, consuming y0 of the 
private good and x0 of the public good. If the individual‘s consumption of the 
public good was to increase to x1 while consumption of the private good remained 
constant, then their indifference curve would shift from I to I‘ and they would 
now be stationed at position B. Using changes in private good consumption to 
create an equivalent gain in utility would require private good expenditure to 
increase from y0 to y1, holding public good consumption constant. Therefore the 
equivalent gain from an increase in the public good is measured by DA in Figure 
1, and is the same as compensation variation for a loss, or WTA. 
Again, using the hypothetical lake as an illustration, the equivalent gain 
measure of value for an increase in water quality would be the level of payment 
that would increase the individuals‘ utility by the same amount as the proposed 
increase in the public good.  
Equivalent Loss 
Equivalent loss is similar to equivalent gains, but is used to calculate the 
decrease in private good expenditure that would reduce an individual‘s utility by 
the same amount as the loss of a public good (Bateman et al., 2002). If an 
individual begins at position B on indifference curve I‘, consuming x1 level of the 
public good and y0 level of private good, then a decrease in the public good to x0, 
holding private good expenditure constant, would reduce their level of utility, 
shifting their indifference curve to position I. To generate an equivalent loss of 
utility while holding public good consumption constant, expenditure on private 
goods would need to be reduced by the amount BC. 
For example, if an individual had access to a lake with clean water which 
was then polluted to a point where it was no longer fit for recreational use, this 
loss of a public good would result in a reduction of that individual‘s utility, 
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holding all else constant. The equivalent loss measure of value for the degradation 
of the lake is the decrease in private good expenditure that would reduce the 
individual‘s utility by the same amount as the proposed reduction in the public 
good. As shown on the Figure 1, this measure is equal to the WTP of the 
individual. 
Table 1. Summary of Valuation Measures 
Gain of a Public Good Loss of a Public Good 
Compensating Variation (WTP) = BC Compensating Variation (WTA) = DA 
Equivalent Gain (WTA) = DA Equivalent loss (WTP) = BC 
 
To summarise Bateman et al.‘s (2002) WTA-WTP comparison: the 
measure of ‗value‘ for a non-market good that will be elicited from an individual 
will depend on whether the elicitation question is phrased in terms of a gain or a 
loss, and whether the respondent is being asked to accept or forgo the change. The 
four measures of value which can be elicited from participants through a 
contingent valuation experiment, and an example of a question to elicit each type 
of measure are as follows: 
1) Willingness to pay for a gain: Compensating variation: BC 
E.g. ‗How much would you be willing to pay for an improvement in 
the water quality of your local lake?‘ 
 
2) Willingness to pay to prevent a loss: Equivalent loss: BC 
E.g. ‗How much would you be willing to pay to prevent a decrease in 
the water quality of your local lake?‘ 
 
3) Willingness to accept to forgo a gain: Equivalent gain: DA 
E.g. ‗How much would you need to be paid to forgo an improvement 
in the water quality of your local lake?‘ 
 
4) Willingness to accept to accept a loss: Compensating variation: DA  
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E.g. ‗How much would you need to be paid to accept a decrease in the 
water quality of your local lake?‘ 
The critical feature to note from the Bateman et al.‘s explanation is that 
that no matter how the question is posed (e.g. in terms of a gain or a loss), WTP 
always quantifies the amount BC, WTA always quantifies the amount DA, and 
since DA is greater than BC, WTA is expected to be slightly greater than WTP.  
While willingness to pay for a gain and willingness to accept to accept a 
loss are both trying to estimate how much value an individual places on a non-
market good or an attribute of a good, these two measures will produce slightly 
different results. Economic theory, as expressed by Bateman et al., explains this 
difference in terms of an income effect where participants asked for their WTA 
experience a higher effective income that those asked for their WTP, and this 
difference in point of reference results in the WTA-WTP gap. However, this 
income effect is expected to be insignificant in most contingent valuation 
scenarios, so the WTA-WTP gap, according to economic theory, should also be 
insignificant (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 25). 
 
In the following section the WTA-WTP disparity will be examined in 
greater detail, addressing the standard economic explanation for the gap (the 
income effect), and explaining why this traditional theory fails to explain the often 




2.5 The WTA-WTP Disparity  
According to standard economic theory, the amount of private good 
expenditure that an individual would be willing to give up to gain a public good 
(Compensating Variation for a Gain: WTP) is expected to be slightly less than the 
amount the individual would need to be paid in order to give up the same public 
good (Compensating Variation for a Loss: WTA), as shown by Bateman et al. 
(2002) in Figure 1. This disparity is due to differences in the respondent‘s initial 
level of welfare, and is known as the income effect (Randall & Stoll, 1980; Willig, 
1976). 
According to the income effect, respondents asked for their WTA have a 
higher level of effective income than those asked for their WTP, since WTA 
participants hold property rights for the good they are valuing and this raises their 
initial level of welfare (Randall & Stoll, 1980). This difference in initial point of 
reference creates the WTA-WTP gap because ‗wealthier‘ individuals would 
typically be willing to pay more for an increase in the public good, and would 
demand more compensation for a decrease in the public good (Bateman et al., 
2002; Mankiw, 2007). The income effect can be clarified using indifference 
curves of an adapted diagram from Bateman et al. (2002, p. 25): Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. The Income Effect  




Following the reasoning outlined in section 2.4.2, the compensating 
variation for a gain of the public good from x0 to x1, or WTP, is equal to BC since 
the individual moves from point A to point C along indifference curve I. The 
compensating variation for a loss of the public good from x1 to x0, or WTA, is 
equal to EB since the individual moves from point B to point D along indifference 
curve I‘. An individual‘s WTA (EB) is clearly larger than an individual‘s WTP 
(BC), following the logic outline by Bateman et al. (2002).  
However, if we were to measure the compensating variation for the gain of 
a public good for an individual who began at the higher welfare level of 
indifference curve I‘, then their WTP would differ from that of an individual 
starting at the lower level of welfare of indifference curve I. For example, assume 
that an individual begins by consuming y1 of the private good rather than y0, and 
x0 of the public good, meaning that they are at point D on the higher indifference 
curve I‘. Their compensating variation for an increase in the public good from x0 
to x1 would be EB since the individual would move from point D to point B along 
their indifference curve. Since EB is greater than BC, it is clear that an individual 
starting at a higher initial level welfare is willing to pay more for the public good 
simply because they are wealthier, or as Bateman et al. state: ―If an individual is 
richer, he can afford to spend more in order to increase the public good‖ (2002, p. 
26). 
Note also than the WTP of an individual starting at the higher welfare 
level of indifference curve I‘ (EB) is the same as the WTA of an individual 
stationed along the same indifference curve (also EB). Therefore, if measuring 
WTA and WTP while holding the individual‘s initial level of welfare constant, the 
two measures would converge. If the starting level of welfare was held at 
indifference curve I, then WTA and WTP would both equal BC, and if the starting 
welfare was held at indifference curve I‘, WTA and WTP would both equal EB. 
Accordingly, the difference between WTP and WTA is due to differences in the 
initial wealth of the respondents since some are endowed with the public good 
(WTA group) and others are not (WTP group).  
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2.5.1 Substantial WTA-WTP Disparities 
The difference in WTA and WTP value measures, resulting from the 
income effect, should be relatively insignificant according to most economic 
theorists (Knetsch, 1990). Randall and Stoll (1980), as well as Willig (1976), 
construct theoretical ‗bounds‘ for the size of expected WTA-WTP gaps resulting 
from the income effect. Willig‘s bounds suggested that if the proportion of the 
change in effect income multiplied by half of the income elasticity is less that 5%, 
and the change in welfare is smaller than 90% of income, then the difference 
between WTA and WTP measures should be ‗small‘ (Willig, 1976).  
Standard ―economic theory assumes that the amount an individual is 
willing-to-pay (WTP) to obtain a good is approximately equal to the amount she 
is willing-to-accept (WTA) to relinquish the same good‖, with the exception of a 
small disparity attributed to the income effect (Sayman & Öncüler, 2005, p. 290). 
However, ―this near equivalence prediction has been contrary to the results of 
most empirical work trying to elicit WTP and WTA‖ which has regularly 
identified substantial differences between the two measures of value (W. L. 
Adamowicz et al., 1993, p. 417).  
Brown and Hammack (1973), in one of the early articles to present both 
WTP and WTA data, found that waterfowl hunters  were willing to pay an 
average of $247 to be able to continue hunting, but required $1044 in 
compensation to sell their hunting rights. Knetsch and Sinden (1984), in another 
early CV experiment, reported a WTA/WTP ratio of 4 for lottery tickets. 
Researchers then began to analyse this unexpectedly large valuation gap by 
collecting WTA and WTP data from participants for a wide range of goods, 
including both non-market and regular market goods. 
Substantial WTA-WTP disparities, much larger than the income effect 
would suggest, became so widespread in the stated preference literature that 
several authors compiled the results of many individual studies in order to 
perform a meta-analysis on other potential causes of the WTA-WTP gap 
(Horowitz & McConnell, 2002; Sayman & Öncüler, 2005).  Horowitz and 
McConnell‘s meta-analysis included the results of 45 individual studies, which 
comprised 201 WTA-WTP experiments (2002, p. 428). The authors found that 
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significant WTA/WTP ratios were observable in a majority of the experiments 
they examined, also noting that most of the experiments‘ authors had ―remarked 
that the WTA/WTP ratio is much higher than their economic intuition would 
predict‖ (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, p. 426). The average WTA/WTP ratio for 
the 201 experiments included in Horowitz and McConnell‘s analysis was 7.17, 
and ranged from 1.95 to 10.41 depending on the type of good being valued (2002, 
p. 433). 
Sayman and Öncüler‘s (2005) meta-analysis included 164 WTA/WTP 
ratios collected from 39 individual studies. The average ratio from their sample 
was 7.1 and ranged from 0.14 to 113 (Sayman & Öncüler, 2005, p. 300). Ratios of 
less than 1 were observed 7 times in their data set, indicating that the selling price 
in that experiment was lower than the buying price.  
Long before Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and Sayman and Öncüler 
(2005) conducted their respective meta-analyses, it was clear that WTA was 
significantly different from WTP in a majority of the stated preference literature, 
and that this difference could not be explained by convention economic theory 
(i.e. the income effect). Contingent valuation researchers therefore looked for 
other explanations as to why an individual‘s WTA for the loss of a good is greater 
than their WTP to gain the good. Most notable of these theories, each of which 
will now be discussed, include weak experimental design, the substitution effect, 




2.6 Weak Experimental Design 
Some researchers have suggested that the large WTA-WTP gaps observed 
in the literature are simply the result of weak experimental design features such as 
using hypothetical payments, elicitation techniques that are not incentive-
compatible, and a general misperception by participants about how the valuation 
process actually works (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). According to this 
argument, experiments designed to be more realistic, ―such as those with real 
money or incentive-compatible elicitation, will yield lower and more reasonable 
ratios‖ (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, p. 426). Furthermore, ensuring subject 
anonymity and clearly explaining the elicitation procedure should also reduce the 
WTA-WTP disparity (Plott & Zeiler, 2005).  
This following section literature review will look at the evidence regarding 
the weak experimental design explanation for the WTA-WTP gap. It will do so by 
reviewing various experimental investigations which dealt with three of the 
theory‘s fundamental components: (1) incentive compatibility of the elicitation 
mechanism, (2) ensuring respondent anonymity, and (3) providing a thorough 
description to participants about how the elicitation mechanism works. 
2.6.1 Incentive Compatible Elicitation Mechanism 
The ―incentive properties of stated-preference surveys is a central debate 
in the valuation of public goods‖ (Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle, 2010, p. 198). An 
elicitation method is considered to be incentive compatible if the technique 
provides ―respondents with incentives to reveal their true valuation‖ of the good 
under analysis (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 128). If the elicitation mechanism is not 
incentive compatible then the WTA and WTP data collected from respondents 
may be subject to various degrees of bias, and will provide an inaccurate estimate 
of the true value they place on the good.  
Incentive compatibility is based on a range of features of the adopted 
methodology. Two important features are: (1) whether or not the experiment 
involves real monetary transactions or is purely hypothetical, and (2) the 
conditions under which participants are either given or denied provision of the 
good, known as the provisional rule (Bateman et al., 2002). 
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2.6.1.1 Hypothetical Bias 
Some researchers claim that if an experiment involves purely hypothetical 
decision making tasks, where the values stated by participants are in no way 
connected to actual required payments or the provision of the good, then there is 
little incentive for respondents to reveal their true WTP or WTA (Bateman et al., 
2002). Participants in hypothetical experiments may exaggerate their stated WTP 
in order to appear more generous to their peers, or to themselves (Bryan & Jowett, 
2009). Another ―possibility is that the answers people give to hypothetical 
questions are likely to be off-the-cuff or careless responses which do not reflect 
their true taste preferences‖ (Carson, 1989, p. 172).  
Introducing real monetary transactions into the experiment is often 
considered to make the contingent valuation scenario seem more realistic to 
participants, and therefore increase the amount of thought that respondents put 
into making their valuation statements, resulting in a more accurate representation 
of the true value they place on the good (Carson, 1989). The difference in 
valuation estimates collected from hypothetical experiments versus binding choice 
experiments - where value statements have a binding monetary consequence – is 
known as a hypothetical bias. While there is experimental evidence to suggest that 
a significant difference exists between valuation data collected through a binding-
choice scenario or a hypothetical scenario (Cummings, Harrison, & Rutstrom, 
1995; List & Gallet, 2001; Taylor et al., 2010), there is also research to contradict 
this theory (Camacho, García, Georgantzís, & Sabater, 2004; Horowitz & 
McConnell, 2002). 
A laboratory experiment conducted by Cummings et al. which tested for 
hypothetical bias found that the WTP ―values elicited by the real DC 
[dichotomous-choice] question, which is incentive compatible, were significantly 
different from the values elicited by the hypothetical DC question..., [and] this 
result is robust to different private goods‖ (1995, p. 266).  
Taylor, Morrison, and Boyle (2010) provide further evidence to support 
the notion of a hypothetical bias in contingent valuation experiments. The authors 
construct a choice experiment to elicit WTP values for various attributes of a 
simple market good (a t-shirt), and also for attributes of a public good (planting of 
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trees is a local park) under both a hypothetical scenario and a binding scenario. In 
the binding treatment, participants were informed that one of the choice options 
they are given would be selected at random, through the roll or a dice, and the 
particular purchasing choice they made on that question would enforced. For 
example, if a choice set asked participants to select between option A: a t-shirt 
with short sleeves and no logo for $10, option B: a t-shirt with short sleeves and a 
logo for $14, or option C: no purchase, and the participant selected option A, they 
would be required to pay $10 in return for the described t-shirt if that choice set 
was chosen to be binding. 
Using a multinomial probit regression model, Taylor et al. estimate the 
marginal WTP of participants for attributes of the private good, which include 
whether the t-shirt had short or long sleeves and a logo or no logo, and features of 
the public good, which included the type of tree being planted, and the size of the 
tree. They find that ―that marginal WTP estimates from the hypothetical 
treatments are much larger, and statistically different than corresponding estimates 
in the binding choice treatment‖ in the public good experiment (2010, p. 197). 
However, their results did not show a significant difference between WTP 
estimated from the hypothetical and binding treatments in the private good 
experiment. 
Camacho, García, Georgantzís, and Sabater (2004) conduct an experiment 
in which hypothetical and real WTP data is elicited from participants for an 
improvement in the recyclability of an office table. The experiment involved 76 
volunteers who were recruited from a Business Administration and Engineering 
course at the University Jaume I. The participants were provided with a brief 
description of two office tables which were identical except that table A was able 
to be dismantled and recycled at the end of its lifecycle, where as table B had to 
be sent to a landfill. Respondents were then asked which of the two tables they 
would prefer to purchase in seven choice tasks where the price of the recyclable 
table increased from 26,000 ECU (experimental currency units) to 38,000 ECU at 
increments of 2,000 units, while the price of the non-recyclable table remained 
constant at 28,000 ECU (Camacho et al., 2004). Participants WTP for the 
recyclability attribute of table A could be derived from the maximum price they 
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were willing to pay for the recyclable table before they would prefer to purchase 
the non-recyclable alternative. For example, if the participant was still willing to 
purchase table A at a cost of 32,000 ECU before they would rather purchase table 
B, then their WTP was 4,000 ECU which is the difference in price between the 
table B and table A.  
In the hypothetical treatment group of Camacho et al.‘s (2004) experiment, 
no connection was made between the valuations made by participants and the 
monetary compensation they received for taking part in the experiment. However, 
in the binding-choice treatment, participants were given an initial endowment of 
40,000 ECU and a provisional rule was introduced which added an incentive 
compatibility component to the elicitation mechanism. Participants in this binding 
treatment were given instructions identical to those in the hypothetical treatment, 
but were informed that one of the seven choice tasks they made would be selected 
at random, and two participants from the treatment would need to use part of their 
40,000 ECU endowment to purchase either table A or table B for the price stated 
on that choice line. The experimental units that participants were endowed with 
could be traded in at the end of the experiment for real money, so participants 
forced to purchase one of the tables would essentially be spending real money on 
the good.  
Camacho et al. (2004) compare the results of their two elicitation sessions 
(hypothetical and binding), to determine if the incentive-compatible binding 
treatment produced WTP data that was significantly different from that collected 
from the hypothetical treatment. The authors found that, ―contrary to most of the 
results obtained in similar studies, at a population level, there are no significant 
median differences between actual and hypothetical stated values of WTP‖ 
(Camacho et al., 2004, p. 313). The price range at which the average respondent 
was indifferent between purchasing the recyclable table or the non-recyclable 
table was between 34,000 and 36,000 ECUs for the hypothetical treatment, and 
between 32,000 and 34,000 ECUs for the binding treatment, a difference that was 




Evidence from Meta-Analysis 
An extensive analysis of the WTA-WTP experiments conducted by 
Horowitz and McConnell, found results similar to Camacho et al. (2004), 
concluding that ―real experiments do not yield ratios that are significantly 
different from those of hypothetical experiments..., [and] thus, any claim about the 
suitability of hypothetical surveys must rest on evidence other than the size of the 
WTAWTP ratio‖ (2002, p. 437).  However, List and Gallet‘s (2001) meta-
analysis of 29 experimental studies provides compelling evidence in support of 
the existence of a hypothetical bias, finding that on ―average subjects overstate 
their preferences by a factor of about 3 in hypothetical settings‖ (2001, p. 241). 
List and Gallet‘s experiment also finds that ―willingness to pay studies 
yield smaller hypothetical-to-actual ratios than willingness to accept studies‖, and 
that the hypothetical bias is greater for public goods than for non-public goods 
(2001, p. 251). The authors suggest that ―subjects should be more apt to correctly 
state their true preferences when performing a familiar hypothetical task (WTP) 
rather than an unfamiliar one (WTA)‖ (List & Gallet, 2001, p. 248). Furthermore, 
similar reasoning can be used to explain their finding that hypothetical bias is 
greater for public goods than for private goods since participants are more familiar 
with valuing private goods and are therefore more likely to accurately estimate 
their WTP for such goods in a hypothetical experiment. This finding would 
suggest that in a hypothetical CV experiment, WTA will be subject to a greater 
upwards bias than WTP, therefore resulting in a larger WTA-WTP disparity than 
would be expected in binding choice experiments. 
While the hypothesis that experiments involving hypothetical payments 
will produce significantly different results that those involving real payments 
seems plausible, the experimental evidence on this theory is mixed. It does appear 
however, that any hypothetical bias within an experiment tends to be smaller for 
valuation tasks which respondents are familiar with, such as stating their WTP for 
ordinary private goods. 
2.6.1.2 The Provisional Rule 
Assuming an experiment involves real monetary transactions, a second 
important feature of the elicitation mechanism is the provisional rule which 
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determines whether or not a participant receives the good they are valuing and 
determines the price that they are required to pay for it. An example of a 
provisional rule could be that if a respondent‘s WTP is greater than a 
predetermined or randomly generated value, then the participant must purchase 
the good for their stated value. It is important to insure that the provisional rule 
does not encourage participants to employ strategic response behaviour in their 
valuation (e.g. by stating values higher or lower than their true WTA or WTP in 
an attempt to effect the provision of the good).  
Mitchell and Carson (1989) suggest that if respondents believe that 
provision of the good is a guaranteed outcome and that they will have to pay the 
amount they state, then there is a clear incentive to understate their true value for 
the good. Conversely, if respondents believe that their stated value will influence 
the provision of good (e.g. in a referendum vote), but the amount of money they 
will be required to pay is unrelated to their bid, then there is a clear incentive to 
overstate their true valuation of the good (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 128). Whether 
or not the elicitation mechanism encourages understatements or overstatements of 
respondents‘ true WTA or WTP is dependent on the particular provisional rule 
employed, but both of these biases are undesirable in contingent valuation studies. 
Taylor states that a provisional rule ―is incentive compatible if there are no 
incentives [for participants] to misrepresent [their] true preferences‖, meaning 
there is no strategic reason for respondents to produce a biased value statements 
(1998, p. 133). It is suggest that true value estimates can only be elicited if 
respondents believe that provision of the good is contingent on their stated value, 
and that they will be required to pay the amount they state (Mitchell & Carson, 
1989).  
 
2.6.2 Subject Anonymity 
Failing to ensure subject anonymity is argued by some researchers to 
affect the behaviour of participants involved in an experiment and impact on their 
stated WTA and WTP for a particular good (Fremling & Posner, 1999; Hoffman, 
McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Plott & Zeiler, 2005). The basis of this 
argument is that participants making decisions without anonymity are more likely 
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to think about how other people will view their decision and may therefore 
provide what they think is a ‗socially acceptable‘ response, rather than a response 
based on their true preference. 
Hoffman et al. show that the degree of anonymity given to a participant 
effects the outcome of a Dictator Game in which some participants are provided 
with an initial endowment (the dictator) and must decide how much to share with 
a fellow participant who did not receive any endowment (1994). Theory would 
suggest that the most economically efficient decision for the dictator would be to 
not share any of their endowment, as there is no adverse repercussion for doing 
so. However, it is a common feature in Dictator Game experiments for 
participants to make economically inefficient decisions and share a proportion of 
their endowment (Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 
2008)  Hoffman et al. run a number of experiments, providing dictators with 
varying degrees of anonymity (1994). They conclude that ―the more anonymous 
the game, the smaller the ―dictator‘s‖ gift‖, suggesting that participants are less 
self-conscious about their decisions when full anonymity is ensured, and provide a 
more accurate representation of their true preference in line with standard 
economic theory (Hoffman et al., 1994, p. 29). 
Fremling and Posner (1999) hypothesis that if valuation decisions are not 
made anonymously then participants may be concerned with how other people 
view their decision, and may therefore make ‗socially acceptable‘ decisions rather 
than economically efficient ones. This hypothesis would explain the results of 
Hoffman et al.‘s (1994) Dictator Game experiment, and could also offer a partial 
explanation for the WTA-WTP disparity in buying and selling experiments. 
For example, talented and successful bargainers tend to sell 
high and buy low. Therefore, if a subject wishes to be known by other 
subjects or the experimenter as a talented bargainer, he might adjust 
his behaviour accordingly even if the elicitation device does not 
reward that type of behaviour 
(Plott & Zeiler, 2005, p. 538) 
 
If what Plott and Zeiler (2005) suggest is an accurate depiction of a 
respondent‘s thought process during a WTA/WTP experiment, then ensuring 
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participant anonymity would eliminate this kind of strategic behaviour, resulting 
in a stated value which is closer to participant‘s true values value for the good, 
whereby reducing the WTA-WTP gap.  
 
2.6.3 Participant Learning 
The market environment in which CV experiments place participants 
would be considered unfamiliar by most people who would have limited or no 
experience making valuations under such conditions. As List & Gallet (2001) 
hypothesised, people produce more accurately statements of their true preference 
when asked familiar type of valuation questions (WTP rather than WTA) for 
goods which they are also more familiar with (private goods rather than public 
goods). Accordingly, the average participant would find it difficult to reveal their 
true preference during a CV experiment, simply because they are unfamiliar with 
the market situation and the elicitation mechanism being used. Also, since 
participants may find it easier to answer a WTP question than a WTA question, 
the former measure of value may be closer to their true valuation of the good 
while the latter is subject to varying types of bias. This is thought by some 
researchers to be the true cause of the WTA-WTP disparity.  
Researchers often use repeated trials in contingent valuation experiments 
in an attempt to reduce the disparity between WTA and WTP measures. The 
rational for this being ―that by allowing respondents to `practice' in the (often 
unusual) market situations in which experiments place them, they are given the 
opportunity to refine their responses to more accurately reflect their preference‖ 
(Morrison, 2000, p. 57). Allowing for participant learning is expected to increase 
how accurately WTP and WTA values capture a respondent‘s true preference 
towards a good, and since these two measures should theoretically be identical 
(Willig, 1976), doing so would eliminate the disparity commonly observed in the 
literature. 
Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987) conducted an experiment to analyse 
how participant learning impacts on WTA and WTP measures elicited using a 
Vickery Auction for a bitter-unpleasant taste experience (tasting sucrose octa-
acetate). The WTP question asked participants how much they were willing to pay 
to avoid tasting the product, while the WTA question asked participants how 
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much compensation they required to taste the bitter product. The researchers 
elicited values from participants over 10 trials, and found that ―WTA and WTP 
tend to converge in a mature market setting..., [a result] consistent with economic 
theory‖ (Coursey et al., 1987, p. 688). This result suggested that as participants 
became more familiar with the elicitation process, both WTA and WTP 
statements converged on the respondent‘s true valuation for the good. 
Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein (1994), in an experiment 
involving ordinary private goods which participants were familiar with (mugs and 
candy bars), found that WTA and WTP measures converged over repeated trials, 
eliminating any statistically significant difference between the two measures of 
value. Shogren et al.‘s (1994) second elicitation experiment involved valuing a 
reduction in the likelihood of a sandwich being contaminated with various 
pathogens. Their results from this experiment also found that the very large WTA-
WTP ratios observed in the first elicitation trial (34 for the 4
th
 pathogen type) was 
reduced substantially over multiple trials (to a ratio of 3), however, participant 
learning was unable to completely eliminate the disparity. 
In a valuation experiment involving chocolate bars, Morrison (2000) 
―found that WTA and WTP estimates of value not only do not converge over 
repeated trials, but [there was] no evidence to suggest that the disparity even 
decreases‖ (Morrison, 2000, pp. 62-63). Morrison‘s experiment also controlled for 
the substitutability of the good, another explanation for the WTA-WTP gap 
proposed by Hanemann (1991), and therefore offers compelling evidence against 
the need for repeated elicitation trials. 
 
The effect on the WTA-WTP gap of allowing participants to become 
familiar with the elicitation method remains unclear. While some experiments 
have found that running multiple elicitation trials can reduce or eliminate the 
disparity (Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et al., 1994), others have not observed 
this effect (Morrison, 2000). Furthermore, in a reassessment of Coursey et al.‘s 
(1987) results, conducted by Gregory and Furby, it was noted that the sample size 
of Coursey et experiment was quite small, and the convergence of WTA and WTP 




2.6.4 Simultaneously Controlling for Weak Experimental Design Features 
These three features of weak experimental design described previously – 
using a non-incentive compatible elicitation mechanism, failing to ensure subject 
anonymity, and not providing participants with adequate training in the elicitation 
procedure – are argued by various commentators to encourage respondents to 
state biased WTA and WTP values which do not accurately reflect their true 
valuation of the good, leading to the commonly-observed disparity. Plott and 
Zeiler  (2005, p. 530) note that while past experimenters had controlled for one or 
two weak experimental design features,  none had controlled for all of these 
design features at once, and consequently designed an experiment to fill this gap 
in the literature.  
Plott and Zeiler‘s (2005) paper provided evidence in support of the weak 
experimental design explanation for the WTA-WTP gap. The authors construct an 
experiment which simultaneously controls for all experimental design features 
which they identify from the literature as being a possibly cause of the WTA-
WTP. Their proposed strong experimental design: (1) uses an incentive 
compatible elicitation technique (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak method - BDM), (2) 
provides training to participants on how the elicitation procedure works, (3) offers 
several paid practice elicitation rounds, and (4) ensures total anonymity for 
participants. The researchers use this experimental design to elicit WTA and WTP 
values from 74 participants for a simple market good, a mug, which other 
experimenters have regularly used to identify and analyse the WTA-WTP gap 
(Plott & Zeiler, 2005). The authors find that no significant WTA-WTP gap is 
observable when taking into account these four experimental features, suggesting 
that a weak experimental design may be the cause of the commonly observed 
disparity (Plott & Zeiler, 2005, p. 540).  
However, Plott and Zeiler‘s (2005) experiment only involved a simple 
market good (a mug), so while controlling for weak design features may remove 
the WTA-WTP gap for simple market goods, it is unclear whether using a similar 
experimental design would remove the gap for non-market goods which typically 
produce a much higher WTA-WTP ratio (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). 
Furthermore, other experiments have controlled for weak experimental design 
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features by using a market for tokens (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) and 
have still observed significant WTA-WTP gaps, suggesting that design features 
are not the entire cause of the WTA-WTP disparity.  
Furthermore, Horowitz and McConnell‘s (2002) meta-analysis of 201 
WTA-WTP valuation studies found that experimental design features were not the 
true cause of the observed disparity. Their analysis concluded that: WTA-WTP 
―ratios in real experiments are not significantly different from hypothetical 
experiments..., incentive-compatible elicitation yields higher ratios, not lower [as 
would be expected]..., [and] there is not strong evidence that the ratio decreases 
through iteration‖  (2002, p. 427). The conclusions reached in Horowitz and 
McConnell‘s (2002) paper provides substantial evidence against the weak 




2.7 The Substitution Effect 
Hanemann (1991) disregarded weak experimental design as the source of 
the WTA-WTP gap, offered an alternative explanation, suggesting that the 
disparity may be caused by there being a lack of available substitutes for the 
commodity being valued. According to economic theory, when two goods are 
perfect substitutes for one another, ―the marginal rate of substitution is constant, 
[and therefore] the indifference curves are straight lines‖ (Mankiw, 2007, p. 461). 
Hanemann hypothesised that if the public good being valued had easily accessible 
substitutes, then the indifference curve between private good expenditure (i.e. 
money) and the public good would tend towards a perfect linear relationship and 
the difference between WTA and WTP would diminish.  
The large empirical divergences between WTP and WTA may 
be indicative not of some failure in the survey methodology but of a 
general perception on the part of an individual that the private-market 
goods available in their choice set are, collectively, a rather imperfect 
substitute for the public good under consideration.  
         (Hanemann, 1991, p. 646)  
As demonstrated in Figure 3 (below), when the private good (i.e. money) 
is a perfect substitute for the public good, the WTP for an increase in the public 
good from point x0 to x1, represented by line BC, should be equal to the WTA for 
an identical decrease in the public good from x0 to x-1, shown by line AE. 
However, when the public good is not considered a perfect substitute, then the 
indifference curve between private good expenditure and the public good will 
become convex to the origin due to a diminishing marginal rate of substitution 
(Hanemann, 1991).  
The diminishing marginal rate of substitution, based on the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility, suggests that when an individual is consuming a 
large quantity of good X they are willing to give up less of good Y to gain an 
additional unit of good X (Mankiw, 2007). However, when an individual is 
consuming a small quantity of good X, they are willing to give up a larger 
quantity of good Y to gain an additional unit of good X. This convex nature of the 
indifference curve, shown in Figure 4, means that an individual‘s WTP for an 
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increase in a public good from x0 to x1, shown by line BC, will be less than their 
WTA for an identical decrease in the public good from x0 to x-1, shown by line 
EA, as theorised by Hanemann (1991). 
 
Figure 3. Indifference Curve for Public Good with a Perfect 
Substitute 
(Adapted from Shogren, Shin, Hayes, & Kliebenstein, 1994, p.256) 
 
Figure 4. Indifference Curve for a Public Good with no Perfect 
Substitute 




To test whether Hanemann‘s substitution theory could be the cause of the 
WTA-WTP gap, many empirical studies have looked to identify a clear 
relationship between the degree of substitutability of a good and the WTA-WTP 
gap associated with the good (W. L. Adamowicz et al., 1993; Horowitz & 
McConnell, 2002; Shogren et al., 1994)  
In an experiment constructed by Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein 
(1994), WTA and WTP values were elicited from 142 participants using a 
Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction for an easily substitutable product, a 
candy bar, and a less-substitutable product, a food-borne pathogen screening 
procedure (1994, p. 259). In the first half of the experiment participants were 
asked how much they would be willing to pay (or accept) to upgrade a small piece 
of candy they had been given to a full-sized candy bar. The bid values were 
collected over a number of trials, with one trial randomly selected to be ‗binding‘, 
in order to ensure incentive-compatibility. The authors used multiple trials to 
allow for participant learning and too see whether WTA-WTP values converged 
as individuals became more familiar with the elicitation procedure. 
In the second half of the experiment WTA and WTP values were elicited 
for a pathogen-screening procedure, using the same elicitation technique that was 
adopted for the candy bar trials. Participants were asked how much they would be 
willing to pay (or accept) to upgrade a sandwich they had been endowed with, 
which had a standard probability of being contaminated with some kind of 
pathogen, to a ‗stringently-screened‘ sandwich, which had a very low chance of 
being contaminated (one in a million). 
Shogren et al. (1994) found that: 
For market goods with close substitutes which are readily 
available in commercial outlets with minimal transaction costs (i.e., 
candy bars and coffee mugs),... WTP and WTA value measures 
converge. In contrast, for a nonmarket good with no close substitutes 
(i.e., reduced health risk), the value measures diverge and persist, even 
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with repeated market participation and full information on the nature 
of the good  
      (Shogren et al., 1994, p. 266) 
Shogren et al.‘s results support Hanemann‘s ‖argument that the degree of 
substitutability between goods may drive the difference between WTA and WTP 
measures of value‖, though the authors did comment that further research into the 
robustness of their results was needed (1994, p. 266). 
In their article A Review of WTA / WTP Studies, Horowitz and McConnell 
(2002) conduct a comprehensive review of WTA and WTP elicitation 
experiments involving 201 different products which they separate into five 
categories based on the type of good being valued. These categories were: Public 
or non-market goods, health and safety goods, ordinary private goods, lotteries, 
and timing goods. Summary statistics from the included experiment can be seen in 
Table 2 (below). 
Table 2. WTA/WTP Ratio by Type of Good 
(Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, p. 433) 
 
As seen in table 2 the WTA-WTP ratio is largest for public or non-market 
goods (10.41) and health and safety goods (10.06), while ordinary private goods, 
lotteries, and timing goods all have much lower ratios of between 1.95 and 2.92. 
This suggests that experiments involving goods with low substitutability (e.g. 
public or non-market goods and health and safety goods) observe a much greater 
WTA-WTP disparity than those experiments involving goods which have a higher 
degree of substitutability (e.g. ordinary private goods).  
 54 
 
These summary statistics however do not take into account other factors 
which could contribute to the WTA-WTP gap. Horowitz and McConnell therefore 
constructed an econometric model to analyse how experimental design features, 
the type of good being valued, the mean WTP for the good, and the year of the 
experiment impacted on the WTA-WTP ratio observed in each study. 
Experimental design features incorporated into the regression model included 
whether the experiment involved hypothetical or real payoffs, which elicitation 
technique was used, and whether the experiment involved student or non-student 
subject participants. The goods being valued were classified as either ordinary 
private good or all others, where lotteries and timing goods were included in the 
all others category even though their WTA-WTP ratios appear closer to that of an 
ordinary private good (see table 2). The authors adopt a random-effects model 
which allows for covariance among multiple experiments in a single study. They 
calculate the model using maximum-likelihood estimation and giving more 
weight to experiments involving a greater number of participants.  
The results of Horowitz and McConnell‘s regression analysis found that 
―non-ordinary goods have significantly higher ratios - they are typically 6 to 8 
points higher than ordinary goods. This effect occurs even when we take survey 
design features and mean WTP into account‖ (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, pp. 
436-437). These results were ―consistent with Hanemann‘s finding that the lower 
the substitution elasticity between a bundle of market goods and the rationed good 
is, the higher the WTA-WTP ratio will be‖ (2002, p.435). 
A hypothetical experiment run by Adamowicz et al. (1993) looked at how 
the substitutability of a ticket to see a National Hockey League play-off game 
could explain variation in the WTA and WTP values elicited for the good. The 
experiment involved 300 first year undergraduate students from the University of 
Alberta. Half of the participants were informed that watching the match on 
television or listening to it over the radio were easily obtainable substitutes to 
seeing the game live, while the other half were told that no such substitutes were 
available. These ‗substitute-available‘ and ‗substitute-unavailable‘ groups were 
each split in two further sub-groups, with WTP values elicited from one and WTA 
values elicited from the other, using close-ended questions where bid amounts 
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varied across each sample. Adamowicz et al. found that the ―difference between 
WTA and WTP was $8.50 (30 percent) smaller for the substitute subsample than 
the no-substitute subsample‖, suggesting that Hanemann‘s substitutability theory 
had some credibility (1993, p.425). 
However, not all investigations into the substitutability effect have found 
clear evidence in support of the Hanemann‘s theory. Adamowicz et al. (1993), for 
example, conducted an experiment to elicit WTP and WTA values from 168 
student participants using the CVM with open ended valuation questions. The 
item being valued was a ticket to see a particular movie at a local theatre. Movie 
tickets were chosen as the good to be valued because they were familiar to 
consumers, they represented a small portion of the participant‘s total income, and 
they had many easily accessible substitutes (W. L. Adamowicz et al., 1993, p. 
419).  
The aim of the Adamowicz et al.‘s Movie Ticket experiment was to use 
characteristic data collected from each participant to judge the substitutability of 
the movie ticket for each individual. The degree to which the video cassette option 
was considered a substitute ―was determined on the basis of the respondent's 
access to a VCR, their attitude towards VCR versus big screen theatre 
experiences, and their attitude towards theatre use‖ (W. L. Adamowicz et al., 
1993, p. 419). The measure of substitutability was compared with the WTA-WTP 
gap of the individual under the hypothesis that the gap should be smaller for 
participants to whom VCR was a close substitute. Results from the movie ticket 
experiment were inconclusive however. Through regression analysis ―the 
potential substitute variables were not found to be significant in explaining any 
observed difference between the two welfare measures [WTA and WTP]‖ (W. L. 
Adamowicz et al., 1993, p. 420). These results contradicted Adamowicz et al‘s 
(1993) Hockey Ticket experiment and offered partial evidence against the 
Hanemann‘s substitutability hypothesis.  
Adamowicz et al. concluded from the results of their two experiments that 
―while substitutes appear to have an effect on the WTP-WTA difference, in this 
sample, the availability of the substitute was not sufficient to erase the significant 
difference between these two measures‖ (1993, p. 425). 
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2.8 The Endowment Effect  
An alternate explanation for the WTA-WTP gap was put forward by 
Thaler (1980) who introduce the idea that an endowment effect may contribute to 
the disparity in value measures. It was suggested that ―individuals asked for their 
WTA for a certain good will consider this good part of their endowment while 
individuals asked for their WTP do not..., [and] this difference in point of 
reference causes a disparity between WTA and WTP‖ (Bischoff, 2008, p. 284). 
While this concept appears similar to that of the income effect, the endowment 
effect theory offers an explanation why the WTA-WTP gap is often larger than 
standard economic theory would predict. 
 
Figure 5. The Endowment Effect 
Experimental investigations into the endowment effect can be broadly 
divided into two schools of thought: those which explain the endowment effect in 
terms of parting-disutility or loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), and those which explain the concept in terms of an unanticipated 
ownership utility effect (Bischoff, 2008; Loewenstein & Adler, 1995; Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2003). 
The parting-disutility effect suggests that the ―WTA–WTP disparity is 
caused by a disutility which the owner suffers when parting with an endowment‖, 
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resulting from the fact that the individual tends to place a greater value on a loss 
than a gain of equal magnitude, a concept  known as loss-aversion (Bischoff & 
Meckl, 2008, p. 1769). The unanticipated ownership utility effect meanwhile, 
explains the disparity ―by the fact that people get attached to goods they own but 
fail to anticipate the utility from feeling attached to one‘s endowment before being 
endowed‖ (Bischoff & Meckl, 2008, p. 1769). Therefore people place a higher 
value on the good once they own it and experience the additional utility that 
comes with ownership.  
While these two explanations for the endowment effect differ on 
theoretical grounds, they both attempt to explain the same phenomenon: why 
individuals tend to place a greater value a good they possess than an identical 
good they do not possess. Distinguishing between a parting-disutility effect and an 
unanticipated ownership utility effect is difficult however, as it is possible that 
they both contribute to the WTA-WTP gap simultaneously. 
 
2.8.1 The Endowment Effect and Parting Disutility  
Kahneman and Tversky, in their prominent article Prospect theory: An 
analysis of decision under risk, showed that, by focusing on gains and losses 
associated with a choice rather than final asset provision, the ―value function [of 
an individual] is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is 
generally steeper for losses than for gains‖, meaning that people place a greater 
value on a loss than an identical gain (1979, p. 263). This finding suggests that 
individuals should be willing to pay more to prevent the loss of a good, than they 
would be willing to pay for a gain of an identical good. This theory of loss-
aversion has been adopted by a group of researchers who explain the endowment 
effect in terms of a parting-disutility which participants experience when asked 
for their WTA.  
Thaler (1980) suggested that ―goods that are included in the individual's 
endowment will be more highly valued than those not held in the endowment, 
ceteris paribus,... because removing a good from the endowment creates a loss 
while adding the same good (to an endowment without it) generates a gain‖, and 
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according to prospect theory, the loss would be more heavily weighted in an 
individual‘s value function than the gain (p.44). Accordingly, an individual 
presented with a WTA elicitation question will feel as those the good being 
valued is part of their personal endowment, interpreting the proposed change as a 
loss, and will therefore place a higher value on the good than they would if they 
were asked a WTP question. 
In Thaler‘s (1980) article Toward a positive theory of consumer choice, 
the author explains the thought process behind several significant marketing 
concepts in terms of the endowment effect and loss-aversion, since at the time 
there was a lack of empirical work on which to base his theory (p.45). One such 
example Thaler used was that of a bill which had recently been passed by United 
States Congress allowing shop owners to charge customers a fee to purchase 
products if they used a credit card. Up until that point shops had been pressured 
by credit card companies not to introduce such a fee, as the card companies 
expected such a charge to reduce the appeal of credit cards. Realising that the bill 
was going to be introduced, the credit card companies lobbied Congress to amend 
the bill so that the change was termed as a ‗cash discount‘ rather than as a ‗credit 
card surcharge‘ (1980, p.45). Thaler implied the credit card companies understood 
that a ‗credit card surcharge‘ would be viewed by customers as a loss associated 
with using a credit card, while a ‗cash discount‘ would be seen as a gain to using 
cash money. So while the change was essentially the same, the card companies 
believed that phrasing it in terms of a ‗gain‘ for using cash would have less of an 
adverse impact on credit card use than calling it a ‗loss‘ associated with using 
credit.  
One of the early empirical investigations into the endowment-effect 
explanation for the WTA-WTP gap was Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler‘s 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem (1990). In 
this paper, the authors use an incentive-compatible CV experiment to determine 
participant‘s WTA and WTP for a range of ordinary market goods. These values 
were then compared to WTA and WTP estimates for an ‗induced value‘ product 
(tokens) elicited using an identical technique, in order to isolate the endowment 
effect from other experiment-based effects. 
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Kahneman et al.‘s experiment is based on the assumption that ―there are 
some cases in which no endowment effect would be expected, such as when 
goods are purchased for resale rather than utilization‖ (1990, p.1328). Tokens are 
a clear example of a good which is held exclusively for resale, and Kahneman et 
al. hypothesise that ―no endowment effect would be expected for such tokens..., 
thus both buyers and sellers should value tokens at the induced value they [the 
tokens] have been assigned‖, and no WTA-WTP gap should be observed (1990, 
p.1328). The authors then proceed to run multiple experiments, each of which 
elicits WTA and WTP values for a particular market good and also for a ‗token‘ 
which could be redeemed for a predefined amount money at the end of the 
experiment session. Any discrepancy between buying and selling prices caused by 
transaction costs, participant misunderstandings, or habitual strategies of 
bargaining, would be isolated by the WTA-WTP disparity, if any, observed for 
the tokens (Kahneman et al., 1990, p. 1328). If the WTA-WTP gap for the market 
good was greater than the WTA-WTP gap for the tokens, then this difference 
could be attributed to an endowment effect associated with the market good. 
The results of Kahneman et al.‘s study, found ―the value that an individual 
assigns to objects such as mugs, pens, binoculars, and chocolate bars appears to 
increase substantially as soon as that individual is given the object‖ (1990, 
p.1342). Considering these objects all have easily accessible substitutes, and since 
the effects of the elicitation procedure itself were isolated by valuing tokens along 
with the market good, these findings provide strong evidence in support of the 
endowment effect theory and throw the alternative theories of weak experimental 
design and the substitution effect into question.  
However, while Kahneman et al.‘s findings did suggest that individuals 
experience some kind of an endowment effect, they were unable to provide a clear 
distinction between an endowment effect was caused by parting disutility and an 
endowment effect caused by unanticipated-ownership utility (1990). Research 





2.8.2 The Endowment Effect and Unanticipated-Ownership Utility 
2.8.2.1 Loewenstein and Adler’s First Experiment 
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) suggest that the WTA-WTP disparity is 
caused by the fact that people get attached to goods that they own resulting in 
increased utility, but are unable to anticipate this feeling of attachment before the 
good is endowed to them. This theory aims to differentiate between parting-
disutility and unanticipated-ownership utility, by collecting estimated selling 
prices from individuals prior to endowing them with a good. The essential 
―difference between the parting-disutility effect and ownership-utility effect is that 
the latter only explains the WTA–WTP gap if it is unanticipated, while the former 
provides an explanation without implying any bias in prediction‖ (Bischoff & 
Meckl, 2008, p. 1769). 
 To test their theory, Loewenstein and Adler construct two experiments 
which elicit selling prices before and after endowment, as well as buying prices. 
At the beginning of Loewenstein and Adler first experiment sessions, all subjects 
were shown a mug engraved with their university‘s logo - Carnegie Mellon and 
Pittsburgh University, depending on the location of the experiment group. A form 
was then randomly distributed to approximately half of all participants asking 
them to ―imagine that they possessed the mug on display and to predict whether 
they would be willing to exchange the mug for various amounts of money‖ 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 931). They were given a list of 40 price levels 
ranging from 25cents to $10 at 25cent increments, and were asked whether they 
would rather keep the mug or trade it for the amount indicated on each line. After 
the subgroup of participants had completed their hypothetical choice tasks, all 
students were presented with a mug and given another set of choice tasks. The 
second set of instructions were identical to the first, but participants were told that 
one of the 40 selling prices had been pre-selected by the experimenter, and the 
choice made by each participant in regards to that line (to either to keep or sell the 
mug) would actually occur.  
From this experiment, Loewenstein and Adler collected data from two 
groups of participants: those that had completed the prediction exercise prior to 
being endowed with the mug, and those that had not. This allowed the authors to 
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―conduct both a between - and within - subject analysis of prediction‖ 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 931). 
Table 3. Predicted and Actual Valuation of the Mug 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 932) 
 
The results of Loewenstein and Adler‘s experiment, as seen in table 3, 
show that participants who took part in the prediction exercise significantly 
underestimated their own actual selling price by a difference of $1.67 at Carnegie 
Mellon (p<0.02), and $1.29 at the University of Pittsburgh (p<0.01). Those 
participants who did not complete the prediction exercise also stated actual selling 
prices well above the estimated selling price. This finding shows that participants 
placed a higher value on the mug once it was in their possession, and were 
unaware that this increase in value would occur prior to being endowed, 
suggesting an unanticipated ownership utility effect. 
One limitation of Loewenstein and Adler‘s first experiment was that the 
elicitation procedure was not incentive compatible, so while respondents did not 
have any reason to misrepresent their true preference, there was no incentive to 
accurately reveal their true preference either (1995). A second limitation was that 
no WTP values were elicited from participants, so the authors were unable to 
determine how the predicted selling price (WTA_P) measured in relation to 




2.8.2.2 Loewenstein and Adler’s Second Experiment 
In their second experiment, Loewenstein and Adler (1995) aimed to solve 
the limitations of their first experiment by using an incentive-compatible 
elicitation mechanism, and by collecting WTP data from participants. To do this 
they randomly divided 106 students from the Northwestern University into two 
experiment groups based in two separate rooms.  
In the first group a coin was tossed for each participant, and if they were 
able to correctly guess the outcome of the toss they were given a mug. Selling 
prices (WTA) were then elicited from those who had won a mug using the same 
procedure as in the first experiment, while buying prices (WTP) were elicited 
from those who had not won a mug, using a similar elicitation technique.  
In the second group however, an identical mug was shown to participants, 
who were told that they had a 50% chance of winning a mug based on the result 
of a coin toss. Prior to the coin toss, predicted selling prices (WTA_P) were 
elicited from the entire group using the same payment-card style elicitation 
mechanism as in the first experiment. Participants were also told that one of their 
choices would be selected at random and would be the binding outcome if they 
were to win a mug. Next, the coin was tossed, and those participants who 
correctly called the outcome were given the good. If these ‗owners‘ had agreed to 
sell the mug at a particular price level, predetermined by the experimenters but 
unknown to the participants, then they were now made to do so. Participants who 
were endowed with the mug were also then asked whether they would like to 
revise their selling price, although they were not actually allowed to do so. The 







Table 4. Mean Valuation of Mugs 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 934) 
 
The endowment effect is again evident in these results, with selling prices 
(WTA) for participants endowed with the good being significantly greater than 
the buying price of those participants not endowed with the good. More 
importantly however, is that a bias in prediction of selling prices is also evident. 
Participants ―with a 50% chance of receiving a mug stated a mean selling price 
that was $1.80 lower than that for subjects who actually possessed a mug‖ 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 934). Furthermore, the selling price predicted by 
the un-endowed group was very similar to the buying price elicited from 
participants who had not won a mug in group 1 ($4.16 and $4.05 respectively). 
This indicates that subjects are unable to foresee the additional utility they would 
gain from possessing the mug, and therefore predict WTA values which were very 
close to elicited WTP values. 
The observation that individuals are unaware of the 
endowment effect presents a novel view of choice. It suggests that 
people not only become attached to what they have (as implied by the 
endowment effect), but do so unknowingly. People seem to be 
unwittingly trapped by their choices; they make choices with an 
unrealistic sense of their reversibility      
     (Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 936).  
Loewenstein and Adler construct an index equation to measure the 
comparative influence that a parting disutility effect and an unanticipated 
ownership utility effect have on the WTA-WTP gap (1). If parting disutility was 
the sole cause of the WTA-WTP gap, ―there is no reason to assume that the 
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members of the experimental groups should not be able to anticipate the disutility 
they would feel when having to part with the mug‖ (Bischoff, 2008, p. 286), and 
predicted WTA (WTA_P) should equal actual WTA, resulting in a beta value of 
zero in Loewenstein & Adler‘s equation (Loewenstein & Adler, 1995, p. 933). 
However, if 100% of the WTA-WTP gap is the result of an unanticipated 
ownership utility effect, then predicted WTA would equal actual WTP resulting in 
a beta value of one. 
   
           
         
                                       
The prediction bias evident in the results from Loewenstein & Adler‘s 
second experiment, presented in table 4, is equal to 0.94 (2), which is 94% of its 
plausible maximum value (1995). This indicates that an ownership utility effect is 
causing a majority of the WTA-WTP disparity in the market for mugs, while a 
parting-disutility and other conventional factors plays a relatively insignificant 
role.  
   
           
           
                                          
Loewenstein and Adler make the comment that when stating a selling 
price for a good which the respondent does not possess, the individual requires 
two stages of introspection: ―(1) imagining one possesses the object and has 
adapted to ownership, and (2) imagining how one would feel about parting with 
it‖ (1995, p.936). Based on the results of their two experiments, Loewenstein and 
Adler suggest that participants are not able to fully anticipate the additional utility 
that comes with the possession of the good, and therefore predicted selling prices 
are subject to a downwards bias. Stating a buying price however, only involves 
one stage of introspection, and Loewenstein and Adler state that they know of no 
evidence to suggest estimated WTP values would be biased (1995, p.936). In 
closing, the authors suggest areas of further investigation, noting that ―it would be 
interesting to test whether people with objects overpredict the buying prices or 




An issue with Loewenstein & Adler‘s second experiment, is that the 
treatment group who predicted their own selling prices prior to being endowed 
with the good, knew that they had a 50% chance of winning the mug. It is 
therefore difficult to confirm that these participants did not feel in any way 
endowed with the good prior to estimating their WTA. If these students felt that 
they had a good chance of winning the mug, they may already consider the good 
to be part of their endowment, meaning an ownership utility effect may have 
introduced some bias into the predicted WTA values. This is one issue which 
other authors, particularly Bischoff (2008), have attempted to overcome. 
 
2.8.2.3 Bischoff’s Experiment 
Bischoff‘s (2008) article Endowment effect theory, prediction bias and 
publicly provided goods: an experimental study, investigates the presence of a 
WTA-WTP gap for a public good, the connection between the observed disparity 
and the endowment effect, and the contribution of parting-disutility and 
unanticipated ownership utility to the size of the gap.  
The author provides a brief summary of the endowment effect literature, 
concluding that WTA-WTP gap appears to be caused ―either by the disutility from 
parting with one‘s endowment and/or by an extra utility from ownership‖, which 
may be unanticipated by non-owners (Bischoff, 2008, p. 283). According to 
Bischoff, the literature on the endowment effect has tended to focus mostly on 
privately owned goods (2008, p. 284), so his research aims to extend the literature 
by looking at the endowment effect in terms of publically owned goods. 
Bischoff‘s interest with investigating the existence of the endowment effect for 
publically owned goods comes from the fact that no one person holds exclusive 
property rights to such goods, so it is unclear whether individuals still experience 
‗ownership utility‘ for such a good. Furthermore, Bischoff aims to distinguish 
between an endowment effect caused by parting disutility, and an endowment 
effect caused by unanticipated ownership utility. Fundamental to Bischoff‘s 
experiment is the assumption that participants not endowed with a good who are 
asked to predict the WTA of participants who are endowed with the good, should 
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be able to account for the parting disutility effect experienced by the endowed 
group, but not the unanticipated ownership utility effect. 
Bischoff‘s experiment was conducted as follows: 
A class of finance students from the University of Giessen, Germany, were 
informed that they were being given the opportunity to take part in an exclusive 
tutorial session (the public good), currently unavailable to other students, which 
would help to prepare them for an upcoming finance exam. The students were told 
that the tutors were highly experienced and participation in the tutorial would be 
of great benefit. The class was then divided into 2 groups.  
Group 1 was told that they were all entitled to attend the tutorial session 
free of charge, and were then asked to state (individually) their willingness to 
accept (the level of payment they would require to forgo attendance of the 
workshop). The group was instructed that if their average WTA was less that the 
per-person cost of running the tutorial ($C – decided on pre-experiment but 
unknown to participants until after) then no participants would be able to attend, 
and each person would receive the cost of the workshop in a personal payment 
($C). However, if the group‘s average WTA was equal to or greater than ‗C‘, then 
the original offer was kept and all students had the opportunity to attend the 
tutorial and no one would receive any kind of cash payment. 
Participants in group 2 were each given an initial endowment of $15 and 
were then asked to state their willingness to pay for the opportunity to attend the 
tutorial session. If their average WTP was less than the ‗$C‘ (not yet known to the 
participants) then no one in group 2 would be offered the tutorial and all would 
retain their $15 endowment. If the average WTP was equal to or greater than ‗C‘ 
then all participants would be able to attend the tutorial, and all would be required 
to pay the cost ‗C‘ out of their $15 endowment regardless of whether or not they 
were planning on attending the tutorial. 
The second part to this experiment was conducted 2 years after the initial 
WTA-WTP elicitation. This component involved a second class of finance 
students, also from Giessen University, who were chosen from a similar finance 
 67 
 
lecture at roughly the same time in the year as the earlier trials. This ensured that 
the participants in the second experiment were similar, in terms of exam 
preparation as well as demographic characteristics, to the participants from the 
first experiment. This class was informed about the first experiment and the good 
(tutorial session) was described in a fashion identical to the previous experiment. 
The participants were then split into two groups: group 1a and group 2a. 
Participants in group 1A were asked to give their best prediction of the 
average WTA of group 1 from the earlier experiment. As an incentive, payments 
were promised to those participants whose predictions were closest to the actual 
average WTA. Participants in group 2A were asked to give their best prediction of 
the average WTP of group 2 from the previous experiment. Again, incentives 
were used to increase the effort made by the participants. Group 2A is therefore 
expected to produce a WTA estimate for individuals who are not yet endowed 
with a good, and group 1A is expected to produce a WTP estimate for individuals 
who are not yet endowed with a good, as is standard with WTP experiments. 
Bischoff‘s analysis ―is based on the assumption that the participants in group 2A 
are able to deliver an unbiased predictions for the WTP voiced in group 2‖ (2008, 
p. 291).  
Table 5. Average WTP and WTA for the tutorial 
(Bischoff, 2008, p. 292) 
 
From Bischoff‘s results, presented in table 5, a WTA-WTP gap for the 
public good (the tutorial) can be clearly identified, producing a ratio of 2.93:1. 
The predicted WTP of group 2a (8.17) was not statistically different from the true 
WTP values elicited from group 2 (8.88), while the predicted WTA of group 1a 
(21.86) was significantly less than the real WTA (26.06) of group 1 at a 95% level 
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of confidence (Bischoff, 2008, p. 292). The predicted WTA was also significantly 
different from the true WTP. To calculate the share of the WTA-WTP disparity 
caused by unanticipated ownership utility, Bischoff uses Loewenstein and Adler‘s 
(1995) index formula (1):  
   
             
            
                                         
Bischoff concludes that the magnitude of the WTA-WTP ratio observed 
for the tutorial session is in line with what the relevant literature would expect. 
More importantly however, is that the ―significant difference between predicted 
and actual WTA clearly supports the notion that the publicly provided tutorial is 
subject to an unanticipated ownership utility effect‖ (Bischoff, 2008, p. 293). The 
beta value of 0.24, from equation 3, indicates that the ownership utility effect 
accounts for roughly one quarter of the total WTA-WTP disparity, leaving three 
quarters of the gap explained by other conventional factors and possibly parting 
disutility.  
To Summarise, Bischoff (2008) finds evidence that the endowment effect 
does apply to publically provided goods, with participants who were endowed 
with the tutorial session stating WTA values far exceeding the WTA values 
elicited from the non-endowed group. The author also finds that public goods are 
subject to an unanticipated ownership utility effect (24% of the WTA-WTP gap), 
even though the public good is not privately controlled, owned, or consumed by 
any one individual. The experiment also provides evidence that participants are 
able to produce unbiased estimates of other individual‘s WTP for a public good. 
 
2.8.3 Substitutability and the Endowment Effect 
It is important to note that while the two central explanations for the 
WTA-WTP gap (substitutability and the endowment effect) discuss the disparity 
from different theoretical perspectives, researchers accept that these two concepts 
are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is likely that the endowment effect is 
dependent on substitutability of the good being valued. 
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An owner will not be reluctant to sell an item at a given price if 
a perfect substitute is readily available at a lower price. This 
reasoning suggests that endowment effects will almost certainly occur 
when owners are faced with an opportunity to sell an item purchased 
for use that is not easily replaceable (Kahneman et al., 1990, p. 1344) 
 
Accordingly, the level of parting disutility experienced by an individual 
should be minimal if they know that there is a perfect substitute available. 
Furthermore, it may also be expected that the unanticipated ownership utility 
effect experienced when an individual is endowed with a perfectly substitutable 
good, would be less than the effect of being endowed with a rare good. However, 





2.9 The Importance of understanding the WTA-WTP Gap 
Understanding whether the WTA-WTP disparity is caused by the 
methodology itself or is an indication of an underlying change in preferences 
resulting from the ownership of a good is important because this knowledge can 
affect how decisions should be made regarding non-market goods. If the disparity 
is caused by weak experimental design, then it should be possible to control for 
these weaknesses and the benefits to society calculated from a buyer‘s (WTP) or 
seller‘s (WTA) perspective should more or less converge. However, if the gap is 
the result of an endowment effect, where owners of a good truly place a higher 
value on that good than non-owners, then the way property rights are established 
in CV experiments will have a significant impact on the way resources should be 
allocated. 
Since holders of some ‗right‘ (i.e. sellers) appear to value a good 
differently than non-holders, ―one of the most economically consequential 
decisions [in experimental design] will be the initial establishment of the property 
rights, especially for environmental and other public amenities for which property 
rights are unclear‖ (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, p. 428). 
Horowitz and McConnell use the example of preserving land from 
development to show how the WTA-WTP gap could impact on how decisions are 
made (2002). The mean WTA/WTP ratio derived from their meta-analysis was 7, 
which would suggest ―that the amount of land that would be preserved if 
development rights were held by the general public is 7 times higher than the 
amount that would be preserved if the rights were deeded to the landowner and 
had to be purchased by the public‖ (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, p. 428). In 
other words, if the public was asked how much they would pay to preserve the 
land (i.e. purchase from the developers), they would be expected to state an 
amount 7 times less than they would charge the developers to purchase the land. 
Therefore, a measure of the ‗correct‘ amount of land to preserve, based on the 
preferences of the public, would be highly affected by whether the elicitation 
question was phrased in terms of WTP or WTA. 
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Knetsch notes the if the underlying causes of the WTA-WTP gap ―are not 
trivial ones attributable to wealth effects, but are those due to pervasive and large 
endowment effects... [then] economic assessments of losses will be seriously 
understated if willingness to pay measures are used‖ (1990, p. 230).  
If environmental degradation or a contemplated change 
imposes losses on individuals, [the] usual practice of using the 
payment measure [WTP] will likely lead to large understatements of 
the welfare changes. As a consequence, too many environmentally 
disruptive projects will be encouraged, too many harmful activities 
will be allowed, inadequate mitigation measures will be undertaken 
when environmental values are at risk, and compensation for losses 
will not fully indemnify adverse welfare changes (Knetsch, 1990) 
 
Therefore, experiments which measure the WTA-WTP gap for different 
types of goods and services, and especially those articles which attempt extend the 
knowledge on the nature of the disparity are of significant importance in the non-
market valuation literature. In order to accurately measure the true economic 
value of a non-market good, it is necessary to understand the process of how 




2.10 Literature Review Summary 
2.10.1 Non-Market Valuation 
All decisions involve making a choice and all choices involve a sacrifice 
of some kind (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 2). When the true benefits of different 
courses of action are known, then the financial cost of each option can be weighed 
against the associated benefits to determine what decision will provide the 
greatest net gain. However, when a decision making task involves a non-market 
good or service, then no market-based price and quantity data is available with 
which to estimate the economic value of the good, and therefore the benefits of 
alternative courses of action are often unclear.  
Non-market valuation is a ―series of techniques that economists use to 
assess the economic value of market and non-market goods‖ based on the 
preferences of individuals (Lipton et al., 1995, p. 16). Through analysis of 
peoples‘ preferences towards different levels of provision of a non-market good, a 
demand curve can be derived and the total economic value that society places on 
that good can be estimated. Preference data can be collected either through 
revealed preference (RP) techniques, such as the travel cost method and the 
hedonic pricing method, or stated preference (SP) techniques, such as the 
contingent valuation method and choice experiments. Revealed preference 
methods use existing behavioural data to econometrically reveal the willingness to 
pay (WTP) of individuals for various attributes of a non-market good, while stated 
preference methods directly elicit valuation data from participants through 
decision making tasks.  
The main benefit of RP techniques is that they use real behavioural data, 
and are therefore based on what people actually do rather than what they say they 
will do (Shaw, 2005), while their main disadvantage is that they cannot be used to 
value goods for which behavioural data does not exist. The main benefit of SP 
techniques is that the ―models are capable of measuring a full range of values, 
including so called passive use or non-use values, as they do not rely on the 
observation of actual behaviour‖ (Du Preez et al., 2010, pp. 136-137). However, 
SP data may be subject to a wide range of biases resulting from the hypothetical 
nature of the decision making tasks, and weaknesses in experimental design. 
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2.10.2 Designing a Contingent Valuation Experiment 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a SP technique which aims to 
measure the monetary value associated with the gain or loss of a specific non-
market good by collecting willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept 
(WTA) data from participants who are placed within a carefully designed 
hypothetical market scenario (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
The hypothetical market model is the most critical component of a CV 
experiment because participants must make their valuation statements (WTP or 
WTA) contingent on the rules and changes outlined in the scenario (Bateman et 
al., 2002). This market scenario needs to describe the good being valued, the 
initial level of provision, the potential final level of provision (i.e. the gain or 
loss), the rule which dictates the final level of provision, any available substitutes, 
and the hypothetical payment mechanism (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 3).  
Once the market scenario is described to participants, they proceed to the 
decision making tasks which elicit their WTP or WTA values for the change in 
provision. While there are many different elicitation methods to choose from - 
open ended questions, the bidding game, payment cards, the single-bounded 
dichotomous choice method, and the double-bounded dichotomous choice method 
– each has its own advantages and disadvantages, with some techniques tending to 
create a bias in respondent‘s valuation statements (Bateman et al., 2002).  
The final stage of creating a contingent valuation experiment is to collect 
data on participant‘s demographic characteristics, attitude and knowledge 
regarding the good being valued, and their views on the CV experiment as a 
whole. Demographic and attitudinal data can be used to assess the validity of an 
individual‘s valuation response, while participant‘s thoughts regarding the 
experiment can help determine if the CV design as a whole is likely to produce a 
reliable estimate of the population‘s WTP or WTA for a good. The validity of a 
CV experiment is based on the its ability to measure the true economic value that 
individuals place on a good, and is assessed in terms of convergent validity and 
theoretical validity (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). Reliability, on the other hand, 
refers to how much of the variation in WTP values (or WTA values) stated by 
respondents is caused by actual differences in the individuals‘ preferences, and 
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how much is caused by random sources, or ‗noise‘, arising from the experimental 
process or biases in the sample group (Mitchell & Carson, 1989).  
 
2.10.3 WTP and WTA Measures of Value 
There are two types of valuation question which CV experiments can use 
to elicit preference data from participants. WTP questions ask respondents how 
much they are willing to pay to gain a good or to protect against losing a good, 
while WTA questions ask respondents how much they need to be paid to forgo the 
gain of a good or to accept the loss of a good (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 25). 
Bateman et al. (2002) explain the concepts of WTP and WTA through the use of 
an individual‘s indifference curve, identifying four different measures of value: 
compensating variation for a gain, compensating variation for a loss, equivalent 
gain, and equivalent loss.  
Compensating variation, either for a gain or for a loss, measures the 
change in private good expenditure (i.e. money), that would exactly compensate 
an individual for the proposed change in the non-market good in order to maintain 
their initial level of utility. The equivalent gain and equivalent loss measures of 
value represent the change in private good expenditure that would generate the 
same shift in the overall welfare level of the individual that the proposed change 
in the non-market good would create. 
As shown previously in table 1, compensating variation for the gain of a 
good is the same as the equivalent loss for the loss of the good, which are both 
equal to the line BC, while compensating variation for the loss of a non-market 
good is the same as equivalent gain and is represented by the line DA.  In 
Bateman et al.‘s (2002) explanation of the different value measures, it is noted 
that WTA questions (line DA) are expected to result in slightly higher value 
estimates than WTP questions (line BC) due to an income effect experienced by 
those participants asked to state their WTA.  
 
2.10.4 The WTP-WTA Disparity 
According to standard economic theory, participants asked to state their 
WTA for a good experience a greater level of effective income than participants 
asked to state their WTP for the same good, and as a result WTA responses are 
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typically greater than WTP responses (Randall & Stoll, 1980; Willig, 1976). This 
disparity is caused because WTA respondents begin at a higher level of wealth 
than WTP respondents, holding all else constant, and ‗wealthier‘ individuals are 
typically willing to pay more for an increase in a public good, or demand more for 
the loss of the good due to standard economic principal of the income effect 
(Bateman et al., 2002; Mankiw, 2007). Accordingly, WTA would be equal to the 
WTP if both measures were taken while holding the initial wealth level of 
participants constant. Many CV researchers point to the theoretical bounds for the 
WTA-WTP gap constructed by Willig (1976) and revised by Randall and Stoll 
(1980) which suggest that the divergence between these two value measures due 
to an income effect should be insignificant in most valuation experiments. 
However, ―this near equivalence prediction has been contrary to the results of 
most empirical work trying to elicit WTP and WTA‖ which has regularly 
identified substantial differences between the two measures of value (W. L. 
Adamowicz et al., 1993, p. 417). Many researchers have therefore investigated 
alternative theories to explain the significant WTA-WTP gap observed in CV 
experiments. 
2.10.5 Weak Survey Design 
Some economists believe that the WTA-WTP gap is purely the result of 
imperfect experimental design where biases introduced through the survey 
process affect the way that participants interpret and respond to the WTA and 
WTP questions (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). This theory suggests that neither 
WTA nor WTP represent the true preference of a participant, and that if all weak 
design features were accounted for, the two value measures would converge on 
the true value of the good. Three experimental design features which authors 
believe contribute to the WTA-WTP gap include: using a non-incentive 
compatible elicitation mechanism, failing to provide participant anonymity, and 
failing to provide clear instructions and training to participants regarding the 
elicitation mechanism. 
An elicitation method is considered to be incentive compatible only if the 
technique provides ―respondents with incentives to reveal their true valuation‖ of 
the good under analysis (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 128). Authors argue that the 
hypothetical nature of most CV experiments, where participants‘ decisions have 
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no real monetary consequence, are not incentive compatible, and that ―the answers 
people give to hypothetical questions are likely to be off-the-cuff or careless 
responses which do not reflect their true taste preferences‖ (Carson, 1989, p. 172). 
A meta-analysis of 29 experimental found that on ―average subjects overstate 
preferences by a factor of about 3 in hypothetical settings... [and that] willingness 
to pay studies yield smaller hypothetical-to-actual ratios than willingness to accept 
studies‖ (List & Gallet, 2001, pp. 241-251). This finding suggested that while 
both measures of value will be biased upwards in a hypothetical experiment, 
WTA estimates will be subject to a larger upwards bias than WTP estimates, 
therefore creating a large WTA-WTP disparity. A second meta-analysis 
conducted by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) however, found that ―real 
experiments do not yield [WTA/WTP] ratios that are significantly different from 
those of hypothetical experiments‖ (2002, p. 437).  
The second feature of the elicitation mechanism which is considered to 
create a large WTA-WTP gap is a non-incentive compatible provisional rule. 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) suggest that a respondent will only provide their true 
WTP (WTA) for a good if they believe that the provision of the good is 
contingent on their stated value and that they will be required to pay (or accept) 
the amount they state. If the participant believes that either their stated value will 
have no impact on the provision of the good, or that their stated value is 
disconnected from the actual amount they will be required to pay (or accept) for 
the good, then there is an incentive for strategic bias, and the value estimate will 
not reflect the respondent‘s true preference. 
Failing to ensure subject anonymity is also argued to introduce a bias into 
the values elicited from participants. It is argued that participants making 
decisions without anonymity are more likely to think about how other people will 
view their decision and may therefore provide what they think is a ‗socially 
acceptable‘ response, rather than a response based on their true preference. In a 
CV context, failing to provide anonymity may result in WTA estimates being 
overstated as respondents want to views as a ―talented bargainer‖ (Plott & Zeiler, 
2005, p. 538). 
Allowing for participant learning is expected to increase how accurately 
WTP and WTA values capture a respondent‘s true preference towards a good, and 
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since these two measures should theoretically be identical (Willig, 1976), doing so 
is expected to eliminate the disparity. Several authors provide compelling 
evidence in support of this concept, finding that allowing for participant learning 
significantly reduces the WTA-WTP gap (Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et al., 
1994), but other investigations, such as Morrison (2002), found no such effect. 
  
While Plott and Zeiler‘s (2005) experiment, which controlled for all of the 
features of weak experimental design detailed previously, found that WTA and 
WTP measures converged for a simple market good (a mug), evidence provided 
by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and Kahneman et al. (1990), found that doing 
so did remove the disparity. Weak experimental design, while offering a partial 
explanation for the WTA-WTP gap, is generally considered not to be the sole 
cause of the disparity. 
 
2.10.6 The Substitutability Effect 
Hanemann‘s (1991) substitutability hypothesis explains the WTA-WTP 
gap as being caused by a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between 
private consumption and the non-market good being valued. Accordingly, goods 
that have easily accessible substitutes, such as pens and candy bars, should 
produce a lower WTA-WTP ratio than goods that do not have easily accessible 
substitutes, such as most public goods. While many experiments have produced 
findings in support of Hanemann‘s theory (W. L. Adamowicz et al., 1993; 
Horowitz & McConnell, 2002; Shogren et al., 1994), the authors also note the 
substitution hypothesis cannot account for the entire disparity between WTA and 
WTP, as a significant gap is still evident even for easily substitutable goods. 
Horowitz and McConnell (2002) for example, show that non-market valuation of 
ordinary private goods still produced an average WTA-WTP ratio of 2.92, when 
the substitutability hypothesis would predict a ratio closer to 1:1. Some 




2.10.7 The Endowment Effect 
An alternative explanation for the significant WTA-WTP gap is known as 
the endowment effect, and is based on the idea that a participant‘s true value for 
good increases once they are in possession of that good (Thaler, 1980). This 
argument suggests that participants asked to state their WTA hold property rights 
to the good where as WTP respondents do not, and that ―this difference in point of 
reference causes a disparity between WTA and WTP‖ (Bischoff, 2008, p. 284). 
While following a similar line of thought to the conventional income effect 
explanation for the disparity, the endowment effect theory suggests that the gap is 
greater than the income effect would suggest due to either a parting disutility 
effect or an unanticipated ownership utility effect. 
The parting disutility explanation for the endowment effect is based on 
Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect theory which suggested that individuals 
place a higher value on the loss of a good than the gain of an identical good. 
Thaler suggested that ―goods that are included in the individual's endowment will 
be more highly valued than those not held in the endowment, ceteris paribus,... 
because removing a good from the endowment creates a loss while adding the 
same good (to an endowment without it) generates a gain‖, and according to 
prospect theory this loss will be more highly valued than the gain (1980, p. 44). 
The unanticipated ownership utility effect suggests that participants who 
are endowed with a good (i.e. the WTA respondents) become attached to that 
good resulting in a gain in welfare that they were unable to anticipate 
(Loewenstein & Adler, 1995; Bischoff, 2008)). If participants were able to fully 
predict this increase in utility then WTA and WTP should not differ (Bischoff & 
Meckl, 2008). However, if this extra utility is unanticipated, then only those 
participants endowed with the good experience the change which increases their 
WTA for the good. 
It is also noted that the endowment effect would only create a WTA-WTP 
disparity if the good being valued did not have any perfect substitutes. If the good 
does have a perfect substitute then participants‘ indifference curves will be 
straight, and WTP will equal WTA.   
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Chapter 3 Method 
 
This method section will begin with a review of the core research 
objectives (3.1) that this thesis aims to address. Following this is an overview of 
the experimental design, detailing the six different treatment groups that were 
required to the collect the data necessary to analyse these research objectives 
(3.2). Next, the construction of the six different survey designs (one for each of 
the six treatment groups) will be described and analysed (3.3), followed in section 
3.4 by a description of the data collection process. Section 3.5 will address 
limitations of the experimental design, and section 3.6 will provide a brief 
summary of the methodology section. 
 
3.1 Research Objectives 
As outlined in the Research Objectives segment of this thesis in chapter 1, 
there are two core areas of investigation that this thesis aims to cover, both of 
which explore the underlying cause of the prominent WTA-WTP disparity 
commonly observed in CV experiments: 
 
3) Investigation of the Endowment Effect 
This research objective aims to isolate the effect that the endowment of a 
good has on participants‘ valuation of that good while controlling for other 
possible causes of valuation disparity, such as weak experimental design. 
Furthermore, this research aims to distinguish between an endowment effect 
caused by parting disutility and an endowment effect caused by unanticipated 
ownership utility. 
To investigate the endowment effect explanation for the WTA-WTP gap, 
two research questions are posed: 
e) Does a significant WTA-WTP disparity emerge in a CV experiment even 
when controlling for features of weak experimental design? 
f) Are individuals who are not endowed with a good able to anticipate the 
magnitude of the endowment effect experienced by participants who are 




4) Investigation of a Hypothetical Bias  
This research objective aims to investigate how the hypothetical nature of 
a contingent valuation experiment impacts on the valuation estimates of 
participants, and also to assess whether a hypothetical bias contributes to the 
WTA-WTP disparity. To investigate these points, two more research questions are 
posed: 
g) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce significantly different 
valuation results to those obtained from an identical experiment but where 
participants‘ decisions have a binding monetary consequence? 
h) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce a significantly 
different WTA-WTP gap than an identical experiment with a binding 
monetary consequence? 
 
In the following section, detail will be provided about the experimental 
design that was constructed to collect all of the data necessary to answer the 
research questions stated above. Once the design of the experiment is explained, 
and the various treatment groups have been identified, six hypotheses will be 





3.2 Experimental Design Overview 
This experiment adopts a design based on that used by Loewenstein and 
Adler (1995) and Bischoff (2008). Like these two previous research papers, one of 
the goals of this experiment is to isolate the effect that endowment has on an 
individual‘s valuation of a good, with the specific intention of separating the 
unanticipated ownership effect from the parting disutility effect. Therefore, 
following the methodology laid out in these previous investigations creates a 
reliable foundation for later analysis. This experiment also attempts to test 
whether the hypothetical nature of a contingent valuation experiment affects the 
WTP and WTA values stated by participants.  
In order to achieve these goals, a laboratory-based contingent valuation 
survey was designed, which aimed to estimate the monetary value that 
participants place on a single attribute of a t-shirt, which was certified organic 
cotton, under differing experimental conditions.  
 
3.2.1 The Good 
Certified organic cotton was chosen to be the attribute under valuation 
because it holds certain ‗public good‘ qualities, which were able to be emphasized 
through the design of the CV experiment. For example, certified organic cotton 
was defined as a non-rival good, since one participant receiving the good would 
not reduce any other participant‘s ability to receive the good. Organic cotton was 
also defined as a non-excludable good, since the outcome of the CV experiment 
determined whether the group as a whole received or did not receive the attribute, 
so no individual participant was able to be excluded from gaining the good once it 
was provided. See section 3.3.4 for more information on the rule of provision for 
the good. 
The purpose of defining the organic cotton attribute as a public good was 
to try an replicate the experimental design used by Bischoff (2008), who used the 
CVM to value a tutorial session. Furthermore, many of the real-world applications 
of the CVM involve public goods, so basing this experiment on the valuation of a 




3.2.2 What Data the Needed to be Collected 
3.2.2.1 Binding WTP and WTA Treatment Groups 
To identify the effects of endowment on participants‘ valuation of organic 
cotton, two treatment groups were needed: WTP_B, who were asked for their 
maximum willingness to pay to gain organic cotton, and WTA_B, who would be 
asked for their minimum willingness to accept to accept the loss of organic cotton. 
These two treatment groups were involved in a binding contingent valuation 
experiment, where the valuation decisions of the participants had real monetary 
consequences. This was to ensure the incentive-compatibility of the elicitation 
mechanism, and to allow for a comparison with value estimates collected from 
WTP and WTA groups where were involved in a purely hypothetical CV 
experiment.  
Comparing the value estimates of participants not endowed with the good 
to the value estimate of those participants who are endowed with the good will 
provide a measure of how endowment affects an individual‘s valuation of organic 
cotton. 
 
3.2.2.2 Prediction WTP and WTA Treatment Groups 
To separate unanticipated ownership utility from parting disutility, 
estimated WTP and WTA data needed to be elicited from two more groups of 
participants, neither of which had been endowed with the organic cotton attribute. 
Following Bischoff‘s (2008) design, this required two prediction groups: WTP_P, 
who was asked to estimate the actual willingness to pay of WTP_B, and WTA_P, 
who was asked to estimate the actual willingness to accept of WTA_B. 
According to the hypothesis of Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and 
Bischoff (2008), the WTP_P group should be able to provide an unbiased estimate 
of WTP_B group‘s valuation since they are at the same level of endowment (i.e. 
neither of them are endowed), while the WTA_P group should be able to provide 
an unbiased estimate of the WTA_B group‘s valuation only if there is no 
unanticipated ownership utility. Since the WTA_P group can not anticipate this 
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additional ownership utility, their WTA estimate should be less than the actual 
WTA of the binding treatment group. 
How closely predicted WTA comes to actual WTA, assuming that 
predicted and actual WTP are equal, will provide a measure of the relative 
contribution of unanticipated ownership utility and parting disutility to the WTA-
WTP disparity. 
 
3.2.2.3 Hypothetical WTP and WTA Treatment Groups 
To test whether the hypothetical nature of CV experiments is a 
contributing factor to the WTA-WTP gap, hypothetical WTP and WTA data is 
elicited under similar conditions to those set in the binding treatment groups. The 
hypothetical WTP group (WTP_H) underwent an identical procedure to the 
binding WTP group, except it was emphasized that there was no connection 
between participants‘ stated WTP values and the outcome of the experiment. The 
same conditions were set for the hypothetical WTA group (WTA_H). 
By comparing the value estimates collected from the hypothetical treated 
groups to those elicited from the binding treatment groups, any hypothetical bias 
will be identifiable, and any contribution of such a bias to the WTA-WTP gap will 
be observed. 
 
3.2.3 Summary of Treatment Groups and Construction of Hypotheses 
As noted above, six different treatment groups are required to collect the 
data necessary for examination of this thesis‘ research objectives. These groups 
are: 
WTP_B - Elicits WTP data from participants in a binding CV scenario 
WTA_B - Elicits WTA data from participants in a binding CV scenario 
WTP_H - Elicits WTP data from participants in a hypothetical CV 
scenario 
WTA_H - Elicits WTA data from participants in a hypothetical CV 
scenario 
WTP_P - Provides an estimate of the WTP_B data 
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WTA_P - Provides an estimate of the WTA_B data 
 
Using data collected from these six treatment groups (above), four 
hypotheses can now be constructed which will help to answer the research 
questions detailed in section 3.1. 
 
1) Does a significant WTA-WTP disparity emerge in a CV experiment even 
when controlling for features of weak experimental design? 
H0: WTA_B = WTP_B 
H1: WTA_B > WTP_B 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and WTP_B treatment groups. 
 
2) Are individuals who are not endowed with a good able to anticipate the 
magnitude of the endowment effect experienced by participants who are 
endowed with the good? 
H0: WTA_B = WTA_P 
H1: WTA_B  ≠  WTA_P 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B treatment group, and those values predicted from the 
WTA_P treatment group. 
 
3) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce significantly different 
valuation results to those obtained from an identical experiment but where 
participants‘ decisions have a binding monetary consequence? 
H0: WTP_B = WTP_H 
H1: WTP_B ≠ WTP_H 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 




H0: WTA_B = WTA_H 
H1: WTA_B ≠ WTA_H 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and the WTA_H treatment groups. 
 
3.2.4 Qualtrics – Online Survey Building Software 
Since the experiments were conducted in the computer laboratories of the 
Waikato Management School, participants were able to be given web-based 
surveys rather than traditional paper-based surveys. This online data collection 
method had two key benefits: 1) it saved time and resources since the surveys did 
not need to be printed and distributed to respondents, and 2) since the data was 
already recorded in an online spreadsheet, time was also saved not having to input 
data from hard-copy surveys into a computer database. 
Survey-building software Qualtrics was used (www.qualtrics.com) to 
construct the six different questionnaires required for the experiment. This 
software allowed for excellent customisation of the content and process of the 
survey, and offered several advantages over paper-based methods. For example, 
the bidding game mechanism which was used in the experiment was able to be 
customized so that once a participant selected the ‗no-buy‘ option in the WTP 
groups or the ‗exchange‘ option in the WTA groups (which represented their 
maximum WTP and minimum WTA respectively), the participant would skip to 
the next stage of the experiment, rather than going through the rest of the price 
levels which were irrelevant. The results of the Qualtrics-based survey were 
collected in a downloadable file which could be interpreted by Microsoft Excel, 
SPSS, and a number of other data-analysis packages.  
 
The following section will provide a detailed look at the design of the six 
different surveys which were constructed using Qualtrics to collect the data 




3.3 Construction of the Experimental Surveys 
As outlined in the Experimental Design overview (section 3.2), six 
separate surveys needed to be constructed to collect the different types of 
valuation data necessary for analysis. These six surveys, while differing slightly in 
design, all needed put participants in the same contingent valuation scenario, and 
elicit value measures from them through an identical process. This was to ensure 
that any difference in valuation results could be attributed directly to the 
intentional changes in survey design, rather than other random factors. The core 
differences between surveys lie in whether the survey was collecting WTP or 
WTA data and whether the experiment had binding monetary consequences, was 
purely hypothetical, or was a prediction exercise. 
The following section will provide a detailed look at the design of the two 
contingent valuation surveys that were given to the binding WTP and WTA 
treatment groups, highlighting the small but critical differences between these two 
surveys. The examination will move through the survey process in the same way 
the participants did, and will address important design features such as: the design 
of the market scenario, the elicitation mechanism and provisional rule, and the 
follow-up questions that participants were asked.  
Following this in-depth examination of the two binding CV surveys, brief 
detail will then be provided regarding the two hypothetical surveys (WTP_H and 
WTA_H) which are identical to their binding counterparts with the exception of a 
few changed in terminology used to emphasize the hypothetical nature of the 
experiment. Lastly, the surveys used to collect predicted WTP and WTA data will 
be addressed (WTP_P and WTA_P), and the incentive compatibility of the 




3.3.1 The Binding WTP and WTA Surveys 
3.3.1.1 Introduction - Defining the base-line level of provision 
At the beginning of the survey, participants in the binding WTP and WTA 
groups were informed that have won a free t-shirt, and were shown an image of 
the t-shirt. Those individuals in the WTP group were informed that their t-shirt is 
made from non-organic cotton, while those in the WTA group were told that their 
t-shirt is made from 100% organic cotton. Participants were then asked to select 
their preferred t-shirt size and colour. 
This introduction to the survey is a critical component to building the CV 
scenario because it defines the property rights for the attribute being valued, 
which in this case is certified organic cotton, and sets the initial levels of 
provision. Both groups were awarded with an identically styled t-shirts, but the 
provision of the organic cotton attribute is given only to those participants in the 
WTA treatment, and not those in the WTP treatment. This sets the two levels of 
endowment which is one of the focus points of this experiment. 
Next, all participants were informed that the experiment was ‗interested in 
[their] opinion about t-shirts made using certified organic cotton’. Those 
individuals in the WTP group were told that their t-shirt can ‘be made using 100% 
certified organic cotton, at an additional cost to [them], depending on the 
outcome of this decision making experiment’ (Appendix 1). Participants in the 
WTA group were told that the ‗t-shirt that [they] have been given can be made 
using 100% certified organic cotton, at no additional cost to [them], depending 
on the outcome of this decision making experiment‘,  
The phasing of this information is again aimed to reinforce property rights 
for the organic cotton attribute while maintaining as much similarity as is possible 




3.3.1.2 Describing the good 
According to Mitchell & Carson (1989) it is important to describe the 
good being valued so that participants are made aware of what exactly they are 
being asked to purchase or sell. It is possible that some participants may not 
understand what the term ‗organic cotton‘ actually means, and it is likely that 
most will have limited knowledge of its benefits. Therefore, a brief paragraph on 
the definition and benefits of organic cotton was offered to participants.  
This information described how cotton is ‗traditionally known as the 
world‘s ‗dirtiest‘ crop because of the large amount of synthetic fertilizers and 
insecticides used in its production‘, and how ‗certified organic cotton is grown 
using methods and materials that have a low impact on the environment‘ (see 
Appendix 1). It is also noted that organic cotton production systems can help to 
replenish and maintain soil fertility, reduce the use of toxic and persistent 
pesticides and fertilizers, and help to build biologically diverse agriculture 
This information aimed to help participants become more familiar with the 
concept of organic cotton, and the benefits associated with organic cotton 
production. 
 
3.3.1.3 Instructions - Elicitation mechanism and provisional Rule 
Once the good (organic cotton) had been described to participants, they 
were then provided with instructions which introduced to the elicitation 
mechanism and also the rule which would decide the final provision of the good. 
WTP_B Elicitation Mechanism and Provisional Rule 
Respondents in the WTP_B group were informed that a ‗number of [their] 
fellow participants [had] also just been given a free non-organic cotton t-shirt, 
and a set of instructions identical to [theirs]’ (Appendix 2) 
Participants were then informed they were going to be given a ‘series of 
options where [they] will indicate whether [they] would prefer to keep the non-
organic cotton t-shirt or exchange it for an identical certified organic cotton t-
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shirt for which [they] would be required to pay the amount indicated’. An 
example of the elicitation question was then provided to them, and they were told 
that the price level would increase at $1 increments until they were no longer 
willing to pay for the organic cotton upgrade, and this would represent their 
maximum willingness to pay. 
The provisional rule was then introduced to the binding WTP group, a rule 
which was based on whether the average maximum WTP of the group as a whole 
was greater than the actual cost associated with the organic cotton attribute, 
denoted by $C. This cost of organic cotton ($C), was set at $4 by the 
experimenter, but was unknown to the participants. This cost estimate for organic 
cotton was based on observations from a web-based wholesalers which sold both 
organic and non organic cotton t-shirts, but the actual level of $C is largely 
irrelevant to the experimental process.  
Participants in the WTP group were then told that if the “average 
[maximum] amount the group is willing to pay is equal to or greater than $C, 
then all of [their] t-shirts will be made using organic cotton and [they] will each 
be required to pay this additional cost ($C) before [they] are able to pick up 
[their] t-shirt‘ (Appendix 2). They were also informed that if the average 
maximum WTP of the group was less than $C, then no one would receive the 
organic cotton attribute, and no one would be required to make any payment. This 
provisional rule is theoretically incentive compatible, meaning it is in the 
respondent‘s best interest to answer truthfully, for the reasons outline in section 
3.3.3. 
 
WTA_B Elicitation Mechanism and Provisional Rule 
Respondents in the WTA_B group were informed that a ‗number of [their] 
fellow participants [had] also just been given a free 100% Certified Organic 
Cotton t-shirt, and a set of instructions identical to [theirs]’ (Appendix 3). 
Participants were then informed they were going to be given ‗a series of 
options where [they] will indicate whether [they] would prefer to keep the 
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certified organic cotton t-shirt or exchange it for an identical non-organic cotton 
t-shirt for which [they] would receive a personal payment of the amount 
indicated’. An example of the elicitation question was then provided to them, and 
they were told that the price offered would increase at $1 increments until they 
were willing to exchange their organic cotton shirt for the non-organic shirt. 
The provisional rule was then introduced to the WTA group, a rule based 
on whether the average minimum WTA of the participants was greater than the 
actual cost associated with the organic cotton attribute, denoted by $C.  
Participants in the WTA group were then told that if the ‗average 
minimum payment demanded by the group is less than the $C, then all of [their] 
shirts will be made from non-organic cotton and [they] will each receive a 
payment of $C, regardless of whether or not this is [their] personal preference‘ 
(Appendix 3). Participants are also informed that if the group‘s average WTA is 
equal to or greater than $C, then they all retain their organic cotton t-shirt, and no 
one receives any further payment. 
 
3.3.1.4 The Value Elicitation Process 
Once the elicitation mechanism and the provisional rule had been 
introduced, participants moved on to the real elicitation choice questions. Before 
they began their first choice task, the binding nature of their decisions was again 
reinforced. 
An iterative bidding game was chosen to be the elicitation mechanism 
used in this experiment because its simplicity makes it easy for participants to 
understand, and because it aims to directly capture the maximum (minimum) 
amount an individual is willing to pay (willing to accept) for a good (see section 
2.23). Alternative mechanism, such as the dichotomous choice approach, require 
the use of econometric regression techniques to derive participants‘ maximum 
WTP or minimum WTA, and often require a much larger sample size to produce 
value estimates of statistical significance (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 101). 
Using such mechanisms would add unnecessary complexity to the data-analyse 
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process, and would reduce the statistical power of the value estimates derived 
from the relatively small participant sample. 
The willingness to pay elicitation questions asked participants to select 
their most preferred of two options: a) ‘Keep non-organic cotton t-shirt, or’ b) 
‘Exchange for an identical organic cotton t-shirt and pay $_X_’, where the value 
of X increased from $1 to $20 at $1 increments (Appendix 4). If a participant 
selected option-b, indicating that they were willing to pay the amount X to 
purchase the organic cotton attribute for t-shirt, then the price would increase by 
$1 and they would again be asked to choose their most preferred option. This 
process would continue until either the participant selected the ‗Keep non-organic 
cotton t-shirt‘ option, or they reached the end of the payment ladder, at which 
point they would move on to the next stage of the survey. The highest $X amount 
that an individual was willing to pay to upgrade their non-organic cotton t-shirt to 
an organic cotton t-shirt is interpreted as their maximum WTP for organic cotton. 
The willingness to accept elicitation question however, asked participants 
to select their most preferred of two options: a) ‗Keep organic cotton t-shirt, or’ 
b) ‗Exchange for an identical non-organic cotton t-shirt and $_X_’, where the 
value of X again increased from $1 to $20 at $1 increments (Appendix 5). If a 
participant selected option-a, indicating they were not willing to sell the organic 
cotton attribute of their t-shirt for the amount X, then the price would increase by 
$1 and they would again be asked to choose their most preferred option. This 
process would continue until the participant either selected the sell-option (option-
b), or reached the end of the payment ladder, at which point they would move on 
to the next part of the survey. The point at which a participant switched from 
option-a to option-b is considered the minimum compensation they require to 
accept the loss of the organic cotton attribute (i.e. WTA). 
 
3.3.1.5 The Prediction Exercise 
After the maximum WTP or minimum WTA had been elicited from the 
participants in the two binding groups, they were then presented with a prediction 
exercise where they were asked to estimate the average valuation collected from 
the other group. This meant that the WTP_B group was asked to estimate the 
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average WTA of the WTA_B group, and vice versa. Further detail regarding the 
process of this prediction exercise, as well as the four other prediction exercises 
included in this experiment, will be provided in section 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.1.6 Follow-Up Questions 
Once participants in the two binding groups had completed their respective 
elicitation and prediction exercises, they were presented with a series of ‗follow-
up‘ questions. This section was identical for all participants in all six of the 
treatment groups, 
The follow-up questions collected standard demographic data from the 
participants including their: age, gender, occupation, weekly disposable income, 
number of dependents, education, and ethnicity. This demographic information 
would be regressed against participants‘ WTA and WTP to ensure their valuation 
responses were not purely random (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
Following these questions, participants were thanked for their time, and 
told to see the experiment supervisor to collect their $25 compensation payment. 
They were informed that their t-shirt, made from either organic or non-organic 
cotton, depending on the outcome of the experiment, would be ready to be picked 
up within two of three weeks, and that they would need to exchange their 
participant card for their t-shirt (since no names were collected during the 
experiment). This ended the binding experimental procedure. 
 
3.3.2 The Hypothetical WTP and WTA Surveys 
The two hypothetical CV surveys (WTP_H and WTA_H) were identical to 
their binding counterparts, except that various words had been changed to ensure 
respondent‘s understood that the experiment was purely hypothetical. The 
information on the benefits of organic cotton, the initial setting of property rights, 
the instructions that were given, and the elicitation mechanism and provisional 
rule that were used were all identical to those previously described in section 
3.3.1, with the exception of several differences in terminology. These differences 
will now be addressed with regards to the WTP treatment only. The WTA_H 
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survey is identical to the WTA_B survey, except for the same changes in 
terminology that will now be identified for the hypothetical WTP survey. 
In the beginning of the experiment, when the property rights were being 
defined, participants in the hypothetical WTP group were told to ‗Imagine that 
[they had] just won a free t-shirt made from Non-Organic, as oppose to the 
introduction of the WTP_B group which informed participants that they ‗had’ 
won a real t-shirt. Furthermore, in the instructions section of the survey, the word 
‗imagine’ was added in some places and phrases such as ‗would be willing to pay’ 
were replaced with ‗would have been willing to pay’, in order to emphasize the 
hypothetical nature of the experiment. Prior to beginning the elicitation procedure, 
participants in the hypothetical treatment groups were asked to ‗remember that the 
results of this experiment are purely hypothetical, but try to answer as though the 
scenario is real’ 
The wording of the elicitation questions for the two hypothetical groups 
was the same as for the binding groups, as was the prediction exercise and the 
follow-up questions. More detail on the prediction exercise will be presented in 
the following section (3.4.3). 
 
3.3.3 The Predicted WTP and WTA Surveys 
The two surveys that were used to collect estimated WTP and WTA data 
(WTP_P and WTA_P) aimed to place respondents within a CV scenario identical 
to the one used to elicit the actual binding WTP and WTA data. According to 
Bischoff, ―when having to predict the preference of others, subjects anchor on 
their own preferences‖, so the closer the preferences of the prediction groups‘ 
matched those of the binding groups‘, the more closely predicted values should 
match actual values. It was therefore critical to ensure that factors which may 
influence participants‘ preferences, such as demographic characteristics and the 
survey process, were identical in both the prediction and binding groups. 
Random allocation of participant into the six different treatment groups 
ensured that demographic characteristics should be similar across all groups. 
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Therefore preferences due to the age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, and education 
of participants should also be equal across all groups. To further ensure that the 
preferences of the prediction groups were similar to those of the binding groups, 
the two prediction surveys were identical to their binding counterparts except that 
it was made clear to participants that they were to try and predict the average 
valuation made by the binding groups. The prediction surveys will now be 
described with reference to the WTP_P survey only, which ran in an identical 
fashion to the WTP_B survey, with a few small changes. The WTA_P survey is 
identical to the WTA_B survey, with the same necessary alteration which will 
now be outlined below for the WTP_P survey. 
The WTP_P survey began by informing respondents that ‗A number of 
[their] fellow participants, selected at random, [had] each won a plain t-shirt 
made from non-organic cotton, similar to the one seen below [an image of a t-
shirt was inserted]‘. The prediction participants were able to customise the t-shirt 
in the same way the binding group had done so. Next, respondents were informed 
that this group (WTP_B) had been given the option to exchange their non-organic 
t-shirts for identical organic cotton t-shirts, depending the group‘s average 
willingness to pay for the upgrade. The prediction participants were told that they 
were going to be given the same survey that the WTP_B group had received, but 
that they should ‗answer the survey questions on the bases of how you believe they 
[the WTP_B respondents] will respond to them’ (Appendix 6). An incentive to 
encourage thoughtful prediction estimates was introduced by offering a $40 cash 
reward to the participant able to provide the most accurate prediction of the 
average WTP of the binding participants. 
Following this introductory information, the survey proceeded in an 
identical fashion to that of the WTP_B survey, explaining the benefits of organic 
cotton, the elicitation mechanism, and the provisional rule that would be used. 
Before they began the actual elicitation procedure however, they were told to 
‗Remember that [they] are answering these questions on the basis of how [they] 
believe [their] fellow participants will answer them, noting that their [the binding 
group] decisions have real monetary implications’. The $40 monetary reward was 
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also reinforced, before participants proceeded with the bidding game elicitation 
mechanism. 
Once they had completed the prediction elicitation process, the WTP_P 
group were given the same follow-up questions that all respondents received, and 
were then asked to leave the experiment room. The differences between the 
WTP_P and WTP_B groups detailed above were identical to the differences 
between the WTA_P and WTA_B groups. 
3.3.3.1 Additional Prediction Surveys 
As well as the two primary prediction exercises (WTP_P and WTA_P), 
prediction data was also collected from the four other treatment groups after they 
had each completed their main elicitation task. The binding and hypothetical WTP 
groups were both asked to estimate the average WTA of the WTA_B participants, 
while the binding and hypothetical WTA groups were both asked to predict the 
average WTP of the WTP_B participants. These additional prediction exercises 
were conducted using the exact same survey design that was given to the two 
main prediction groups. 
 
3.3.4 Incentive Compatibility of the Provisional Rule 
The provisional rule used in this experiment, described in section 3.3.1, 
was designed to be incentive compatible, meaning that it is in participant‘s best 
interest to state their true WTP or WTA for the good. Its incentive compatibility is 
reliant on the fact that participants do not know the value of $C, which removes 
the strategic incentive to overstate or understate their true valuation of the good to 
try and influence the average WTP or WTA of the group. To demonstrate this 
point, the thought process of a respondent stating their WTP when $C is known 
and when $C is unknown will be examined. 
If a participant‘s true WTP is $10 and the value of $C is known to be $7, 
then the participant has an incentive to overstate their true valuation to increase 
the average WTP of the group and ensure provision of the good, because they 
know they will only be required to pay the $7. If a participant‘s true WTP is $5 
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and $C is known to be $7, then there is an incentive to understate their true WTP 
to reduce the average WTP of the group, and have the good withheld.   
This incentive to produce biased valuation data results from the fact that 
participants believe that their stated WTP will influence the provision of the good, 
since provision is based on the group‘s average valuation, but is unrelated to the 
actual amount they will be required to pay, since this amount is determined by $C 
(Bateman et al., 2002, p. 128). To remove this incentive for strategic bias, $C is 
therefore made unknown to participants, thereby creating a connection between 
stated WTP and the actual amount participants will be required to pay. 
If a participant‘s true WTP is $10 and the value of $C is unknown, then an 
overstated WTP may result in the participant actually having to pay more than 
$10 if the good is provided (e.g. is $C was $12). An understatement of true WTP 
may result in the good not being provided even thought the participant would 
have been willing to pay the amount necessary to obtain the good (e.g. if $C was 
$7). The fact that $C is unknown to the participant means they should not 
understate or overstate their true WTP or WTA, because doing so may result in an 
unfavourable outcome for the participant. Therefore, the provisional rule outlined 
above is considered incentive compatible. 
 
In the following section, the process of data collection will be examined, 





3.4 Data Collection 
3.4.1 Collecting Participants 
To gather participants for the experiment, a number of different 
recruitment strategies were utilised, which included: talking directly to students 
during a summer school class, starting a number of email-chain to spread 
information about the experiment, distributing flyers throughout the Waikato 
University campus, and placing a job advertisement on a student employment 
website. In order to encourage involvement, a $25 participation fee was promised 
to each respondent to compensate them for their time. 
On the first of December 2010, a third-year finance class of around 40 
students was given a brief presentation which explained the details of the 
experiment, the compensation participants would receive, and instructions on how 
to register for one of the six experiment sessions. Students were free to ask further 
questions regarding the experiment to clarity any points. 
Due to ethical restrictions on the use of Waikato University‘s student 
email distribution list, it was not possible to publicise the experiment to all 
students through a single bulk email. A chain-email approach was instead adopted 
where students were encouraged to distribute a information sheet about the 
experiment to friends that they believed might be interested in taking part in the 
experiment. This information sheet (Appendix 7) provided brief details about the 
experiment, such as how long the session would take, what the research was 
investigating, and the compensation payment participants would receive for their 
time. Copies of this experiment information sheet were also posted on 12 notice 
boards around the University campus, particularly in areas of high foot traffic so 
as to maximise exposure.  
As well as the in-class presentation, the chain-email system, and the 
distribution of flyers around the university, a job-placement was also advertised 
on the Student Job Search website (www.sjs.co.nz). This advertisement stated that 
student participants were wanted for an economics experiment that would be held 
in the Waikato Management School computer labs, and that participants would 
receive a payment of $25 for roughly one hour of their time. 
The response to the various forms of recruitment, particularly the SJS 
notice, was substantial, and within two weeks of the web-based registration 
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system being opened, the six experiment sessions were fully booked with 180 
registered participants. The number of participants allowed to register for each 
experiment session was limited to 30 to make conducting the sessions easier for 
the experimenters, and also due to limitations on the number of computers 
available in the laboratory.  
 
3.4.2 Collecting Data 
Data was collected during six experiment sessions which ran from the 13
th
 
of December 2010 till the 16
th
 of December 2010 in the computer labs of the 
Waikato University Management School. Each session involved between 27 and 
30 participants and lasted up to one hour, with the first half of each session 
dedicated to a contingent ranking experiment being conducted by Professor 
Riccardo Scarpa, and the second half dedicated to the contingent valuation 
experiment detailed previously.  
The decision to run both the contingent ranking experiment and the 
contingent valuation experiment consecutively was based on both financial 
constraints and time constraints. Running the experiments independently would 
have meant additional participants would have needed to be recruited and further 
compensation payments would have needed to be made to ensure the desired 
quantity of respondents were attained for both experiment. Joining the two 
experiments together was therefore convenient, and since no adverse impacts on 
either the ranking exercise or the CV exercise were expected, the decision would 
have a minimal effect the results of the experiments. 
As previously noted, there were six experimental treatment groups 
involved in the CV experiment, each with a different survey design: WTP_B, 
WTA_B, WTP_H, WTA_H, WTP_P, and WTA_P. During each of the six 
experiment sessions, participants were divided evenly and randomly into these six 
treatment groups through the use of randomly-distributed participant cards, and 
data was collected accordingly. This process had the advantage of ensuring a 
random allocation of participants to each of the six treatment groups. If each 
experimental session has been dedicated to just one the six treatment groups, then 
the sample for each treatment may not have been random since the day and time 
of each experiment session may influence the type of participants involved (e.g. a 
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higher proportion of people with jobs may participate in the 6pm - 7pm sessions 
due to work obligations). 
 
3.4.3 The Experimental Procedure 
The procedure for each of the six experiment session was identical to 
ensure that no bias was introduced into the results from differences in the 
experimental process. Each session lasted up to one hour, with half of that time 
allocated to Professor Scarpa‘s contingent ranking experiment and the remainder 
allocated to the CV experiment. What follows is an overview of how a typical 
experiment session was conducted. 
At the beginning of the experiment session each person randomly selected 
a ‗participant card‘ which provided them with a unique participant-id number, a 
treatment code for the experiment, and a unique security code. Participant-id 
numbers ranged from 100 to 130 for the first experiment, 200 to 230 for the 
second experiment, and so on, and were the only form of identification attached to 
respondents‘ answers. Treatment codes ranged from one to six (i.e. for each of the 
six subgroups) with roughly five of the thirty participants being allocated to each 
of the six treatment codes in each experiment session. See Appendix 8 for an 
example of the participant card design. Participants were informed that these cards 
were important and that they should keep them in a safe place after the 
experiment, since any prizes won during the session, such as t-shirts or prediction 
winnings, would need to be collected upon redemption of the participant card. 
Once each person had received a participant card they were asked to find 
an unoccupied computer and read through the information sheet which was 
displayed on the screen, ticking the ‗I agree‘ box if they accepted the conditions 
specified on the form. See Appendix 9 for the Information Sheet for Participants. 
Participants were asked not to begin the survey until they had been given further 
instruction. 
After a majority of the thirty participants who had registered for the 
session had arrived and taken their seats, the introductory dialogue (Appendix 10) 
was read aloud to the class. This dialogue introduced the two experimenters, 
Riccardo Scarpa and Francis Powley, and clarified the structure that the 
experiment session would take. Participants were informed that the unique id 
 100 
 
number they had each been given would be the only connection between 
themselves and the responses that they provide, ensuring their complete 
anonymity. They were asked to read all of the information in the survey 
thoroughly and to pay particular attention to the instructions they were given. 
They were told that after completing their first set of ranking choice tasks they 
would need to enter their participant-id and treatment-id numbers before 
continuing to the second half of the experiment (the CV component). Participants 
were advised to raise their hand if they had any questions or ran into any technical 
difficulties during the session in order to alert the experimenters. It was also noted 
that the experiment was investigating their individual preferences towards the 
each of the options they were to be given, so there were no right or wrong 
answers. Lastly, they were told that they could collect their $25 compensation 
payment outside the class room once they had completed the experiment. 
Once the introductory dialogue was complete, participants were again 
asked to thoroughly read through the Information Sheet for Participant, if they 
had not already done so, and were then told they could begin the experiment. 
During the subsequent hour, participants each worked through their survey 
individually, with only a few technical difficulties arising, most of which related 
to the images failing to load on the computer screen. These issues were quickly 
resolved with only a minor interference into the experimental process. As 
participants each completed the experiment, they left the room to collect their $25 
and were asked again to keep their participant card safe if they wished to collect 
any prizes they may have won. 
 
The six experimental sessions were all conducted in the way described 
above, with no distinguishable difference in process between the sessions. 
Therefore, participants within each of the six treatment groups received identical 
information and underwent an identical survey procedure even though they were 
divided over six different session times. Furthermore, a majority of the 
information which participants received was provided via the computerised 
survey itself, which again helped to minimise any difference in procedure between 
sessions. Ensuring that all participants underwent the same experimental 
procedure was vital since the data collected from a particular treatment group (e.g. 
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WTP_B) in a single session (e.g. session 1) would be aggregated with the 
associated data from the five other sessions, and any differences in the data 
collection process would make this aggregation problematic.  
  
3.4.4 Ethical Issues 
To comply with the ethical research guidelines put in place by the Waikato 
University, it was necessary to provide participants with full anonymity. To 
achieve this goal each person was given a unique participant card upon entry into 
the computer labs which provided a respondent number as well as a treatment 
code. The individual was asked to enter these details into the survey system prior 
to commencing the experiment.  
Other than anonymity, there was no ethical concerns regarding the 
contingent valuation experiment, and the research was granted ethical approval by 
the Waikato Management School Ethics Committee. See Appendix 11 for the 





3.5.1 Theoretical Validity 
The validity of a CV study is a related to how accurately the experiment is 
able to measure the true economic value that individuals place on a good. The 
concept of validity is separated into convergent validity, the degree to which an 
alternative non-market valuation technique produces WTP estimates which 
converge with those of the CV experiment, and theoretical validity, which is how 
closely the experiment‘s findings are consistent with economic theory (see section 
2.3.3 - Evaluating the Validity and Reliability of CV Data). 
Testing for theoretical validity usually involves regressing an individual‘s 
WTP against independent variable which hold some theoretical connection to 
their WTP, such as their attitudes towards the good (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
However, the experiment presented previously did not collect data on 
participants‘ attitudes towards organic cotton or the benefits associated with 
organic cotton production, so testing the theoretical validity of the valuation 
estimates is problematic. Without attitude data from participants a comprehensive 
test for theoretical validity is not achievable, though it may be possible to regress 
the WTP of participants on their demographic characteristics in order to make 
some loose inferences about the validity of the experiment results. 
Failing to demonstrate the validity of the CV results would make it 
difficult to justify the accuracy that that value measures collected from the 
participants represents their true preferences. However, since the goals of this 
research are to test for differences in valuation estimates coming from 
hypothetical and binding scenarios, and from WTP and WTA elicitation 
mechanisms, validity is not a large concern. 
 
3.5.2 Participant Learning 
The experimental design failed to account for the effects that participant 
learning may have on the magnitude of the WTA-WTP gap. Several authors had 
found evidence that running a number of practice elicitation rounds before 
eliciting real value estimates from participants reduced the size of the disparity as 
respondents became more familiar with the elicitation procedure and were able to 
more accurately indicate their true preferences (Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et 
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al., 1994). While the experimental evidence on the effects of participant learning 
are still mixed (Morrison, 2000), controlling for this feature of weak experimental 
design would give more credibility to the findings of this research. 
However, an example of an elicitation question was shown to participants 
before they began the elicitation procedure (Appendix 4 and 5), and they were 
also able to move backwards through the survey to change their responses if they 
wished. While not an ideal way to facilitate participants learning, these design 
features would still have removed some of the confusion relating to the elicitation 
procedure. 
 
3.5.3 Sample Biases 
Contingent valuation researchers typically define the population they want 
to estimate WTP or WTA values for (i.e. the population that would be affected by 
a proposed policy change), and then collect a random sample of participants from 
within this population (Carson, 1989). Collecting a random representative sample 
allows the experiment‘s valuation results to be generalised to the greater 
population from which the sample was taken.  
However, in the CV exercise outlined previously, no experimental 
population was defined, and random sampling techniques were not used to collect 
respondents (see section 3.4.1 – Collecting Participants), and therefore a sample 
selection bias may be present within the participant group. For example, many of 
the participants were recruited through the Student Job Search advertisement, so 
the sample may have a high proportion of unemployed or student respondents, 
who may be less willing to pay for organic cotton, then the general Hamilton 
population. It would therefore be inappropriate to suggest that WTP of the sample 
group could be used to estimate the WTP of the Hamilton population. 
For the purposes of this research, sample selection bias is not an issue 
provided participants were divided into each of the six treatment groups (WTP_B, 
WTA_B, ect.) randomly, which they were. Consequently, any biases in the 
experimental sample would be identical in each of the treatment group, so while 
the valuation results themselves may not be generalisable, comparisons of WTP 




3.6 Summary: Methodological Design 
3.6.1 Identifying the Endowment Effect 
The two surveys used to test for the affect that endowment has on 
participant‘s valuation of a good, WTP_B and WTA_B, were identical except for 
the small changes required to set the two different levels of endowment, and to 
collect the ‗buying‘ and ‗selling‘ prices. In order to isolate the endowment effect 
explanation of the WTA-WTP gap from other theories such as weak experimental 
design, it was critical that the binding surveys were constructed in such a way to 
reduce other possible causes of bias. 
 To account for these other potential causes of the WTA-WTP disparity, 
the  experimental design utilised an incentive compatible provisional rule – so 
there is no incentive for strategic response behaviour, the decision-making tasks 
had binding monetary outcomes - so participants should make thoughtful choices, 
participant anonymity was guaranteed -  so participants are able to express their 
true preferences without the influence of social pressures, and although there were 
not practice elicitation rounds, the mechanism was clearly explained – so 
participants should be able to present their true valuations trough the bidding 
game mechanism. 
By controlling for these weak experimental design factors, any disparity 
between WTA_B and WTP_B can be attributed to the different levels of initial 
endowment experienced by the two groups: the un-endowed WTP group, and the 
endowed WTA group. 
 
3.6.2 Isolating the Unanticipated Ownership Utility Effect 
As previously noted, the process used to elicit the predicted WTP and 
WTA data was identical to the method used to elicit the binding WTP and WTA 
data, except that participants were asked to answer the valuation questions how 
they believed their binding counterpart groups would respond to them. As noted 
by Bischoff (2008), there is scarce experimental evidence to support the notion 
that predicted valuation estimates will converge with actual valuation estimates in 
a CV experiment. However, if predicted WTP is able to offer an unbiased 
estimate of actual WTP, then the suitability of the prediction methodology used in 
this experiment is establish. Then, if predicted WTA diverges from actual WTA, 
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as was found by Bischoff (2008) and Loewenstein and Adler (1995), then this is 
an indication that an unanticipated ownership utility effect is present in the 
valuation data. If no divergence between predicted and binding WTA is observed, 
then this contradicts the argument of an unanticipated ownership utility effect, and 
suggests that the WTA-WTP gap is more likely the result of people‘s aversion to 
loss (i.e. the parting disutility effect). 
 
3.6.3 Isolating a Hypothetical Bias 
Since the two hypothetical treatment groups are identical to their binding 
treatment counterparts, except for the few changes necessary to emphasize that 
they are purely hypothetical, any differences in valuation results between the two 
sets of data can be attributed directly to a hypothetical bias. Furthermore, if there 
are any unanticipated imperfections in the survey methodology, the bias in WTP 
and WTA data resulting from these flaws would be the same in both the binding 
and hypothetical treatments. Therefore, comparing the data collected from the 
WTP_B and the WTP_H groups, as well as the WTA_B and the WTA_H groups, 
will allow for a clear identification of the effects that the hypothetical nature of 
contingent valuation experiments has on participants‘ stated preferences. 
 
 
In the following section of this thesis, the findings of the experiment, 
based on the data collected using the six survey designs outlined previously, will 






Chapter 4 Findings and Discussion 
This chapter will present the valuation data collected from the six survey 
groups detailed in section 3.2.3 along with findings and discussion relating to each 
of the research objectives outlined in section 3.1 This chapter will begin by 
presenting the summary statistics derived from the 10 sets of data collected from 
the 6 treatment groups (section 4.1). This data will be tested to: 1) ensure that 
there was no significant difference between the demographic characteristics of the 
sample groups which could have introduce a sample selection bias, 2) assess the 
data‘s reliability and theoretical validity, and 3) determine whether the data sets 
follow approximate to a normal distribution curve (section 4.1). Section 4.2 will 
assess the existence and magnitude of a WTA-WTP gap using the binding 
treatment data. Next, the predicted WTP and WTA data will be used in 
conjunction with their binding equivalents to indentify whether WTA_B 
respondents experience an unanticipated ownership utility effect, and how this 
effect contributes to the WTA-WTP gap (section 4.3). Section 4.4 will compare 
the hypothetical WTP and WTA data to their binding equivalents to assess 
whether the hypothetical nature of CV experiments have a significant impact on 
the stated values of participants. Section 4.5 will then review the predicted WTP 
and predicted WTA data elicited from the hypothetical and binding groups, to 
determine how the elicitation process prior to the prediction exercise affects the 
ability of participants to provide unbiased estimates other participant‘s stated 






4.1 Assessing the Quality of the Data  
This section will firstly present the summary statistics derived from the 
WTP and WTA data sets that were collected through the CV experiment detailed 
previously (chapter 3), and some brief comments on these statistics will be made. 
Next we will assess whether any fundamental differences exist between 
the demographic characteristics of the six different treatment groups. The 
hypothesis testing conducted in later sections of this chapter relies on the 
assumption that any differences in valuation estimates are the direct result of the 
specific changes made to the CV surveys. Any difference between treatment 
groups, other than the intentional changes in the survey design, could introduce a 
variety of other participant-based biases into the results. 
Following this, the reliability of the value estimates elicited from each of 
the six treatment groups will be tested by regressing the WTP or WTA on the 
demographic characteristics of the participants in that group. This will determine 
whether variation in the WTP or WTA responses is the result of underlying 
differences in participant‘s valuation of the good, or simply random ‗noise‘ 
arising from the survey process (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 211). 
Next, the WTP data from the binding treatment group will be used to 
estimate a demand curve for organic cotton, and to calculate the welfare gain 
associated with provision of the good. This will demonstrate what a real-world 
application of the CVM may aim to calculate. However, considering this is not the 
focus of the research, welfare gains or losses will not be addressed in great detail. 
Lastly, the WTP and WTA estimates from each of the six groups will be 
tested for ‗normality‘ using the Sparipo-Wilk method. Assessing the normality of 
the data is important when it comes to deciding whether to use parametric or non-
parametric hypothesis tests to compare the different groups.  
 
4.1.1 The Data Sets: Descriptive Statistics 
As detailed in chapter 3, there were six main treatment groups involved in 
the experiment, each of which completed a slightly different variation of a CV 
survey which aimed to assess how much value participants place on the attribute 
of certified organic cotton.  
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Valuation data was elicited from two of groups of participants under the 
specification that the group‘s average stated value would determine the provision 
of the attribute (see section 3.3.1). These two binding treatment groups (WTP_B 
and WTA_B) were also asked to predict the average valuation elicited from the 
other group (i.e. WTP_B was asked to estimate the average value stated by the 
WTA_B group, and vice versa). 
Two treatment groups provided valuation data under a purely hypothetical 
CV context, identical to the binding treatment except that no monetary 
consequence to participants‘ stated values was specified (WTP_H and WTA_H). 
These groups were also asked to estimate the average valuation of the two binding 
groups. 
The final two treatment groups were not asked to state their own valuation 
for the good, but were asked only to predict the average valuation estimate elicited 
from the two binding groups (WTP_P and WTA_P). 
 
The raw WTP and WTA data sets collected from the binding and 
hypothetical treatment groups are presented in Appendix 12 and the six prediction 
data sets can be found in Appendix 13. Summary statistics derived from these data 
sets are presented below. 
 
Table 6. Hypothetical and Binding WTP/WTA - Descriptive Statistics 
 
  WTP_B WTA_B WTP_H WTA_H 
Mean ($) 4.741 12.833 5.500 10.793 
S.E. Mean 0.848 1.256 0.671 1.325 
Median ($) 4 13.5 5 8 
Std. Dev. 4.408 6.879 3.674 7.133 
n 27 30 30 29 
 
On average, participants in the un-endowed binding treatment group were 
willing to pay a maximum of $4.70 to have their non-organic cotton t-shirt 
upgraded to an identical organic cotton t-shirt (see table 6). The average minimum 
amount that the endowed binding group (WTA_B) demanded in compensation to 
exchange their organic cotton t-shirt for an identical non-organic cotton t-shirt 
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was $12.80. Since average WTP and WTA both exceeded the per-capita cost of 
the organic cotton attribute ($C = $4.20), both groups received the organic cotton 
t-shirts as specified by the provisional rule (see section 3.3.4), and the WTP 
participants were each required to pay the $4.20 before they would receive their t-
shirt. 
The median WTP and WTA for the two binding groups are $4 and $13.50 
respectively. Median measures of central tendency are sometimes used in CV 
analysis because they are less influenced by outliers in the data set, which is often 
an issue in such investigation.  
The mean WTP and WTA of the hypothetical treatment groups are $5.50 
and $10.80 respectively. From these value measures alone it appears that a 
hypothetical bias may be present in this data, with participants overstating what 
they would be willing to pay to gain organic cotton and understating how much 
they would demand to part with it in a hypothetical context. However, without the 
appropriate hypothesis tests this theory cannot yet be confirmed. 
The median WTP and WTA of the hypothetical groups are $5 and $8 
respectively, and appear to more closely converge than the equivalent median 
measures from the binding treatments ($4 and $13.50 respectively). This could 
indicate that hypothetical CV experiments produce smaller WTA-WTP gaps than 
those that include a binding provisional rule. Again, this observation cannot be 
validated or dismissed without the appropriate hypothesis tests.   
 
Table 7. Predicted WTP/WTA - Descriptive Statistics 
  WTP_P1 WTP_P2 WTP_P3 WTA_P1 WTA _P2 WTA_P3 
Mean 6.125 2.690 3.233 12.419 8.267 4.630 
S.E.  Mean 0.781 0.823 0.747 1.207 1.206 0.945 
Median 5 1 2 10 6.5 1 
Std. Dev. 4.420 4.433 4.091 6.722 6.607 4.908 
n 32 29 30 31 30 27 
 
Notes: 
WTP_P1: The WTP_P group’s prediction of WTP_B 
WTP_P2: The WTA_H group’s prediction of WTP_B 
WTP_P3: The WTA_B group’s prediction of WTP_B  
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WTA_P1: The WTA_P group’s prediction of WTA_B 
WTA_P2: The WTP_H group’s prediction of WTA_B 
WTA_P3: The WTP_B group’s prediction of WTA_B  
 
Predicted WTP and WTA values varied considerable across the different 
treatment groups (see table 7). The two main prediction groups, whose sole task 
was to estimate the average WTP and WTA of the binding groups appears to have 
produced reasonably accurate estimations, with a mean estimated-WTP of $6.13 
(WTP_P1) and a mean estimated-WTA of $12.42 (WTA_P1). These estimated 
values both seem similar to the actual average WTP and WTA of the binding 
groups. This may offer support to the idea that a group of un-endowed participants 
are able to produce unbiased estimates of the actual WTP and WTA data elicited 
from binding treatment groups.  
The prediction estimates produced by the two hypothetical groups appear 
slightly less accurate however, with a mean estimated-WTP of $2.70 (WTP_P2) 
and a mean estimated-WTA of $8.30 (WTA_P2). Similarly, the two binding 
groups also appear far less able to estimate each other‘s WTP and WTA when 
compared to the two primary prediction groups, producing a mean estimated-
WTP of $3.23 (WTP_P3) and a mean estimated-WTA of $4.63 (WTA_P3). 
 
As previously noted, although the descriptive statistics presented in tables 
6 and 7 may appear to support of oppose the various hypotheses detailed in 
section 3.2.3, statistical hypothesis testing is required before any judgements can 
be made.  
 
4.1.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Treatment Groups 
This section will look at the demographic make-up of the six treatment 
groups, comparing their sample statistics to the average sample statistics of the 
experiment group as a whole. The purpose of this analysis is to ensure that none 
of the treatment groups differ significantly in terms of their participant‘s 
characteristics, as such a difference may result in response biases between 




Table 8. Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Group 
Treatment Total WTP_P WTA_P WTP_H WTA_H WTP_B WTA_B 
Average Age 25.576 24.422 26.548 24.638 27.155 24.796 25.883 
Male (%) 0.511 0.531 0.452 0.483 0.483 0.593 0.533 
Student (%) 0.757 0.806 0.710 0.700 0.759 0.846 0.733 
aIncome 93.645 88.281 95.565 99.583 94.397 92.593 91.667 
bDependents 0.417 0.452 0.519 0.261 0.583 0.348 0.321 
cEducation 0.500 0.500 0.516 0.414 0.621 0.556 0.400 
bEthnicity 0.545 0.531 0.548 0.621 0.414 0.407 0.733 
        n 179 32 31 30 29 27 30 
a Average weekly disposable income 
b Average number of dependents 
c Percentage with a degree or higher 
d Percentage of European 
 
Table 8 presents the demographic data collected from the 179 participants 
involved in the experiment. The Total column provides the average sample 
statistics for the experiment group as a whole, while the following six columns 
separate the sample statistics by treatment group. This allows for the identification 
of any divergence between the sample statistics of the experiment group as a 
whole and each of the individual treatment groups. Any such divergence would 
indicate that the treatment groups were not all equal in terms of participant 
characteristics, which could cause issues when it comes to comparing the data 
collected from each group. 
As shown in the Total column, the average age of participants was just 
under 26, the proportion of males to females was roughly 50/50, 75% of 
participants were students, the average number of dependents per participant was 
less than 1, 50% of respondents had at least a bachelors degree, and just over 50% 
were European. 
At first glance, it appears that the sample statistics from each of the six 
treatment groups more or less converge with that of the sample averages for the 
entire experiment, shown in the Total column. For example, the average age of 
respondents in the six treatments ranges from 24.42 in the WTP_P group to 27.15 
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in the WTA_H group, which are both relatively close to the sample average of 
25.58.  
However, to provide conclusive evidence that the participant groups do 
not differ significantly from the sample average, each of the treatment group‘s 
seven sample statistics are subtracted from the corresponding statistic from the 
Total column, and the t-statistic for this difference is calculated. For example, the 
average age of respondents in the WTP_P group (24.42) is subtracted from the 
average age of respondents in the entire experiment sample (25.58). This 
difference is 1.16, and with a t-statistic of 0.687, the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the two means is zero is not rejected at the 5% level of 
significance, implying that the WTP_P does not differ significantly from the 
sample average in terms of average age. The complete table of results are 
presented Appendix 14. 
The only treatment group which differs in any significant way from the 
sample average is the WTA_B group who had 19% less European participants 
than the experiment sample as a whole. While this difference was significant at 
the 5% level, the discrepancy is not enough to imply that the data collected from 
this group will be biased, as the six other demographic characteristics are all in 
line with the sample averages. 
The seven demographic characteristics of the five other treatment groups 
were not different statistically from the sample average in any significant way 
(Appendix 14). It can therefore be concluded that all six of the treatment groups 
are identical in terms of the characteristics of their participants, and any 
differences in valuation results between the groups cannot be attributed to biases 
resulting from difference in the sample. 
 
4.1.3 Testing for Reliability and Theoretical Validity 
According to Mitchell and Carson, ―reliability refers to the extent to which 
the variance of the WTP [or WTA] amounts given by respondents in a contingent 
valuation survey is due to random sources, or ‗noise‘‖ (1989, p. 211). Reliability 
can be assessed by regressing the WTP or WTA values elicited from participant 
against the demographic characteristics of those participants to ensure that the 
variance in value estimates is not purely random. It is suggested that if a 
 113 
 
regression model, using only a few key variable, produces an R
2
 greater than 0.15, 
then the reliability of the data is confirmed. 
Regressing the binding WTP and WTA values on various combinations of 
independent variables (demographic characteristics of participants) using the 
ordinary least squares method produced the following linear models (standard 
errors in parentheses): 
 
WTP_B = 3.187 + 3.813(Ethnicity
1
)  
                                  (1.013)   (1.587) 
 
WTA_B = 19.936 – 6.554(Male2) – 6.531(Student3) +1.612(Ethnicity)  
                      (3.256)   (2.074)             (2.370)                 (2.370) 
 
Note: Standard errors of coefficients are in the parentheses 
1
Ethnicity: binary variable where 1 = European and 0 =  non-European 
2
Male: binary variable where 1 = male and 0 = female 
3
Student: binary variable where 1 = Bachelors degree or higher and 0 = 
less than a Bachelors 
 
The WTP_B model presented above produced an adjusted R
2
 of 0.155, 
which implies that variation in the independent variable (ethnicity) can account 
15.5% of the variation in the dependent variable (WTP). This is a relatively low 
R
2
, but it is still larger than the 0.15 which Mitchell and Carson suggest is 
necessary to establish reliability. 
The WTA_B model presented above produced an adjusted R
2
 value of 
0.342, implying that variation in the independent variables can account for around 
34% of the variation in the dependent WTA variable. This is well above Mitchell 
and Carson‘s 0.15 lower R2 limit, and confirms the reliability of the binding WTA 
data. 
The reliability of the binding WTP and WTA data is confirmed, with the 
adjusted R
2
 value of each regression model exceeding 0.15. This indicates that the 
independent variables included in each of the regression models are able to 
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explain enough of the variation in WTP or WTA to establish that this variation is 
not entirely due to random ‗noise‘. 
 
 
4.1.4 Calculating the Consumer Benefit of Organic Cotton 
To demonstrate what a researcher may use real-world CV data for, the 
binding WTP data for the organic cotton attribute will now be used to reveal the 
demand curve, and to calculate the level of ‗benefit‘ that provision of the organic 
cotton attribute would bring to the sample group.  
 
 
Figure 6. Demand for Organic Cotton 
 
Figure 6 shows the inverse relationship between the bid price for organic 
cotton and the number of participants in the binding treatment who were willing 
to pay that amount to gain the attribute. We can see that at a price level of $20 
none of the participants were willing to pay to gain the good. As the price level 
decreases the number of participants willing to pay to gain the good increases, as 
we would expect. The actual price of the organic cotton is shown by the line $C 
and is $4.20. This value for organic cotton was the difference in price between the 
plain non-organic cotton t-shirts and the plain organic cotton t-shirts that were to 
be given to participants in the binding WTP and WTA treatments. Using this price 
level and the demand curve of the binding WTP group, it is possible to estimate 





























The ―traditional measure of consumer benefit, proposed by Dupuit in the 
nineteenth century and championed by Marshall, is consumer surplus, which is 
defined as the area under the ordinary (Marshallian) demand curve and above the 
price line (Bateman et al., 2002, p. 23). The consumer surplus is a measure of the 
difference between what people are willing to pay to gain a good, and what they 
are required to pay for that good.  
For the WTP_B group, this consumer surplus can be calculated by 
subtracting the price of organic cotton ($4.2) from the maximum WTP of each 
participant whose WTP is greater than $4.2, and summing these results. As shown 
in Appendix 15,  the total consumer surplus for the WTP_B group is $51.40. This 
indicates that if the organic cotton attribute was provided only to those 
participants who were willing pay at least $4.20 to gain it, the total consumer 
benefit of this provision would equal just under $51.40.  
This consumer benefit measure relies on the assumption that those 
participants not willing to pay $4.20 for organic cotton do not have to do so. 
However, since the contingent valuation scenario described in section 3.2.1 
defined the organic cotton attribute as a public good, specifying that it would 
either be provided to all participants for the price $C or withheld from all 
participants, the true measure of the good‘s benefit to the group is reduced. To 
calculate the true benefit to the group or collectively purchasing the organic cotton 
attribute, the benefit measure needs to account for the ‗losses‘ experiences by 
those participants who are forced to pay an amount greater than their maximum 
WTP.  
To calculate the true consumer benefit of the organic cotton attribute, the 
cost $C ($4.20) is subtracted from the average WTP of all the respondents ($4.74) 
which gives us the average consumer surplus of $0.54. This average consumer 
surplus is then multiplied by the total number of respondents in the treatment 
group (n=27) to give the total consumer surplus measure, which equals $14.58. 
While the additional benefit that the binding WTP group would receive from 
organic cotton is lessened when taking into account those participants not willing 





The average consumer surplus for organic cotton for our sample group, 
calculated previously, would be multiplied by the total number of people affected 
by the proposed provision of the good to estimate the total benefit to society that 
the good would create. This is possible only if the sample group is randomly 
selected from the defined population, and the significance of the estimated 
average WTP allows for the estimation of population parameters. 
 
4.1.4.1 Generalising the Consumer Surplus Measure 
In a real world application of the CV method, it is likely that the 
researcher would want to extend the consumer surplus measure derived from their 
participant group to a larger population in order to make inferences about the total 
economic gain associated with a proposed change. To support this generalisation, 
the researcher would need to ensure that the participant group used to elicit WTP 
data is a random representative sample of the defined population, and is of a large 
enough size to produce a statistically significant average WTP measure.  
If these conditions are met, then the researcher would typically multiple 
the average consumer surplus calculated for their sample group by the total 
number of people in the population who would be affected, estimating the total 
consumer surplus of the proposed change. However, since the sample group used 
for the research was not randomly selected from some larger defined population, 
such inferences cannot be made using any of the WTP of WTA data collected. 
 
4.1.5 Testing Data for Normality 
In the following sections of analysis and discussion, the 10 data sets which 
were collected from the six treatment groups (Appendix 12 and 13) will be 
compared to one another to test the hypotheses outlined in section 3.2.3.These 
hypothesis tests will be carried out using the parametric technique of comparing 
sample means and analysing the associated t-statistic. However, this method of 
hypothesis testing requires that the population distribution for each data set 
follows the normal distribution curve (Stock & Watson, 2007). While it is 
generally assumed that most sample distribution will approximate to a normal 
curve if the number of observations is large enough, we will test each of our six 
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data sets using the Sharipo-Wilk test to determine whether they can in fact be 
considered ‗normal‘. 
This technique was chosen to assess the normality of the data due the 
relatively small sample sizes of each data set. The ―Shapiro-Wilk Test is more 
appropriate for small sample sizes (< 50 samples)‖, while an alternative test called 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is generally used for data sets with over 2000 
observations (Leard Statistics, 2010). 
 




W-Statistic df Sig. 
WTP_B .877 27 .004 
WTA_B .895 30 .006 
WTP_H .940 30 .088 
WTA_H .869 29 .002 
WTP_P1 .815 32 .000 
WTP_P2 .656 29 .000 
WTP_P3 .782 30 .000 
WTA_P1 .899 31 .007 
WTA _P2 .896 30 .007 
WTA_P3 .746 27 .000 
 
Note: The Shapiro-Wilk test was conducted using SPSS statistical 
software 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test conducted using SPSS 
for all 10 of the data sets collected from the 6 treatment groups. The WTP_H data 
set is the only set which follows a normal distribution curve according to the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, with a significance value greater than 0.05. All nine of the 
other data sets have a significance level of less than 0.05 which means that the 
null hypothesis that the data is normally distributed is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. 
Since a majority of the data sets do not conform to the normal distribution 
pattern, standard parametric hypothesis tests are not ideal for use with this data. 
Therefore, two non-parametric hypothesis test – Mood‘s median test and the 
Mann-Whitney U test – will be used alongside the parametric t-test when 
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comparing the data sets. Further detail regarding each of these hypothesis tests 





4.2 Identifying the WTA-WTP Gap 
The following analysis will compare the WTA and WTP data elicited from 
the two binding treatment groups (WTA_B and WTP_B) in order to answer the 
first research question detailed in section 3.2.3: Does a significant WTA-WTP 
disparity emerge in a CV experiment even when controlling for features of weak 
experimental design? 
 
4.2.1 Parametric and Non-Parametric Hypothesis Tests 
Since the normality of the two data sets cannot be confirmed (Shapiro-
Wilk test, p < 0.05) both parametric and nonparametric hypothesis tests will be 
used to analyse the data. The t-statistic for the difference between two population 
means is the first hypothesis-testing method which is used, as well as the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test and Mood‘s Median test. Each of these 
methods aims to identify whether the two individual data sets could have 
theoretically been collected from an identical population distribution or whether 
there is a significant difference between the likely population distributions of the 
two sets. The process for calculating the relevant test statistic for each of the three 
hypothesis testing methods will be detailed below using the two binding data sets 
(summarised in table 10 below). For the remainder of the analysis sections 
however, SPSS software will be used to estimate the test statistics. 
 
Table 10. Sample Statistics of the Binding WTA and WTP Groups 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 




    




    
Difference 8.092 9.5 
 




4.2.1.1 Parametric t-Test 
The first method used to test whether there is a significant difference 
between the WTP_B and WTA_B groups involves using the mean, standard 
deviation, and number of observations of each data set to estimate the population 
distribution of each set and determine whether the distributions are equal. 
The null hypothesis that we are interested in, that WTA_B = WTP_B, can 
be reinterpreted as H0: µWTA_B - µWTP_B = d0, where µWTA_B is the population mean 
of the binding WTA group, µWTP_B is the population mean of the binding WTP 
group, and d0 = is the difference between the two means (Stock & Watson, 2007, 
p. 82). Since the true population mean of each data set is unknown, the sample 
mean for each group is used as an estimator: Y-barWTA_B – Y-barWTP_B = d0. The 
statistical significance of d0 is determined by the t-statistic for the difference 
between the two means, which relies on the standard error (SE) of the estimator 
for the difference between the population means: Y-barWTA_B – Y-barWTP_B 
 
SE(Y-barm – Y-barw) =   




    
 
  
   (4) 
 
t-statistic = 
                  
                
             (5) 
 
Table 10 shows that the difference between the two sample means is equal 
to $8.10 indicating that the average WTA stated by the binding group was $8.10 
higher than the average WTP stated by the binding group.  The standard error of 
this difference can be calculated using the standard deviations and number of 
observations of each data set:  
SE(Y-barWTA_B – Y-barWTP_B) =   
      
  
 
      
  
   
S.E = 1.515 
 
t-statistic = 
        
     
 




According to the student-t distribution for 30+ degrees of freedom (Stock 
& Watson, 2007, p. 757), the t-statistic calculated above (5.340) exceeds the 1-
sided critical value of 2.75 which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the 
two data sets are equal at a 1% level of significance. Furthermore, the t-statistic is 
positive, so we can infer that the mean of WTA_B is significantly greater than the 
mean of WTP_B. 
As previously noted, this method of hypothesis testing assumes that the 
population distribution for each sample is normally distributed, which our 
previous analysis was unable to confirm. The following two hypothesis testing 
techniques make no such assumption about the population distribution. 
 
4.2.1.2 Mann-Whitney U Test 
The Mann-Whitney U test ―may be used to test whether two independent 
groups have been drawn from the same population... [and] is one of the most 
powerful of the nonparametric tests‖ (Siegel, 1956, p. 116). The null hypothesis, 
H0, is that that the two populations of WTA_B and WTP_B have the same 
distribution. The alternate hypothesis, H1, is that WTA_B is stochastically larger 
than WTP_B. The alternate hypothesis can be accepted if the probability that a 
score from WTA_B (wta_b) is larger than a score from WTP_B (wtp_b) is greater 
than one-half: p(wta_b > wtp_b) > 0.5 (Siegel, 1956, p. 116). H1 could be also be 
p(wta_b > wtp_b) < 0.5, to test if WTA_B is less than WTP_B, or p(wta_b > 
wtp_b) ≠ 0.5 for a two-tailed test. 
 The first stage in calculating the U-statistic is to pool the WTA_B and 
WTP_B data sets, and rank each data point from the lowest to the highest (e.g. 1, 
2, 3...), before separating the values back into their two original groups and 
summing the assigned ranks for each group. See Appendix 16 for this process. 
The sum of assigned ranks for the WTA group is 1137.5 (n1=30), while the sum 
of assigned ranks for the WTP group is 515.5 (n2=27). 
The U statistic is then calculated using the following formula (Siegel, 
1956, p. 120): 
 
          
        
 




          
        
 
          
 
          
Since the smallest of the sample groups (WTP_B) still has more than 20 data 
points, the significance of the U-statistic can be calculated by substituting the U 
value (137.5) into the following formula to produce a z-score (Siegel, 1956, p. 
123): 
    
  
    
 
                  
  
  (7) 
 
    
      
     
 
 
                 
  
   
 
    -4.275 
According to the normal distribution table, the z-value of -4.275 is outside 
the range of -4.0 to 4.0, which means that it has a one-tailed probability of 
occurring if H0 is true of p <0.0003 (Siegel, 1956, p. 247). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that the population distribution of WTA_B and WTP_B are equal can 
be rejected at a 1% level of significance, and we can confirm that stated WTA is 
stochastically larger than stated WTP in the two binding treatments. 
 
4.2.1.3 Mood’s Median Test 
Mood‘s median test ―is a procedure for testing whether two independent 
groups differ in central tendencies. More precisely, the median test will give 
information as to whether it is likely two independent groups... have been drawn 
from populations with the same median‖ (Siegel, 1956, p. 111). Because this 
hypothesis test is based on the median of the sample distribution rather than the 
mean, it is less influenced by samples with large outliers. The null hypothesis is 
that the WTA_B and WTA_B data sets are both drawn from populations with the 
same median, while the alternate hypothesis is that the WTA_B data is drawn 
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from a population with a median larger than that from which the WTP_B data was 
drawn (single-tailed test). 
The first step in this hypothesis test is to pool the two sets of data and 
calculate the resulting median, which for the WTA_B and WTP_B groups is equal 
to 8. Next, the number of data points in each sample group that are less than or 
equal to this combined median (8), are counted, as are the number of observations 
greater than the combined median. These results are presented in table 11 below.  
 
Table 11. Median Test: Form for Data 
  WTP_B WTA_B Total 
Scores > combined median (8) 4 (A) 22 (B) 26 
Scores ≤ than combined median (8) 23 (C) 8 (D) 31 
Total 27 30 N = 57 
 
If the two samples are from populations with the same median, then we 
would expect around half of each group‘s scores to be above the combined 
median, and half to be below the combined median. To test whether there is a 
significant difference between the allocation of scores between the four segments 
of table 11, we use the Chi-Squared test, assuming the combined sample groups 
have more than 40 observations (Siegel, 1956, p. 112). Using the formula 
presented below (8), the 2 value for the data can be calculated. 
 
    




                    
   (8) 
 
Note: A, B, C, and D correspond to each of the four elements of table 11, 
and N is the combined sample size.  
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The standard Chi Square table of critical values (Siegel, 1956, p. 249) 
shows that an 2 ≥ 10.83 with 1-degree of freedom, has the probability of 
occurring if H0 is true of p<0.0005 for a 1-tailed test. H0 is therefore rejected at a 
1% level of significance, and it can conclude that the median of the WTA_B 
population is significantly greater than the median of the WTP_B population. 
 
These three hypothesis tests (parametric t-test, the Mann-Whitney U test, 
and Mood‘s median test) will all be used to test each of the hypotheses outlined in 
section 3.23. However, for the remainder of the hypothesis tests, the statistical 
software SPSS will be used to conduct the calculations and the results will be 
summarised as shown in table 12 in the following discussion section. 
 
4.2.2 The WTA-WTP Gap: Results and Discussion 
Table 12. Comparison of WTA and WTP from the Binding Treatment 
Groups 
H0: WTA_B = WTP_B 
H1: WTA_B > WTP_B 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and WTP_B treatment groups. 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 




    




    
Difference 8.092 9.5 
 




   17.328**   






Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (1-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (1-tailed test) 
The null hypothesis that the binding data collected from the WTA_B and 
WTP_B groups could have come from identical population distributions is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance according to all three of the hypothesis 
tests provided above. This indicates that population distribution from which the 
WTA_B data was collected has a significantly greater mean and median that the 
population distribution of the WTP_B data.  
Accordingly, those participants endowed with organic cotton at the 
beginning of the experiment (WTA_B) value the attribute nearly 3 times more 
highly than those participants not endowed with the good (WTP_B). This 
WTA/WTP ratio of 2.7, is strikingly similar to that observed by Bischoff who 
calculated a ratio, under similar experimental condition, of 2.9 for a publically 
available tutorial session (2008, p. 292).  
 
4.2.2.1 Weak Experimental Design 
From the results presented above we can conclude that that a significant 
WTA-WTP gap exists within the data collected from the two binding treatment 
groups. It is also apparent that this gap is statistically significant even though 
these CV surveys both used an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism and 
provisional rule, removed potential hypothetical bias by including a binding 
monetary outcome, and ensured participant anonymity. These results indicate that 
the WTA-WTP disparity observed in our data is not likely the result of weak 
experimental design, but rather a fundamental difference in the value that each 
group places on the organic cotton attribute. 
As noted in chapter 3, the experimental design adopted for the thesis was 
based on that used by Bischoff (2008), and included the same initial allocation of 
property rights, the same binding provisional rule, an identical elicitation 
mechanism which even used the same question structure, and involved a good 
which was also defined as being a public good. It is therefore interesting that 
while actual binding valuation estimates differ considerable between this current 
research and Bischoff‘s research, the WTA/WTP ratio in both experiments are 
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nearly identical (2.7 in this current experiment and 2.9 in Bischoff‘s experiment). 
This finding is a little troubling, because if two experiments which adopt identical 
survey designs produce the same WTA/WTP ratio even though they are valuing 
different goods using different participant samples, then the observed disparity 
could theoretically be attributed to some unaccounted for flaw in the 
methodology.  
 
4.2.2.2 Mean versus Median WTA/WTP Ratios 
It may be expected that the median measure of WTA and WTP could 
result in a lower disparity since this measure of central tendency is less vulnerable 
than the sample mean to large outliers in the data which are common in CV 
experiments, especially when using a open-ended elicitation format. Horowitz and 
McConnell‘s meta analysis provided support for this theory, finding that of the 
―41 experiments that reported ratios of both means and medians... the ratio 
involving means was greater than the ratio involving medians in close to 80% of 
the experiments‖ (2002, p. 430). However, contrary to this finding, the 
WTA/WTP ratio from our data is actually greater when calculated using median 
measures (3.3) rather than mean measures (2.9). 
 
4.2.2.3 WTA/WTP Ratio and the Substitutability Theory 
The organic cotton attribute was defined in the CV experiment as being a 
public good where consumption was non-rival and no participant could be 
excluded from purchasing the good (or selling it) once the final level of provision 
was decided. A common theme in the CV literature, which was summarised by 
Horowitz and McConnell (2002), is that WTA/WTP ratios are typically much 
higher for public goods than they are for ordinary private goods. The average ratio 
for a public good in Horowitz and McConnell‘s study was 10.41, considerably 
larger than the average ratio for an ordinary private good, 2.92 (2002, p. 433). 
This theme is typically explained in the literature as resulting from the 
substitutability effect (see section 2.7) which suggests that a good which has 
easily accessible substitutes will have lower WTA/WTP ratio than a good which 
has fewer available substitutes, due to differences in the diminishing marginal rate 
of substitution between these types of goods. Accordingly, the effects of 
unanticipated ownership utility and parting disutility on the WTA-WTP gap 
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should be different for public and private goods. This idea is one of the reasons 
why Bischoff‘s experiment (2008) and this current experiment both defined the 
good to be valued as a public good, to assess the contribution of unanticipated 
ownership utility and parting disutility to the WTA-WTP gap of a the less-
substitutable good.  
However, the results from this experiment, as well as Bischoff‘s 
experiment, appears to suggest that participants may actually have viewed the 
good being valued as an ordinary private good rather than a public good. This 
judgement is made since the WTA/WTP ratio in both Bischoff‘s experiment and 
this current experiment (2.9 and 2.7 respectively) appear to resemble the typical 
ratio for an ordinary private good (2.92) rather the ratio for a public good (10.41), 
as specified by Horowitz and McConnell (2002). Therefore, assessing the relative 
contributions of unanticipated ownership utility and parting disutility to the 
endowment effect for a public good, is not possible. 
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4.3 Unanticipated Ownership Utility and Parting Disutility 
This analysis is related to the research question: Are individuals who are 
not endowed with a good able to anticipate the magnitude of the endowment effect 
experienced by participants who are endowed with the good? 
 
This section follows the framework constructed by Loewenstein and Adler 
(1995) and revised by Bischoff (2008), which aims to isolate the two main effects 
that these authors identify as contributing to the endowment effect: unanticipated 
ownership utility and parting disutility (loss aversion). As previously noted, the 
technique used to separate these two effects involves collecting actual WTA and 
WTP values as well as predicted WTA and WTP values, and then comparing the 
sample distributions of the actual and predicted WTA data to assess whether the 
two data sets are significantly different.  
If predicted WTA is equal to actual WTA, this indicates that the un-
endowed prediction group is able to fully anticipate the ownership utility gained 
from possessing the good, and therefore the endowment effect (i.e. the difference 
between actual WTA and WTP) is entirely due to parting disutility and other 
conventional factors. Conversely, if predicted WTA was to is equal actual WTP, 
this would suggest that participants in the prediction group were unable to 
anticipate any of the ownership utility that they would gain from possessing the 
good. The main assumption underlying this analysis is that the predicted WTP is 
able to provide an unbiased estimate of actual WTP. To test this assumption, the 
WTP_B and WTP_P1 data sets are compared, and the difference between 
distribution statistics are tested in table 13 below. 
 
4.3.1  Testing Predicted WTP for Bias 
Table 13. Comparison of WTP Binding and WTP Prediction Treatment 
Groups 
H0: WTP_B = WTP_P1 
H1: WTP_B ≠ WTP_P1 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 




Value Measure Mean Median n 








    
Difference -1.384 -1 
 




   0.022   
 




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
 
The null hypothesis that the binding WTP data and the predicted WTP 
data could have been drawn from the same population distribution cannot be 
rejected by at 5% level of significance according to the three test results provided 
in table 13. The two-tailed parametric t-statistic (t = -1.2), suggests that while 
average predicted-WTP ($6.13) was slightly greater than the actual average WTP, 
this difference is not large enough to be considered statistically significant at a 5% 
level (p > 0.05). The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U statistic (U = 343) also 
confirms that H0 cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. 
Furthermore, Mood‘s median test produces an 2 value of 0.187 which fails to be 
statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level of confidence. We can 
conclude from these three hypothesis tests, that the true population distributions of 
predicted and actual WTP do not differ significantly in either mean or median 
value measures.  
This indicates that the predicted WTP data and the actual WTP data are 
not statistically different, providing strong support for the core assumption 
underlying the following analysis – that participants are able to provide an 




4.3.2 Testing Predicted WTA for Bias 
Table 14. Comparison of WTA Binding and WTA Prediction Treatment 
Groups 
H0: WTA_B = WTA_P1 
H1: WTA_B ≠ WTA_P1 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and WTA_P1 treatment groups. 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 








    Difference 0.414 3.5 
 
    at 0.238     
bU 442.500 
  c2   0.146   
 




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
 
The null hypothesis that the binding WTA data and the predicted WTA 
data could be drawn from an identical population distribution cannot be rejected 
by at 5% level of significance according to any of the three test statistics provided 
in table 14. The two-tailed parametric t-statistic (t = 0.238), the Mann-Whitney U 
statistic (U = 442.5), and Mood‘s Chi Square statistic (2 = 0.407) are all 
considered statistically insignificant at the 5% level. This means that the 
distribution of the WTA_P1 and WTA_B data sets are not considered 
significantly different, suggesting that the participants in the un-endowed 
prediction group were able to fully anticipate the endowment effect that was 
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experienced by those participants who were endowed with the organic cotton 
attribute (WTA_B). 
This finding is contrary to what Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and 
Bischoff (2008) found in their respective experiments. These authors both 
determined that estimated WTA was significantly lower that actual WTA, 
attributing this disparity to the unanticipated ownership utility effect by 
suggesting that the participants in the estimation group were unable to anticipate 
the full utility gained by those participants in the actual WTA group. These 
authors then used a simple mathematical equation to determine the proportion ( ) 
of the WTA-WTP gap (in the actual elicitation groups) that could be attributed to 
the unanticipated ownership effect.  
Although the finding of this current research do not suggest that any 
unanticipated ownership utility effect is present in the binding WTA group (since 
WTA_B = WTA_P1), we will now calculate the beta value for this effect, just as 
Bischoff (2008) had done so. 
 
4.3.3 Calculating the Effect of Unanticipated Ownership Utility 
To calculate the proportion of the WTA-WTP gap that can be attributed to 
unanticipated ownership utility, signified by β, the following formula is used: 
 
   
           
         
   (1) 
 
Table 15. Mean WTA and WTP from the Binding and Prediction 
Groups 
Group N Mean  S.E of Mean 
WTA_B 30 12.833 1.256 
WTP_B 27 4.741 0.848 
WTA_P1 31 12.419 1.207 






Substituting the values presented in table 15, into the formula (1), we 
calculate a β value of 0.051. 
   
               
              
 
 
         
 
This β of 0.051 suggests that the unanticipated ownership utility effect 
only accounts for around 5% of the total WTP-WTA disparity, leaving other 
conventional factors, such as the parting disutility effect, to account for the 
remaining 95%. This β is substantially lower than that observed by Loewenstein 
and Adler who calculated a β value 0.94 (1995, p. 935), and also much lower than 
that calculated by Bischoff, β = 0.24 (2008, p. 293).  
 
4.3.4 Discussion 
The reason for the insignificant level of unanticipated ownership utility 
observed in this current research is unclear. It could be argued that the significant 
biases in predicted WTA observed by the two previous research experiments 
(Loewenstein and Adler, 1995; Bischoff, 2008) was due to factors such as 
differences in the demographic characteristics of the treatment groups, rather than 
the unanticipated ownership utility. This may indicate that the unanticipated 
ownership utility effect does not actually exist, and that the past findings related to 
this theory are inaccurate. 
On the other hand, it is possible that this current research did not allow the 
ownership utility effect to develop fully in the binding WTA group. Considering 
that these participants (WTA_B) had not actually been given their organic cotton 
t-shirt at the time they stated their WTA, it is possible that they did not actually 
feel they ‗owned‘ the good. If participants had physical possession of the t-shirt, 
like the respondents in Loewenstein and Adler (1995) held possession of their 
mugs, then the unanticipated ownership utility effect may have been more 
significant for organic cotton, resulting in an even larger WTA-WTP gap.  
A third explanation for why the β value in this current experiment is 
insignificant compared to that observed in previous studies, is that the organic 
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cotton attribute may simply not provide individuals with any unanticipated 
ownership utility. Since this attribute is intangible, both the WTP and WTA 
groups are essentially endowed with the same good (a t-shit), so the fact that the 
WTA group‘s t-shirts were made from organic cotton may not have significantly 
increased the utility felt by these participants. This would suggest that the WTA-
WTP gap observed in this experiment is most likely caused by the parting 




4.4 Hypothetical Bias and the WTA-WTP Gap 
The section of analysis will compare the WTA and WTP data elicited from 
the two binding treatment groups (WTA_B and WTP_B) to the corresponding 
data sets obtained from the hypothetical treatment groups (WTA_H and WTP_H) 
to answer the following two research questions:  
a) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce significantly different 
valuation results to those obtained from an identical experiment but where 
participants’ decisions have a binding monetary consequence? 
b) Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce a significantly 
different WTA-WTP gap than an identical experiment with a binding monetary 
consequence? 
 
4.4.1 Identifying a Hypothetical Bias 
Table 16. Comparison of WTA Binding and WTA Hypothetical 
Treatment Groups 
H0: WTA_B = WTA_H 
H1: WTA_B ≠ WTA_H 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and WTA_H treatment groups. 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 








    
Difference 2.04 5.5   






c2   0.857   




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 




From the three hypothesis tests presented in table 16 (above), it is apparent 
that the data collected from the hypothetical WTA group does not differ in any 
significant way from the data collected from binding WTA data. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance (5%).  
Although the binding group‘s average WTA of $12.83 is slightly greater 
than the hypothetical group‘s average WTA, $10.79, according to the parametric 
t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test, this difference of $2.04 is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the low 2 value for Mood‘s median test 
indicates that the two data sets could have been collected from two populations 
with identical medians, so the binding and hypothetical data cannot be considered 
different in this regard either. 
We can therefore conclude that introducing a binding monetary 
provisional rule, which connects participant‘s decisions to a real monetary 
payment, does not significantly affect how participants responded to the WTA 
survey in our experiment. 
 
Table 17. Comparison of WTP Binding and WTP Hypothetical 
Treatment Groups 
H0: WTP_B = WTP_H 
H1: WTP_B ≠ WTP_H 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTP_B and WTP_H treatment groups. 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 
 
   




    




Difference -0.759 -1   









c2   0.569   




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
 
The hypothesis tests presented in table 17 indicate that the null hypothesis 
- that the hypothetical and binding WTP data sets collected from our sample 
groups are equal - cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. While 
average hypothetical WTP ($5.50) is slightly larger than the average binding WTP 
($4.74), all three of the parametric and nonparametric hypothesis tests that were 
use conducted confirm that this difference is insignificant. 
We can therefore conclude that, just as in the WTA comparison (table 16 
introducing a binding monetary provisional rule does not significantly affect how 
participants responded to the WTP questions presented in our organic cotton CV 
survey. 
 
4.4.2 Hypothetical Bias and the WTA-WTP Gap 
Table 18. Comparison of WTA Hypothetical and WTP Hypothetical 
Treatment Groups 
H0: WTA_H = WTP_H 
H1: WTA_H > WTP_H 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_H and WTP_H treatment groups. 
 
Value Measure Mean Median n 








    
Difference 5.293 3   








c2   4.886* 
 




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (1-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (1-tailed test) 
 
The results presented in table 18 (above) indicate that the hypothetical 
WTA data is significantly larger than the hypothetical WTP data, both in terms of 
mean and median measures. The null hypothesis that these two data sets could 
have been drawn from identical population distributions is rejected at the 1% level 
of significance by the t-test (t = 3.565) and Mann-Whitney U test (U = 246.5), and 
is rejected at the 5% level of significance by Mood‘s median test (2 = 4.886). It 
can therefore be confirmed that a statistically significant WTA-WTP disparity 
exists within the hypothetical CV data. 
The value of the WTA-WTP gap, in terms of sample averages, observed in 
the hypothetical data is $5.29 which is slightly less than the gap observed in the 
binding data: $8.10. Furthermore, the WTA/WTP ratio is slightly smaller in the 
hypothetical groups than the binding groups (1.96 compared to 2.7 respectively). 
However, since no hypothetical bias was observed in our organic cotton CV 
experiment, either in terms of a WTP or WTA, then it can be suggested that 
purely hypothetical CV experiments may not produce significantly different 
WTA-WTP gaps than experiments involving real monetary transactions. 
However, this finding may be a unique feature of this CV design, and further 





4.5 Prediction Bias across Treatments 
This section of analysis aims to compare the actual WTP and WTA values 
from the binding treatment groups to the predicted WTP and WTA values elicited 
from all six of the different treatment groups. This analysis aims to assess how the 
prior experience with the CV scenario, which was experienced by the hypothetical 
and binding treatment groups, impacts on the ability of these participants to 
produce unbiased valuation estimates.  
To review the process through which the six different prediction data sets 
were collected see section 3.3.3. Essentially the different prediction data sets can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1) WTP_P1 – participants are only asked to predict WTP_B‘s average 
response (i.e. WTP_P treatment) 
2) WTP_P2 – Hypothetical WTP data is elicited from participants before 
they are asked to predict WTP_B‘s average response (i.e. WTA_H 
treatment) 
3) WTP_P3 – Binding WTP data is elicited from participants before they 
are asked to predict WTP_B‘s average response (i.e. WTA_B 
treatment) 
 
The process for the three WTA prediction groups is the same as above but 
P2 and P3 groups were collected from WTP_H and WTP_H, respectively. 
 
In all of the hypotheses tests presented so far in this analysis section, 
significance levels to reject the null hypothesis have been limited to 5% and 1%. 
This was because included lesser levels of significance, such as a 10% rejection 
region, would not have changed the results of any of the hypothesis tests (i.e. p-
values for each test was either very low or very high). However, the hypothesis 
tests outlined in this section include a 10% rejection measure, as well at the 
typical 5% and 1% levels. This is because some of the null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level, but they can be rejected at the 10% level, so including 




4.5.1 WTP Prediction Comparisons 
Table 18. Comparison of WTP Binding and the Three WTP Prediction 
Groups 
H0: WTP_B = WTP_P1/P2/P3 
H1: WTP_B ≠ WTP_P1/P2/P3 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTP_B and WTP_P1/P2/P3 treatment groups. 
 
  WTP_P1 WTP_P2 WTP_P3 
Actual Mean (WTP_B) 4.741 4.741 4.741 
Predicted Mean 6.125 2.69 3.233 
Actual Median 4 4 4 
Predicted Median 5 1 2 
    
Difference in Means -1.384 2.051 1.508 
Difference in Medians -1 3 2 
    
t-statistic -1.200 1.735 ' 1.334 
U 343.000 240* 296.5’ 
2 0.022 3.473 ‘ 0.398 




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
‗H0 rejected at a 10% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
 
From table 18 we can see that, as examined in section 4.3.1, the first 
prediction group (WTP_P1) whose only task was to estimate the average WTP 
stated by the binding group, is able to provide an unbiased estimate of actual 
WTP. None of the three hypothesis tests were able to reject the null at any 
meaningful level of significance. 
However, for the WTP_P2 data set, elicited from the WTA_H treatment 
group, the null is rejected at the 10% level of significance by both the t-test (t = 
1.735) and Mood‘s median test (2 = 3.473), and is rejected at the 5% level by the 
Mann-Whitney U test (U = 240). This indicates that the predicted WTP stated by 
 140 
 
the hypothetical WTA group ($2.69) cannot be considered an unbiased estimate 
for actual WTP ($4.74). 
The third set of predicted WTP data (WTP_P3), collected from the 
WTA_B group, cannot be considered an unbiased estimate for actual WTP. The 
null hypothesis that WTP_B is equal to WTP_P3 is rejected at a 10% level of 
significance by the Mann-Whitney U test (U = 295.5), though the other two 
hypothesis tests are unable to reject the null. Regardless of the insignificant t-
statistic and 2 value, the null hypothesis is still rejected by the nonparametric U 
test, confirming that the two data distributions are significantly different from one 
another. 
From the comparison of prediction estimate presented above, it appears 
that participants are able to provide an unbiased estimate of the average WTP of 
the binding treatment group as long as that they are not first asked to state their 
own WTA valuation for organic cotton (in either the hypothetical or binding 
treatment). Some aspect present in both the hypothetical and binding WTA 
elicitation process appears to introduce a significant bias into the predicted WTP 
stated by these participants.  
The WTP prediction bias appears to be downwards in direction, with the 
WTP_P2 and WTP_P3 groups both providing an average estimate lower than the 
actual WTP mean. However, the direction of bias is not confirmed by this 
analysis. 
 
4.5.2 WTA Prediction Comparison 
Table 19. Comparison of WTA Binding and the Three WTA Prediction 
Groups 
H0: WTA_B = WTA_P1/P2/P3 
H1: WTA_B ≠ WTA_P1/P2/P3 
Null: there is no significant difference between the value estimates 
collected from the WTA_B and WTA_P1/P2/P3 treatment groups. 
 
  WTA_P1 WTA_P2 WTA_P3 
Actual Mean (WTA_B) 12.833 12.833 12.833 
Predicted Mean 12.419 8.267 4.63 
 141 
 
Actual Median 13.5 13.5 13.5 
Predicted Median 10 6.5 1 
    
Difference in Means 0.414 4.566 8.203 
Difference in Medians 3.5 7 12.5 
    
t-statistic 0.238 2.623‘ 5.221** 
U 442.5 281.5’ 114** 
2 0.146 2.469 12.879** 




Mann-Whitney U test 
c
Mood's median test (2 corrected for continuity) 
‗H0 rejected at a 10% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
*H0 rejected at a 5% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
**H0 rejected at 1% level of significance (2-tailed test) 
 
Similar to the previous WTP prediction comparison, table 19 shows that 
participants are able to produce an unbiased estimate for actual WTA under the 
condition that they are not first asked to state their own valuation for organic 
cotton. The null hypothesis that binding WTA is equal to predicted WTA is not 
rejected for the WTA_P1 group, but is rejected at the 10% level for the WTA_P2 
group (t-stat = 2.623‘ and U-stat = 281.5‘),  and at the 1% level for WTA_P3 (t-
stat = 5.221**, U-stat = 114**, and 2 = 12.879**). 
This finding is consistent with that of the analysis in section 4.3.2, and 
suggests that eliciting WTP valuation data from participants, whether through a 
hypothetical or binding CV survey, prior to the prediction exercise introduces a 





4.6 Results Summary 
Section 4.1 of the previous analysis chapter confirmed that the six 
treatment groups from which the experimental data was collected do not differ 
significantly in terms of the demographic characteristics of respondents. 
Therefore, any differences in the valuation data collected from these groups can 
be directly attributed to the intentional crafted differences in each group‘s survey 
design.  
It was calculated that the mean WTP and WTA of the binding treatment 
groups were $4.74 (S.E = 0.848) and $12.83 (S.E = 1.256) respectively. The 
reliability of the binding WTP and WTA responses was confirmed by regressing 
several explanatory variables derived from participants‘ demographic 
characteristics on each set of valuation data. This regression analysis confirmed 
that variation in binding WTP and WTA responses was not entirely due to random 
‗noise‘ but could be, in part, explained by variation in the characteristics of the 
participants. 
The binding WTP data was used to construct a demand curve for organic 
cotton, calculating that the total consumer surplus that the group would gain if the 
organic cotton attribute was provided to them all at the price of $4.20, would be 
$14.58. This consumer surplus would increase $51.40 if only those participants 
who were willing to pay more than $4.20 had to purchase the organic cotton 
attribute. 
Lastly, the Sharipo-Wilk test determined that all of the data sets collected 
from the six experimental groups, with the exception of the WTA_H data, could 
not be considered to follow a normal distribution at the 5% level of significance. 
It was decided to included nonparametric hypothesis tests, as well as the standard 
parametric t-test, in the data analysis process 
 
Section 4.2 outlines the process of testing for a statistically significant 
difference between the distribution of two independent sets of data using the 
parametric t-test, the Mann-Whitney U test, and Mood‘s median test. These three 
hypothesis tests all confirmed that our binding WTA data set was significantly 
larger than the WTP data set at a 1% level of significance. This confirmed that a 
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significant WTA-WTP gap, with an absolute value of around $8 and a ratio of 
2.7:1, was observed in the binding experimental groups even though these 
treatments controlled for elements of weak experimental design which are 
commonly used to explain such a disparity. This analysis confirmed that a 
significant WTA-WTP disparity does emerge in a CV experiment even when 
controlling for features of weak experimental design.  
It was also noted that the ratio of binding WTA/WTP (2.7), while similar 
to the ratio identified in Bischoff‘s (2008) experiment (2.9), appears to more 
closely resemble the typical ratio for a ordinary private good (2.92) rather than a 
public good (10.41). It was therefore concluded that participants may have viewed 
the organic cotton attribute as a private good rather than as a public good, even 
though the provision of the attribute was designed to make it resemble a public 
good. 
 
Section 4.3 compared the actual WTP and WTA values elicited from the 
binding groups to the estimated WTP and WTA collected from the two primary 
prediction groups, to identify the impact that the unanticipated ownership utility 
effect had on the WTA-WTP gap. The null hypothesis that the average predicted 
WTP ($6.13) and actual average WTP ($4.42) were equal was unable to be 
rejected at any meaningful level of significance, and predicted WTP was therefore 
confirmed as an unbiased estimator for actual WTP.  
It was then determined that predicted WTA (mean = $12.42) and actual 
WTA (mean $12.83) were also not significantly different in terms of their value 
distributions. This implied that predicted WTA was an unbiased estimator for 
actual WTA, a finding which opposed Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and 
Bischoff (2008) who both determined that their prediction groups were unable to 
provide an unbiased estimate for actual WTA. These two authors explained this 
bias in WTA predictions as resulting from an unanticipated ownership utility 
effect which is experienced by the actual WTA group but not the predicted WTA 
group. However, the results of this current experiment suggest that the 
unanticipated ownership utility does is not present in the binding WTA valuation 
data and is unlikely to have contributed to the WTA-WTP gap.  
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It is therefore concluded that the significant WTA-WTP gap observed in 
our experiment is the result of parting disutility and other conventional factors, 
rather than an unanticipated ownership utility effect. 
 
Section 4.4 compared the WTA and WTP data elicited through the two 
binding treatments to the WTA and WTP data elicited through the hypothetical 
treatments to assess whether a significant hypothetical bias is present, and 
whether this bias has any significant impact on the size of the WTA-WTP gap. It 
is shown that hypothetical WTA did not differ in any statistically significant way 
from binding WTA. This finding was also true for the two WTP data sets. It was 
therefore concluded that the hypothetical nature of a CV experiment is not likely 
to produce statistically different WTA and WTP results compared to those 
obtained from a binding experiment with real monetary outcomes.  
Furthermore, while the two hypothetical value measures did produce a 
substantial WTA-WTP gap, this gap was not significantly different from the gap 
observed in the binding treatments. This finding was based on the fact that neither 
hypothetical WTA nor WTP differed from their binding equivalents. 
 
Section 4.5 provides an analysis of the six different prediction data sets 
that were collected, comparing each set‘s distribution to that of the data it was 
attempting to estimate (i.e. WTP_B or WTA_B). It was concluded that the main 
prediction groups for both WTP and WTA (WTP_P1 and WTA_P1) were able to 
provide unbiased estimates of actual WTP and WTA. However, the remaining 
four prediction data sets, collected from the hypothetical and binding elicitation 
groups after they each completed their main valuation experiments, was found to 
provide significantly biased estimates of actual WTP and WTA. 
The null hypothesis that the WTP_P2 and WTP_P3 data sets were 
identical to the WTP_B data set was rejected at the 5% level for the P2 group and 
at the 10% level for the P3 group. Furthermore, the null that the WTA_P2 and 
WTA_P3 data sets were identically distributed to the WTA_B data set was also 
rejected, at the 10% level for the P2 group and at the 1% level for the P3 group. 
It was concluded from these findings that participants in our experiment 
were able to provide unbiased estimates of binding WTP and WTA, provided they 
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were not asked to state their own valuation of the good prior to the prediction 
exercise. If the participants were asked to state their WTP or WTA in either the 
hypothetical or binding treatment, before being asked to predict the actual 
valuation data, their ability to provide an unbiased estimate is eliminated.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This aim of this thesis was to construct and conduct a simple CV 
experiment which was designed specifically to test for difference in valuation 
estimates that arise due to particular aspects of the survey‘s design. As noted in 
the introductory remarks, the main features of experimental design that this thesis 
was investigating were: 1) the initial allocation of property rights for the good 
being valued and the phrasing of the elicitation questions, 2) the hypothetical 
nature of a contingent valuation scenario. Within these two areas of investigation 
four main research questions were posed, each of which will now be concluded 
with reference to the findings of the organic cotton CV experiment outlined in 
chapter 3. 
 
5.1 The Endowment Effect 
 Does a significant WTA-WTP disparity emerge in a CV experiment even 
when controlling for features of weak experimental design? 
Based on the results of our experiment, we can conclude that a significant 
WTA-WTP disparity does emerge in a CV experiment, even when features of 
weak experimental design are controlled for. A statistically significant WTA-
WTP gap is observed for organic cotton, with participants in the two binding CV 
treatments stating an average WTA to give up the attribute of $12.83 and an 
average WTP to gain the attribute of $4.75. Since the binding CV surveys were 
both specifically designed to eliminate other potential sources of the WTA-WTP 
gap that were identified in the literature, such as weak experimental design, the 
results of this thesis indicate that the disparity is most likely due to an endowment 
effect experienced by those participants given initial property rights to the good. 
This endowment effect suggests that participants who are endowed with a good 
(WTA) place a greater real value on that good than participants who are not 
endowed with the good (WTP), and the WTA-WTP gap is caused by this 
difference in real, rather than flaws in the survey methodology. 
The implications of this finding is that when designing a CV experiment, 
the initial setting of property rights and the way in which the elicitation questions 
are phrased will have a significant impact on the value estimates produced. 
Therefore, researchers need to think carefully when designing their CV 
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experiment, to assess whether the population effected by the proposed change 
being investigated currently hold property rights for the good, or do not hold 
property rights for the good.  
 
Are individuals who are not endowed with a good able to anticipate the 
magnitude of the endowment effect experienced by participants who are endowed 
with the good? 
Our results confirm that individuals who are not endowed with a good 
(predicted WTA) are able to fully anticipate the magnitude of the endowment 
effect experienced by participants who are endowed with the good (binding 
WTA), provided that this un-endowed group are not asked to state their own 
valuation for the good prior to the prediction process. This conclusion is derived 
from the findings detailed in section 4.3 and section 4.5, which showed that 
predicted WTA is considered an unbiased estimator for actual WTA, and that 
predicted WTP also matches actual WTP. 
This conclusion also provides evidence that the endowment effect is most 
likely caused by parting disutility rather than unanticipated ownership utility. 
Furthermore, this finding provides strong evidence to suggest that participants are 
able to provide an unbiased estimate for the preferences of others‘, adding to the 
relatively small amount of literature on this topic. 
 
5.2 Hypothetical Bias 
Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce significantly different 
valuation results to those obtained from an identical experiment where 
participants’ decisions have a binding monetary consequence? 
This thesis provides compelling evidence against the idea that the 
hypothetical nature of a CV experiment has a significant influence on valuation 
results. As shown in section 4.4, the value estimates obtained through the binding 
and hypothetical treatment groups do not differ in any significant way. This 
means that participants in a hypothetical CV experiment should respond to 
elicitation questions in a similar way to how they would respond if the experiment 
involved real monetary transactions. Therefore, criticism of the CVM based 
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around the notion that the hypothetical nature of this valuation technique makes it 
invalid, appears to be unfounded. 
 
Does a purely hypothetical CV experiment produce a significantly 
different WTA-WTP gap than an identical experiment with a binding monetary 
consequence? 
Lastly, the results of this experiment fail to show that the hypothetical 
nature of a CV study has any impact on the magnitude of the WTA-WTP gap. 
This means that while a significant disparity between these two measures of value 
is observed in hypothetical CV experiments, the gap cannot be attributed in any 
way to the fact that participant‘s decision do not have binding monetary 
consequences. This conclusion provides additional support for the endowment 
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Appendix 10: Introductory Dialogue 
Hello and welcome. Thank you all for coming.  
My name is Francis Powley, and this is Professor Ric Scarpa, and we will be coordinating this 
experiment session today.  
Before we begin, it is important that you have all read through and understood the Participant 
Information Sheet that should be on the screen in front of you. 
Has everyone read through that? 
..... 
Once you have read through the Information Sheet, and if you are happy with the conditions it 
lays out, tick the ‘Agree Box’ and enter the ID Number from your participant card, labelled 
resp_id. 
This participant number will be the only thing connecting you to the answers you provide. This 
insures total anonymity. 
Please read all of the information in the experiment, paying particular attention to the 
instructions you are given, and think about your answer carefully before making a selection. If 
you think you have made a mistake you can always go back and correct your answer. Once you 
have completed the first set of choice tasks a link will appear which will lead you on to the 
second part of the experiment. 
Once you reach the second part you will need to enter you Participant ID number again, and also 
your treatment code, labelled tr_wid. 
Again, please read all of the information you are given thoroughly and think about each question 
before you answer. Once you complete the second half of the experiment you will be given your 
final instructions and you will be able to collect your $25. 
All further instructions regarding your choice tasks are included in the online questionnaires. If 
you have any technical issues or questions regarding the tasks please raise your hand and either 
myself or Ric will come over to help.  
Remember, we are interested in your personal preference towards each of the options you are 










Appendix 12: Binding and Hypothetical WTP and WTA – 
Raw Data 
WTP_B WTA_B WTP_H WTA_H 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 2 
0 1 0 3 
1 6 0 4 
1 7 2 5 
1 7 3 5 
2 8 4 5 
2 10 4 6 
2 10 4 6 
3 10 4 6 
3 10 5 7 
3 10 5 8 
4 10 5 8 
5 12 5 8 
5 15 5 10 
5 15 6 10 
5 15 6 10 
6 15 6 11 
6 16 6 15 
7 18 6 16 
8 20 8 20 
8 20 8 20 
10 21 8 21 
10 21 10 21 
12 21 10 21 
19 21 10 21 
  21 10 21 
  21 10 21 
  21 15   
n = 27 n = 30 n = 30 n = 29 
 
Notes: 
WTP_B = WTP data collected from the binding treatment group 
WTA_B = WTA data collected from the binding treatment group 
WTP_H = WTP data collected from the hypothetical treatment group 
WTA_H = WTA data collected from the hypothetical treatment group  
 169 
 
Appendix 13: Predicted WTP and WTA – Raw Data 
WTP_P
 
WTP_P2 WTP_P3 WTA_P1 WTA _P2 WTA_P3 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
2 0 0 1 1 1 
2 0 0 3 1 1 
3 0 0 4 1 1 
3 0 0 5 1 1 
3 0 0 5 1 1 
3 0 0 7 1 1 
3 0 0 7 1 1 
4 0 0 8 3 1 
4 0 0 9 3 1 
4 0 0 10 5 1 
4 0 0 10 5 1 
4 0 1 10 6 1 
4 0 1 10 6 1 
5 1 1 10 6 3 
5 2 3 10 7 5 
5 2 3 11 9 5 
5 2 3 12 10 5 
5 2 4 15 10 6 
5 3 4 15 10 7 
5 3 4 16 10 9 
5 3 5 20 11 10 
5 3 5 20 13 10 
7 4 5 20 15 10 
8 5 5 20 15 10 
10 8 6 21 16 10 
10 9 8 21 18 21 
10 11 10 21 20   
13 20 14 21 21   
15   15 21 21   
15     21     
20           
n = 32 n = 29 n = 30 n = 31 n = 30 n = 27 
 
Notes: 
WTP_P1: The WTP_P group’s prediction of WTP_B 
WTP_P2: The WTA_H group’s prediction of WTP_B 
WTP_P3: The WTA_B group’s prediction of WTP_B  
WTA_P1: The WTA_P group’s prediction of WTA_B 
WTA_P2: The WTP_H group’s prediction of WTA_B 




Appendix 14: Difference between the Treatment Groups’ 













Treatment WTP_P WTA_P WTP_H WTA_H WTP_B WTA_B 
Average Age 1.154 -0.973 0.938 -1.579 0.780 -0.307 
t-stat 0.687 -0.722 0.694 -0.891 0.436 -0.146 
Male (%) -0.020 0.060 0.028 0.028 -0.081 -0.022 
t-stat -0.220 0.646 0.302 0.297 -0.832 -0.235 
Student (%) -0.049 0.047 0.057 -0.002 -0.089 0.024 
t-stat -0.686 0.565 0.663 -0.019 -1.240 0.285 
Incomea 5.364 -1.919 -5.938 -0.751 1.053 1.979 
t-stat 0.142 -0.046 -0.148 -0.018 0.026 0.048 
Dependentsb -0.035 -0.102 0.156 -0.167 0.069 0.095 
t-stat -0.266 -0.594 1.207 -1.058 0.538 0.623 
Educationc 0.000 -0.016 0.086 -0.121 -0.056 0.100 
t-stat 0.000 -0.174 0.928 -1.296 -0.562 1.083 
Ethnicityd 0.014 -0.003 -0.076 0.131 0.138 -0.188 
t-stat 0.150 -0.037 -0.827 1.388 1.407 -2.256 
       n 32 31 30 29 27 30 
 
 
a Average weekly disposable income 
b Average number of dependents 
c Percentage with a degree or higher 
d Percentage of European 
 
Further notes: 
1) Differences were calculated by subtracting the sample mean for each of the 
treatment groups from the sample mean for the experiment as a whole. For 
example, Mean Age in group WTP_P was 24.42 while the Mean Age for the 
experiment as a whole was 25.58. The difference is therefore 25.576-24.422 = 
1.154. 
 
2) t-statistics were calculated by dividing the difference between the two means by 
the standard error of the difference. The standard error of the difference was 
calculated using the formula                




   
 
  
    (Stock & Watson, 
2007, p. 84). 
 
3)  A t-statistic less than -1.96 or greater than 1.96 indicates that the null hypothesis 




Appendix 15: Standard Consumer Surplus Measure 
WTP_B Price Consumer Surplus 
$5.00 $4.20 $0.80 
$5.00 $4.20 $0.80 
$5.00 $4.20 $0.80 
$5.00 $4.20 $0.80 
$6.00 $4.20 $1.80 
$6.00 $4.20 $1.80 
$7.00 $4.20 $2.80 
$8.00 $4.20 $3.80 
$8.00 $4.20 $3.80 
$10.00 $4.20 $5.80 
$10.00 $4.20 $5.80 
$12.00 $4.20 $7.80 
$19.00 $4.20 $14.80 
   Total consumer 
surplusa =  
$51.40 
 
aTotal consumer surplus equals the sum difference between what participants are 
willing to pay for organic cotton (WTP_B) and what they are required to pay (Price), 




Appendix 16: Mann-Whitney U Test – Ranking  
WTA_B Rank WTP_B Rank 
1 8 0 2.5 
1 8 0 2.5 
1 8 0 2.5 
1 8 0 2.5 
6 24 1 8 
7 27 1 8 
7 27 1 8 
8 30 2 13 
10 35.5 2 13 
10 35.5 2 13 
10 35.5 3 16 
10 35.5 3 16 
10 35.5 3 16 
10 35.5 4 18 
12 40.5 5 20.5 
15 43.5 5 20.5 
15 43.5 5 20.5 
15 43.5 5 20.5 
15 43.5 6 24 
16 46 6 24 
18 47 7 27 
20 49.5 8 30 
20 49.5 8 30 
21 54 10 35.5 
21 54 10 35.5 
21 54 12 40.5 
21 54 19 48 
21 54     
21 54     
21 54     
        
R1 1137.5 R2 515.5 
n1 30 n1 27 
  
Note: R1 is the sum of the ranks for WTA_B data and R2 is the sum of the ranks for the WTP_B 
data. If two or more WTA or WTP values are equal, then their ranks are summed and divided 
across each tied value. 
 
 
 
